# Daily Report

# East Europe

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15 December 1993

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*FBIS-EEU-93-239* *15 December 1993*

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## Macedonian PDP Chiefs Brief Selami on Changes

*AU1512084893 Tirana ATA in English 0926 GMT 14 Dec 93*

[Text] Tirana, December 14 (ATA)—The chairman of the DPA [Democratic Party of Albania], Mr. Eduard Selami, received on December 13 in Tirana the delegation of the provisional presidency of the Party of Democratic Prosperity [PDP] of the Albanians of Macedonia, led by Mendu Thaci and Alirıza Lloga.

The guests told Mr. Selami of the recent political developments in the PDP. Shuffles in the party leadership, they said, were a result of the demands from all its members and of the Albanians living in Macedonia, as problems which are exclusively theirs. The name they are calling us, radicals, is created by the ill-willing anti-Albanian circles and their collaborators, who after their shameful tricks were definitely discredited, are now trying to throw mud at genuine democratic forces. We shall continue to contribute to the peace and stability in Macedonia and at the same time will demand the realisation of the just demands of the Albanians living in their territories in Macedonia.

Mr. Selami thanked the guests for the visit and pointed out that the Albanian Democratic Party has followed with interests the developments in the PDP, as the largest party of the Albanians in Macedonia. The Assembly of Gostivar, Mr. Selami said, is an historical events for the PDP and for all Albanians in Macedonia. It marks a turning point in the observation of the democratic functioning of your party. It is also a victory of the democratic forces in this party against corrupted and sold-out persons as well as against those involved in terrorist acts. It is an important event in the possible correct solution of the just demands of the Albanians according to Helsinki Act and the stability of the state of Macedonia.

The two sides stressed the need of coordination of Albanian political parties wherever they are and had almost similar opinions for the developments and the crisis in the Balkan region.

Also attending the meeting were the secretary general of the DPA, Tritan Shehu; the vice chairman, Tomorr Dosti; and the member of the Presidency, Dylber Vrioni.

### Meet With Prime Minister

*AU1512074393 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 14 Dec 93*

[Text] This morning Prime Minister Aleksander Meksi received the delegation of the provisional presidency of the Party of Democratic Prosperity [PDP] of the Albanians in Macedonia, led by Mendu Thaci and Alirıza Lloga.

Meksi expressed his conviction that the changes in the party leadership that took place at the Gostivar assembly will elevate the work of this party to a higher level, so as to become a party that contributes to peace and stability in Macedonia and strives to fulfill the just demands of the Albanians in Macedonia. Mr. Meksi stressed that the Albanians in Macedonia are a state-forming and historically peace-loving people.

During the talks, they stressed that the PDP's new leadership will continue to insist on defending the rights of Albanians who live in their own territories in Macedonia by basing themselves on international standards of human rights and also by respecting the rights of other peoples in Macedonia.

## Berisha Praises CSCE Report on Minorities

*AU1412212093 Tirana ATA in English 1120 GMT 14 Dec 93*

["'Albania Will Observe the Copenhagen Charter on the Rights of Minorities'—from the Meeting of President Berisha With Mr. Max van der Stoel"—ATA headline]

[Text] Tirana, December 14 (ATA)—On December 13, President Berisha received the CSCE high commissioner for national minorities, Maks van der Stoel, who is on a visit to Albania. Mr. Berisha thanked Mr. Stoel for his commitment to easing ethnic friction in the region. The president praised Mr. Stoel's objective reports on the situation of the Greek minority in Albania and of the Albanians in Macedonia, which have contributed to the establishment of better interethnic relations.

President Berisha and Mr. Stoel talked over different aspects of the rights of ethnic minorities in Albania after the transition to democracy. President Berisha pointed out that after the visit to Albania of Greek Foreign Minister Mr. Papoulias, a good climate has been created in the relations between the two countries. Mr. Berisha told Mr. Stoel that the government has opened an office to deal with the problems of minorities. A commission has also been created for problems of education for the Greek minority in accordance with the Copenhagen Charter, and a new Greek language department has been opened at University of Gjirokaster. "We shall observe the Copenhagen Charter to the letter, and this policy will be reflected in the law on education which will soon be presented to the parliament."

Mr. Stoel expressed his pleasure for the better climate in the relationship between Albania and Greece, which is reflected in the interethnic relations as well.

On December 13, the CSCE high commissioner also had separate meetings with the Albanian Foreign Minister Alfred Serreqi and the Minister of Education Xhezair Teliti.

### Court Chairman Determined To Fight Corruption

*AU1412204093 Tirana ATA in English 1112 GMT 12 Dec 93*

["'There Are Corrupted Persons and Not Corrupted Institutions'—Mr. Zef Brozi, Chairman of the Court of Appeals Says"—ATA headline]

[Text] Tirana, December 12 (ATA)—In an interview with RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE, the chairman of the Court of Appeals, Zef Brozi, said that "there are not corrupted institutions but corrupted persons." There are corrupted judges as well as honest ones and a lot of others who work with devotion, despite their not so good economic and social conditions. Most of them are challenging corruption, Mr. Brozi said. He asked that the terms "corruption, speculation, and gossip" should not be instrumentalized. Mr. Brozi declared that he will not hesitate to bring to court anyone who offends juridical institutions.

"In case there are facts, proofs and documents which testify to the corruption of any of the judges, I do not hesitate to make them subject to penal persecution," Mr. Brozi said.

Regarding the corruption of the juridical institutions in connection with the former socialist premier, Fatos Nano, arrested under the charge of abuse of office and falsification of official documents, Mr. Brozi said that allusion should be aimed at those who have prevented the investigation about the truth about Fatos Nano and others. They are at the same time collaborators in corruption.

Concerning the untimely conditional release of prisoners, Mr. Brozi pointed out that it will be based on the Penal Code and the latest changes made to it by the People's Assembly.

### Former Premier Accused of 'Ordinary Crime'

*AU1412204393 Tirana ATA in English 0916 GMT 12 Dec 93*

[Text] Tirana, December 12 (ATA)—RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE of December 11 publishes some documents in connection with the guiltiness of the former premier, Fatos Nano, in the Arsidi question. The documents are dated March 27 and March 30, 1991. They prove that former Premier Fatos Nano and former minister of foreign trade, Shane Korbeci, had brought Mr. Nicola Arsidi to Albania and had charged him to negotiate the Albanian foreign debt. One of the documents is signed by Mr. Nano and proves that he has decided that Arsidi should be an adviser at the Albanian Ministry of Foreign Trade and asks explanations on how he will be paid and which are juridical obligations.

Another document signed by former minister of trade asks explanations about Arsidi, his assets, reputation, the problems that may arouse from issuing such a document, the level of guarantee for the promises of Nicola Arsidi, etc. The document asks that the instructions of "Comrade Fatos" should be observed on this question.

"Fatos Nano is accused of an ordinary crime, which has not to do with his political convictions and activity," RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE writes referring to these documents and in response to continuous efforts of the opposition to name the former premier Nano a "political prisoner."

### Kalakula's Parliamentary Position Examined

*AU1412164693 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 8 Dec 93 pp 1,2*

[Beqir Skreli article: "Will Kalakula Form His Own Party?"]

[Text] As expected, Kalakula formally announced his resignation from the Democratic Party [PD] and its parliamentary group in front of the People's Assembly yesterday morning, declaring himself to be an independent deputy. He did this through a joint Kalakula-Baleta statement.

According to the statement, this step was motivated by the following main reasons:

—The work of the PD has disappointed these gentlemen in their aspirations for the struggle against communism and for the establishment of freedom and democracy in Albania.

—The government has not properly struggled against the Red speculators and against corruption, but has even in some cases covered up corruption.

—Arbitrary stands have been adopted in the restoration of land to its legitimate proprietors.

—Unfair and arbitrary criteria have been applied to privatization.

—The nonfunctioning of the rule of law.

—The unjustified rise in unemployment, and their dissatisfaction over the government's policy in the national question.

—According to their statement, the grant of land into the ownership of citizens of foreign ethnicity and the admission of foreign prelates to leading church positions has had serious consequences.

—Disagreement with the statements of the PD leadership calling the PD a party of the rightist center, when it is in fact a party of the leftist center.

In the statement he read, Kalakula said that the criticisms they had repeatedly leveled against the PD leadership were not well received. According to him, this leadership is contriving a behind-the-scenes alliance with left-wing forces against the PD's right wing. At first, Kalakula said, the leadership replied to the warnings of our standpoints with silence, while it has recently hurled

itself into an unprincipled assault, using antidemocratic political intrigue. He mentioned here the failure to respect the statute and the rule book, and the exclusion of certain persons from leadership positions. The radio and television have also become involved in the service of their patrons in this dishonest war, with montages of applause and disinformation for the viewers. According to Kalakula, RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE has also maintained this attitude. He called this "a Tropoje newspaper, abandoned by professional journalists. [quotation marks as published]

Kalakula called the current PD leadership neocommunist.

In reply to the Kalakula-Baleta statement, Arbnori gave the floor to Ali Spahia. In a standard issue speech for such occasions, he essentially stressed the following:

—Kalakula-Baleta are trying to seize the banner of the struggle against communism, but the PD will not give it up.

—He expressed appreciation for the role of Kalakula-Baleta in defense of the PD program in the 22 March [1992] election campaign.

—Their disagreements are not with the party presidium or the PD parliamentary group but with the program.

—According to Spahia, Kalakula has been impelled to make his decision by careerism. It is this careerism, he stressed, that made Kalakula accept the post of agriculture minister and to undertake the enforcement of the Land Law that he now opposes.

—Kalakula has preferred to abandon the PD program and the interests of Albania for the sake of his family's two hectares of property.

—He called the step of Kalakula-Baleta a matter for their consciences.

—Spahia called the PD program the best program expressing the interests of the entire Albanian nation.

—In conclusion, he said that the PD dissociated itself from right-wing extremism, calls for fascism, and left-wing extremism.

As was evident from his reply, Spahia behaved with moderation and care, trying to confine the problem to the two individuals concerned. This is because he and his superiors are frightened of the supporters who applauded Kalakula in the parliament when he made his famous statement about being proud to be called a fascist, as well as the stormy applause for Kalakula at the Tirana party conference. In other words, Spahia and his friends are saying: It is all right that Kalakula has gone, but we must protect at all costs and not touch or offend the other Kalakulas who make up the majority of the PD.

Kalakula has now left the PD. Will he form a new party according to the unforgettable and immortal instructions of Chairman Eduard Selami?

## Article Views Unemployment, 'Wretched Economy'

*AU1412181293 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 10 Dec 93 pp 1,4*

[Dede Kola article: "'An Organized Ceremony' and a Wretched Economy"]

[Text] The Second National Assembly of the Democratic Party [PD] ended to the indifference of most of the population, who remain exposed to the economic crisis the country is painfully experiencing and the toil and disappointment of the happy days of the "boom" which the political party that today holds an absolute monopoly of the country's legislative and executive power was to bring to the Albanian economy. The phrase "an organized ceremony," applied to this assembly by a former PD official, enables one to interpret not only the political differences within this party but also the efforts of the television to cover with a white veil the economic chaos in which we now find ourselves. It is difficult for a state without an economy to confront the groundswell of dissatisfaction arising from below. It is difficult today to find a single branch of the Albanian economy operating with total effectiveness. The abandonment of the economy is one of the minefields that the Albanian Government must sweep; otherwise it will find itself continually faced with unexpected crossroads and dilemmas. The propaganda that claims that the Albanian economy is growing at a rate of 8 percent this year and that Albania has the highest economic growth in Europe in 1993 consists of mere slogans that can convince only the shortsighted, and using them does no good to the development of democracy. I do not believe there is a single person in this country who would not wish our economy to be worthily represented and in operation, but the chaos and stagnation convince one of the opposite.

A strong economy presupposes a strong state and vice versa. However, there are no convincing signs of either at the moment. The economy means production, but also consumption. This is just as true as another fact that a country that has no production, but only consumption, has no economy. It is an unfortunate fact that Albania does not produce, but only consumes.

What is consumed is what people need in order to subsist. This consumption is the fruit of people's individual efforts to survive, of their initiative, and of the considerable help Albanian emigrants give to their relatives. It is not a result of the economic policy being followed at present in this country.

The foreign currency that emigrants alone have brought into Albania is calculated to amount to about $800 million. The financial resources of the state and its lifeblood are the revenues paid into the budget from the

sale of the emergency aid sent by foreign countries, almost entirely food, and the collection of taxes levied on the private traders that keep the market afloat. These taxes are doubtless indirectly paid by consumers through higher prices, not to mention the taxes for garbage collection and on household furnishings that individuals pay directly. The collapse of branches of the economy and the lack of any prospects for their revival has made it necessary, according to the government program recently submitted to parliament by the prime minister, to impose taxes on rural agricultural producers, starting from January 1994.

If anybody is unconvinced of the collapse, crisis, and paralysis of the economy, we leave them free to judge solely on the basis of the unemployment figures, which they can obtain not from us but from the Statistics Institute in Tirana. Throughout 1993, the number of unemployed has hovered around 400,000, a scandalous figure corresponding to about 45 percent of the able-bodied population. The skills and energies of these 400,000 people are therefore paralyzed, and 175,000 of these people, or almost one half of them, are aged between 35 and 55. This "national guard" was maintained on welfare last summer, and this "generosity" is now drying up completely. Job creation has failed; so-called organized emigration has failed; foreign investments, by which we mean investments with a noticeable influence on the economy, have failed. This has stifled the economy of the state and the economic life of individuals with it.

It is not the government's alms, but its efforts to cope with its tasks that keep people alive. "During 1993 (the quotation refers to the period up to June, but nothing has improved since; on the contrary, the situation has deteriorated) 107,000 people have received unemployment benefits of 500 leks each, or a total of 53,500,000 leks. As is evident, this allowance is enough to buy two kg of meat, 2.5 kg of cheese, or 10 loaves of bread. The number of people receiving unemployment benefits is rising as a result of the end of welfare payments and their inability to find work." This is not our conclusion but a quotation taken from a symposium of Albanian and foreign economic experts held in Tirana one month ago.

In reply, the state can quote the number of millionaires, or say that that there have never before been so many bananas on the market, or that you can find Pepsi and Coca-Cola on every street corner without waiting in line, or that there has never been so much chewing gum or Dove chocolate on sale. All these things are true. However, the state must also realize that alongside these facts thousands of people are living on the extreme verge of destitution. The state must not only claim credit for the one or more individuals who, by dint of their own talents and the government's incompetence, have become millionaires, but must also examine the nationwide incomes of the population, not only in total, but according to social strata. There is a deep contradiction between the 10-fold price rises and the doubling or trebling of wages.

**[Box, p. 4]**

**Unemployment Threatens the Albanians**

| | First Quarter | Second Quarter | Third Quarter |
|---|---|---|---|
| On welfare | 357,000 | 330,000 | 193,000 |
| In search of work | 91,000 | 107,000 | 207,000 |
| Total | 448,000 | 437,000 | 400,000 |

These are the Albanian unemployment figures for the first nine months of this year, according to the records of the Statistics Institute. All these people are considered unemployed, and we do not believe Mr. Shehi, minister of labor and social welfare, when he considers those on welfare as employed. Nor, on the basis of the above evidence, do we understand the minister's statement a few days ago that there are 270,000 unemployed in Albania. In fact, all the aforementioned people are unemployed, and the reduction of the number on welfare and the rise in those looking for work has merely meant the transfer of these people from one category to another.

If the minister of labor and social welfare, as a member of the cabinet, is concerned to publicize his work and the government's, let him issue "real" and not "notional" figures. The television would also do well to tell us where these people have been employed.

We do not understand the statement made by Mr. V. Xheka, chairman of the Independent Trade Unions [BSPSh], at his news conference the day before yesterday [8 December], at which he admitted that "We as a trade union do not keep regular records of unemployment," and also stated that "unemployment was 270,000 but is now 130,000." According to him, the government was the source for this figure, and, again according to him, "the trade union does not prejudge government sources." We do not believe that there is total agreement over this problem between the BSPSh leadership and the government, but the sad fact remains that unemployment is threatening Albania. This is not simply a reality on paper and in words, but a reality of our thronged street corners.

## Officials React to Russian Election Results

### Zhelev Congratulates Yeltsin

*AU1412175393 Sofia BTA in English 1501 GMT 14 Dec 93*

[Text] Sofia, December 14 (BTA)—President Zhelyu Zhelev today sent a telegram to Russian President Boris Yeltsin, offering hearty congratulations on the adoption of the new Constitution. It paves the way for the further building of a modern state based on the rule of law and a market economy, of a modern, democratic Russia, the telegram says.

"I wish you and the Russian people success in your efforts to carry out radical democratic reforms and win Russia its rightful place in the international community," Dr. Zhelev says.

### Party Officials Comment

*AU1512073193 Sofia BTA in English 2118 GMT 14 Dec 93*

[Text] Sofia, December 14 (BTA)—Stefan Savov of the Union of the Democratic Forces (SDS): "The trend evident in the preliminary results of the general elections in Russia is not the most favourable. Two extremist wings—the nationalist and the communist—are gaining ground, which is no case good for Bulgaria."

Speaking at a news conference today, SDS leader Filip Dimitrov said the preliminary results cause certain concern but the SDS would not commit itself to a stand before the final results are known.

Nora Ananieva of the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP): "Disappointment with the present government and nostalgia for the former Soviet Union as a world power led to these returns and pushed Zhirinovskiy to the fore. Everything will depend on the line-up of forces in parliament." It is early for the BSP to take an official stand, the BSP told a news conference today.

Yunal Lyutfi of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS): "Given the preliminary results, we can see a curious line-up taking shape in the Russian parliament. Unfortunately, Zhirinovskiy's party is likely to win a substantial percentage of the seats. Yet I hope the results will be somewhat different. If things do not change, we'll have to wait and see how parliament works and then draw conclusions. Actually, Zhirinovskiy's coming out on the political stage works in favour of Yeltsin, as the wiser part of the Russian people and the world public see in the nationalist features of a politician which are outmoded. So far Yeltsin is winning, as he managed to push through his draft constitution. A comparison between Yeltsin and Zhirinovskiy tips the scales in favour of the former."

Chavdar Kyuranov of the BSP: "Certainly, we first have to wait for the final results, but if the early returns are indicative, I don't think it will be a good day for world democracy. A nation is free to elect its own MP's but at the same time every thinking person is free to judge. I think that what we have in Russia is a nationalist choice. This was largely predictable. The nationalist danger was greater in Russia than in any other former socialist country. Obviously, a lot of people there would like to revive that one-time world power, the Soviet Union. The question is, how this would be done: on the basis of democracy, through the free will of breakaway Soviet republics, through dictatorship, or through a revival of the old imperial aspirations of Tsarist Russia. I am afraid the present situation is closest to the third scenario."

Asparukh Panov, MP of the SDS: "I am deeply disappointed with the preliminary results of the elections in Russia. I think that the alignment taking shape is the worst possible for the Russian parliament. It is both a warning for us and a reason for pride, given the development of the democratic process in Bulgaria. I cannot but mention that since its earliest days of existence the SDS endorsed European values and a civil society and has always denounced nationalism. Despite growing nationalist trends in this country, I am sure that a party like Zhirinovskiy's will never win as much votes here. The situation in Russia provides another reason to consider as soon as possible the SDS-sponsored draft decision on Bulgaria's joining NATO and state clearly that we see our future security only within a NATO framework."

Gospodin Atanasov of the New Union for Democracy (NSD): "The results of the elections are a troublesome victory for nationalism in Russia. This may lead to a U-turn in the democratic process in Europe and the world and we cannot but worry. The only silver lining is the approval of the Constitution, but it, too, passed by a slim margin. There is a rift between the parliament and the president emerging and it will not help the reforms."

Ruslan Semerdzhiev, independent: "I have always thought democracy would be difficult to implement in Russia and the fact that extremist forces are winning proves it. I am seriously concerned about Russia's future policy, as it always reflects on this country. Developments similar to those in Russia seem to be taking place here. I'd compare Zhirinovskiy with George Ganchev and this signals that similar things may happen here."

## Croatian Foreign Minister Arrives on Visit

### Granic's Arrival Comments Noted

*AU1412184793 Sofia BTA in English 1648 GMT 14 Dec 93*

[Report by Evgeniya Drumeva]

[Excerpts] Sofia, December 14 (BTA)—Croatia's Foreign Minister Mate Granic arrived on an official visit here this afternoon. Tomorrow he will hold talks with Bulgaria's Foreign Minister Stanislav Daskalov and will be received by President Zhelyu Zhelev, National Assembly Chairman Aleksandur Yordanov, and Prime

Minister Lyuben Berov. "We will discuss the situation in southeastern Europe," Mr. Granic said on his arrival.

"We will also discuss the development of bilateral relations. We have signed certain agreements and are preparing others, including a cultural cooperation agreement and a consular agreement," Mr. Daskalov said. He stressed the legal framework of bilateral relations should be strengthened and trade and economic contacts promoted. [passage omitted]

Croatia sent a protest note to the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry a month ago in connection with a visit to Sofia by a Serb parliamentary delegation.

### Cooperation Accords Signed

*AU1512111493 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1000 GMT 15 Dec 93*

[Text] On 15 December, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, official talks took place between Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic, and his Bulgarian counterpart, Stanislav Daskalov, our reporter Maya Boneva reports.

[Begin Boneva recording] In addition to the situation in the Balkans, the two ministers discussed bilateral relations. A cooperation treaty was signed. A future cultural cooperation agreement between Bulgaria and Croatia was discussed. The judicial foundation of developing relations between the two countries was established by the consular agreement, which was signed a short while ago. A great hope for developing relations between Bulgarians and Croats is vested in the trade-economic relations. The relevant appropriate document has been worked out. [end recording]

### Serbs in Croatia Discussed

*LD1512115193 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 15 Dec 93*

[Text] Mate Granic, Republic of Croatian foreign minister and deputy prime minister, and Bulgarian Foreign Minister Stanislav Daskalov signed a protocol on cooperation between the Foreign Ministeries of the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bulgaria in Sofia this morning.

Talking openly to his Bulgarian counterpart, Minister Granic explained Croatia's attitude toward the integration of UN Protected Areas [UNPA] into Croatia's legal and political system. Croatia is willing to give the Serbs in Croatia autonomy and local self-government, Granic stressed, adding that the problem does not rest with their minority rights but with the creation of a greater Serbia. Bulgaria's attitude to this issue, presented in the talks between the two ministers, is very similar to Croatia's, Granic said. As for relations with Serbia, Minister Granic pointed out that mutual recognition is a precondition for the normalization of relations and that Croatia demands that the question of sanctions against Serbia be linked not only to a solution to the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina but also to the situation in Croatia.

### Daskalov Comments on Talks

*AU1512134293 Sofia BTA in English 1321 GMT 15 Dec 93*

[Text] Sofia, December 15 (BTA)—Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic, who started an official visit to Bulgaria yesterday afternoon, and Bulgarian Foreign Minister Stanislav Daskalov signed a protocol on cooperation between the Bulgarian and Croatian Foreign Ministries today.

The signing of the protocol followed one-hour talks between the two ministers.

"We share a lot of interests in the development of the bilateral relations and regional cooperation, as well as in our integration into the European economic and political structures," Foreign Minister Daskalov said after the talks. "We discussed the relations between our two countries and intend to further promote them through signing a number of agreements, and we concluded the negotiations on a bilateral treaty on friendship and cooperation, which will be endorsed sometime soon." Mr. Daskalov said, commenting on his talks with Croatian Foreign Minister Granic.

The sides agreed to sign other documents, including a cultural accord, and to start negotiations on agreements such as on double taxation avoidance, on investment protection and transport.

The promotion of the economic contacts between the two countries will be particularly important, according to the Bulgarian foreign minister. The talks devoted special attention to the situation in the region and the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the two foreign ministers said.

## Estonian Foreign Minister Makes Official Visit

### Cited on Zhirinovskiy's Success

*AU1412075793 Sofia BTA in English 1928 GMT 13 Dec 93*

[Text] Sofia, December 13 (BTA)—Bulgarian Minister of Foreign Affairs Stanislav Daskalov and Estonian Minister of Foreign Affairs Trivimi Velliste, who arrived on a three-day official visit here this afternoon, signed a protocol on consultations between the foreign ministries of the two countries.

This is the first visit by Estonia's foreign minister to Bulgaria. Bulgaria and Estonia re-established their diplomatic relations signing a special protocol to this effect in September 1991.

The foreign ministers talked for about one hour and a half concentrating on the promotion of bilateral relations. Attention was paid on the two countries' efforts for integration with Europe. The sides considered the situation in Europe, Russia and the regional problems of

the Balkans and the Baltics. "We discussed all major issues," Estonian Foreign Minister Velliste said after the meeting.

"We agreed to phase in a new stage in our cooperation building up our relations in the field of economy, technology and culture step by step under the new conditions," Bulgarian Foreign Minister Daskalov told reporters. At his meeting with his Estonian counterpart Minister Daskalov learnt that there were twenty students studying Bulgarian at the University of Estonia, he believes that Bulgaria can render the university assistance in this respect.

The sides exchanged draft agreements on investment and economic cooperation. It was agreed that a Bulgarian business delegation would visit Tallin. It is the sides' shared opinion that the volume of bilateral trade is abnormally small, while there are very good prospects for its expansion, Mr. Daskalov said. "Estonians remember very well how tasty Bulgarian wine is," Mr. Velliste added. He said that at this evening's talks the sides discussed what should be done to make it possible for Estonians to drink Bulgarian wine again. Minister Trivimi Velliste is optimistic about the promotion of Bulgarian-Estonian relations in trade and tourism. He believes that in a few years' time Estonians will be able to spend their holidays in the Bulgarian Black Sea resorts.

Both foreign ministers declined any comment on the Russian election results. Mr. Daskalov said that the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs would come up with an official stand on the matter. The Estonian foreign minister also refused any definitive assessment. Commenting on the relative success achieved by Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, Mr. Velliste said that this was "an especially dangerous phenomenon which is alarming to some extent." The Estonian foreign minister expressed his hope that the democratic forces would take the upper hand both in parliament and in Russia.

Tomorrow Mr. Trivimi Velliste will be received by President Zhelyu Zhelev, National Assembly Chairman Aleksandur Yordanov and Prime Minister Lyuben Berov.

### Meets With Zhelev, Berov, Yordanov

*AU1412182493 Sofia BTA in English 1733 GMT 14 Dec 93*

[Report by Iva Toncheva]

[Text] Sofia, December 14 (BTA)—The prospects for bilateral relations, the problems of the Balkans and the Baltics and the elections in Russia were high on the agenda of the talks between Estonian Foreign Minister Trivimi Velliste, who came on an official visit here yesterday, and Bulgaria's President Zhelyu Zhelev, Prime Minister Lyuben Berov and National Assembly Chairman Aleksandur Yordanov.

An Estonian foreign minister visits Bulgaria for the first time since Bulgaria recognized Estonia's independence in August 1991 and the countries established diplomatic relations in September that year. Trivimi Velliste is the first representative of an Estonian Government who is officially visiting Sofia.

During his meetings, Velliste pointed out there are good prospects for Bulgarian-Estonian relations, especially in the economic field. He also stressed this in a statement for the press.

A large part of the Zhelev-Velliste discussion was devoted to bilateral relations. The Bulgarian president invited his Estonian counterpart to visit Bulgaria, the Bulgarian President's foreign policy adviser said. The sides mentioned that the meeting may also take place in Estonia. The presidents are expected to sign a bilateral treaty on friendship and cooperation. For nearly forty-five minutes, Zhelev and Velliste exchanged views on developments in Europe and in Russia. Velliste told the press the early returns of the Russian elections aroused concern but he hoped the reforms would not be reversed.

"We saw the preliminary results of the elections in Russia as manifesting a trend adverse to the promotion of democratic processes," said National Assembly Chairman Aleksandur Yordanov after his talks with Foreign Minister Velliste. He said the sides held identical views of national security. According to him, both Estonia and Bulgaria see their security within the framework of active contacts with European structures, NATO and the Western European Union and in pressing ahead with procedures for their joining NATO. Yordanov expects that the countries will strengthen parliamentary cooperation in the near future.

The talks of Prime Minister Lyuben Berov with the Estonian foreign minister focused on economic topics. The two discussed ways to ease transport connections between the two countries and the promotion of cooperation in tourism. Velliste suggested that the sides consider the signing of an accord on tourism. "I think Bulgaria will be attractive to Estonian tourists," the Estonian foreign minister said.

Addressing the press, Velliste expressed certainty that trade between Bulgaria and Estonia could expand, especially Bulgarian wine, fruit and other farm produce exports.

## Visiting Czech Industry Minister Holds Talks

### Received by Berov

*AU1412204593 Sofia BTA in English 1757 GMT 14 Dec 93*

[Excerpt] Sofia, December 14 (BTA)—[passage omitted] Later today, Czech Minister of Industry and Trade Vladimir Dlouhy was received by Prime Minister Lyuben Berov. The two exchanged information on the progress of privatization in the two countries. According to Mr. Dlouhy, Bulgaria and the Czech Republic should restore their good economic and business relations of the

past by encouraging companies and businessmen to develop closer contacts such as in machine engineering, agriculture, trade and tourism.

### Rules Out Bilateral Free Trade Zone

*AU1512092993 Prague CTK in English 2108 GMT 14 Dec 93*

[Text] Sofia, Dec 14 (CTK)—Czech Industry and Trade Minister Vladimir Dlouhy met Bulgarian representatives today to discuss mainly the restoration of the two countries' commercial contacts, Dlouhy's spokesman Lubos Beniak told CTK.

In Sofia Dlouhy met with Bulgarian Premier Lyuben Berov, Deputy Premier and Trade Minister Valentin Karabashev, Industry Minister Rumen Bikov, and Finance Minister Stoyan Aleksandrov to discuss trade which has sharply declined since the break-up of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON).

In the first ten months of 1993 Czech exports to Bulgaria were worth $40 million, while imports amounted to $10 million. At the end of the 1980's, Czechoslovakia was Bulgaria's third most important trade partner. Today the Czech Republic does not place even among the first twenty of Bulgaria's importers, beaten, among others, by Albania. The two sides agreed that such a decline in trade impaired both of them.

Bulgaria asked the Czech Republic for support in its striving for membership of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), as it is the last former COMECON country not to be a GATT member yet.

Dlouhy praised Bulgaria's effort at integration into international economic structures. He said that the Czech Republic could not offer Bulgaria any unilateral customs advantages with regard to other GATT members. The two countries' economic systems are not compatible enough to enable responsible discussion on a common free-trade zone. Nevertheless, it is obvious that their trade does not correspond to the two countries' possibilities, Dlouhy stated.

Bulgarian debts to the former Czechoslovakia increased to over 300 million transferable rubles (some $60 million) in the COMECON period. One third of the amount has already been paid off. Bulgarian representatives stressed that in the foreseeable future, they were ready to pay off the remaining part as well.

In Sofia Dlouhy and Berov opened a two-day workshop on Czech experiences from the privatization process and economic transformation. In Bulgaria, the Czech Republic is often considered a model example of successful solution to these problems.

### Arab Envoys Protest 'Free Bulgaria' Threats

*AU1512083493 Sofia BTA in English 1949 GMT 14 Dec 93*

[Excerpts] Sofia, December 14 (BTA)—The ambassadors of ten Arab countries today presented a protest note to Foreign Minister Stanislav Daskalov against "the danger to Arab citizens" recently created in Bulgaria. [passage omitted]

This reaction was provoked by a police check in a Sofia residential district early last week when foreign nationals put up resistance, killing one and severely wounding two police officers, who still are in hospital. The perpetrators, suspected of drug trafficking, escaped. According to a preliminary report of Sofia's Directorate of the Interior, they were Arabs. On the next day the Sofia Directorate of the Interior said the men wanted by the police were Iranians. Later on two Iranian nationals resisted arrest and were shot dead. The Directorate of the Interior did not give details on the incidents, saying publicity would impede the search for the drug traffickers and the investigation.

The dailies ran extensive reports on the police operations, as well as eyewitness accounts. There was speculation in the papers about corruption in the police. The dailies also highlighted the recent sharp rise in drug pushing, especially in Bulgarian schools. At the same time, scathing headlines in the dailies accused Arabs of drug trafficking. There followed an outcry in the press about xenophobia in Bulgarian society. Petko Angelov, secretary at the Interior Ministry, was quoted as saying there was no xenophobic attitude towards Arabs in Bulgaria.

Two months ago the murder of a taxi driver by a Syrian in Sofia sparked off protests by taxi drivers, which lasted several days. In a special declaration the ambassadors of the Arab countries to Sofia condemned crime in general and said the case should be handled by Bulgarian justice.

Foreign Minister Stanislav Daskalov promised to organize a meeting between the ten diplomats and Interior Minister Viktor Mikhaylov. Ambassador Isma'il Muhammad Abu-Shamala [name as received] of Palestine told the press after today's meeting. The Arab countries insist on security guarantees for their nationals in Bulgaria, he said, adding it had been proved there was not a single Arab among the criminals. The ambassador denied speculation that the Arab countries were going to retaliate and stressed they would continue developing friendly relations with Bulgaria. Mr. Daskalov pointed out the Bulgarian media are independent and said the Foreign Ministry was ready to help clear up the matter in hand. He confirmed the principled position of the Bulgarian Government on the friendly nature and active development of relations between Bulgaria and the Arab countries.

An Arab source said more details would be given and a news conference called on what the ambassadors see as an anti-Arab campaign. It emerged that in the last few

days the embassies of the Arab countries and several Arab firms received letters threatening that all Arabs would be killed unless they left this country by the year's end. The letter was signed by an unknown organization styling itself as "Free Bulgaria." [passage omitted]

### Interior Ministry Issues Statement

*AU1412204293 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 14 Dec 93*

[Text] Today the ambassadors of 10 Arab countries—Iraq, Libya, Lebanon, Syria, Morocco, Algeria, Yemen, Kuwait, Egypt, and Palestine—met with Bulgarian Foreign Minister Stanislav Daskalov. They delivered a protest note concerning the dangerous situation for Arab citizens that has developed following the recent operations by the Interior Ministry and what they called the tendentious campaign mounted by the Bulgarian mass media.

In connection with the inquiries received from certain mass media as to whether embassies of Arab countries and Arab companies had received a threatening letter from an organization calling itself Free Bulgaria which threatens retribution against citizens of Arab origin, the Interior Ministry Press Center issues the following announcement:

The Interior Ministry organs have information concerning the sending of a threatening letter, and they will take all the measures prescribed under the law to establish the names of anonymous persons who sent the letter and to guarantee the security of the diplomatic representations, foreign companies, and foreign citizens. The Interior Ministry organs will take the prescribed lawful measures against all persons who undertake such actions.

### Zhelev's 'Anticonstitutional' Ambitions Viewed

*AU1412211293 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 9 Dec 93 p 7*

[Docent Dragomir Draganov article: "'Presidential Republic' or Power Ambitions?"]

[Text] On 1 December, in an interview for the BBC, Zhelyu Zhelev concluded that it is "much more efficient" for all countries undergoing a transition period to have a "presidential system." Afterward, those countries which could not fall in an everlasting love with their president as a sole owner of the state "could return to the parliamentary system."

With all the respect I have for the "head of state" institution and for the person who at present fulfills this function, I declare the following: The thoughts expressed by Mr. Zhelev in his interview are wrong, vague, anticonstitutional, and imply dangerous power ambitions and appetite.

1. The thoughts are wrong because not a single country that has already completed the transition toward democracy, adopted the presidential system as a "more efficient" political system. It did not happen in Italy or Germany after 1945, when they implemented the transition from totalitarianism to democracy, or in Portugal and Spain after 1974-5 when they implemented their transition from authoritarianism to democracy.

It did not happen in the countries that are presently undergoing a transition period, regardless of whether they already adopted new democratic constitutions.

Something similar happens only in Yeltsin's Russia. However, Russia implements a different transition—from totalitarianism to authoritarianism. In other words, this is a transition from nondemocracy to nondemocracy.

2. The thought are vague, because they do not reveal what king of "presidential republic" our head of state wants.

The theory and practice of democracy recognize only two such forms—the North American and the French. The first is called the "rule of the omnipowerful president," because he also is the head of the government, i.e., he combines representative functions with the executive power functions. Something like this could not happen in Bulgaria simply because according to our constitution we are a different model of democracy.

Subsequently, what is left is the "a la Francaise" model. In principle, this is logical. After all, we already joined the Francophone Movement. However, this also is impossible in a country as Bulgaria, first of all because our model resembles the Fourth, rather than the Fifth French Republic. Second, this is impossible because in 1958 De Gaulle established the "presidential" Fifth Republic after a sharp constitutional crisis.

Bulgaria does not experience such a sharp and continuous constitutional crisis. What Bulgaria is experiencing, rather, is a governmental crisis, which is a result on failing to observe the constitution, something which is impossible in France. Consequently, the Fifth Republic "model" could not apply to Bulgaria.

Then what is this "presidential" republic Zhelev dreams about? Is it something new and unprecedented in the democratic theory and practice? Come on, let us stop to amaze the world with our novelties, and continue along well-traced and tested roads....

3. The position expressed by Mr. Zhelev is unconstitutional. According to Article 1 of our new constitution, we are a parliamentary-rule republic. The aforementioned democratic states, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Portugal, which have already implemented a successful transition toward democracy, also belong in this category. All their constitutions contain the principle that the president (or the king) "reigns but does not govern." Precisely this, namely, that the Bulgarian president will "reign" but not "govern," for a maximum of two five year terms, is specified by our constitution.

Furthermore, many presidents changed in the aforementioned states, while the Spanish king ardently supported

working out and adopting the country's constitution. However, not one of them expressed a wish to expand his prerogatives during their mandate, because they all were taught to observe the constitution as it is rather than try to cheat.

I hope that Mr. Zhelev, as all other candidates in the January 1992 presidential elections, was quite aware of the clauses of our constitution on the basis of which he was elected president. If he did not like the clauses and considered the presidential prerogatives restricted, them why was he a candidate? Why did he not relinquish his post to someone who would remain loyal to the constitution and the "game rules" it spells out? Does he not try to play a dangerous game whose outcome he cannot control?

4. In addition to being anticonstitutional, Mr. Zhelev's claims also imply power ambitions and desire. This is so because every demand to concentrate more power in the hands of a certain person during the transition period of a frail democracy, conceals a dangerous authoritarian tendencies.

In principle the theory of the transition toward democracy also envisages a variant related to stopping the process and returning (or at least trying to return) to the authoritarian methods of ruling.

This is what happened in Spain. Thank God, the participants in the coup did not implement their desire, mostly because on the night between 23 and 24 February 1981 no other than King Juan Carlos himself became a guarantor of the constitution and democracy. He did this because he swore to respect, observe, and guard the basic democratic law.

However, our president thinks in a rather different manner. On the one hand he demands a legislative initiative because it was unjust to give the president, directly elected by the people, only a postponing veto. On the other hand, he demands to reshuffle the cabinet in order to make it more efficient. Finally, he accuses the parliament of effecting its legislating activity in a poor manner.

This is how the circle is closed. It began with Zhelyu Zhelev's demand to have a legislating initiative—he wants to tell the parliament what laws it should adopt, he wants to reshuffle the cabinet, and if it does not obey—he wants to become the political and economic owner of the state. Since one knows that he also is the supreme commander of the Bulgarian Army and controls the internal and external security services, he could really become a single ruler.

In other words, he could become a dictator, or more precisely, a new Todor Zhivkov with a higher education.

Please, allow me to roar: 45 years are enough!

P.S. The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not commit in any way the Bulgarian Atlantic Club.

## SDS Leader Views Movement's Political Role

*AU1412112893 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 6 Dec 93 pp 1,8*

[Interview with Filip Dimitrov, chairman of the Union of Democratic Forces Coordinating Council, by Panayot Denev; place and date not given: "The SDS Is the Only Alternative to the Communist Party"]

[Text] [Denev] Mr. Dimitrov, four years have elapsed since the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] was established. You have been chairman of the SDS National Coordinating Council for the last three years. What is the most important thing that can be said about the past period?

[Dimitrov] Four years are a long time under conditions of great change, such as the change we are undergoing. The SDS has resisted as a political force throughout those years. The SDS is, in fact, the only political formation in Eastern Europe that has managed to survive and continues to represent the only significant alternative to the Communist Party. This alone is an achievement that preserves us against the "Polish option." The SDS proved that it is capable of governing the country, despite enormous difficulties. The year 1992, evidently, was the most tolerable year in the entire period of the crisis, which still persists.

[Denev] What about the constant accusations that almost none of the original founding members is with the SDS any longer?

[Dimitrov] First, it is not true, because many of the people who participated in the establishment of the SDS from the very first days of its existence, who attended the roundtable negotiations and so forth, are still with us. Second, it is not true, because the people who made the SDS are our supporters and voters, and because their basic nucleus remains unchanged. Such facts, precisely, confirm the further existence of the SDS. Third, your question as such, is incorrect. Every fundamental reform of a of system begins with people who are striving for small changes and is pursued by the more radical elements.

[Denev] The SDS government was overthrown in 1992. What would the country's situation be today if your cabinet had remained in power?

[Dimitrov] It is very difficult to make such an evaluation. The SDS government relied on two powerful factors to overcome the crisis, namely, the solution of the foreign debt problem and relations with the international financial institutions. The government was overthrown on the eve of a great achievement. If we had succeeded in reaching agreement with the international financial institutions at that very moment, Bulgaria would have been a different country today. It would be much more like Hungary.

[Denev] That is precisely what the majority, or at least part of the SDS supporters cannot understand. Who could have an interest in overthrowing the government

shortly before reaching agreement on the foreign debt, so as to prevent the agreement?

[Dimitrov] It is not only the agreement itself, but the conditions under which it would have been achieved that are in issue. The forces, which were no longer in control at that time and may hopefully not influence the present solution of the foreign debt problem, realized that they were missing the boat. Bulgaria's economic stabilization would have deprived them of the opportunity to rob the country and would have prevented certain groups and circles connected with the former Communist Party, which tried and are still trying to rule the country beyond the state institutions, to engage in unrestrained illegal activities.

[Denev] Last week in parliament there was the debate on unclassified personal police files. It seems that it remains the chief topic throughout the current week. What is your view? Is there any doubt about the SDS Parliamentary Group's position on the issue?

[Dimitrov] The problem of unclassified personal files challenges our responsibility toward the nation and should by all means be resolved.

[Denev] Do you mean the responsibility of the SDS?

[Dimitrov] It applies to the SDS and to all those who feel responsible toward the nation. It is a problem concerning Bulgaria, because it is very dangerous for a country to be ruled by people who act by remote control and by methods that have nothing to do with democratic institutions. People are very sensitive to this subject and they demand an answer. It is another matter that the moment the problem is submitted to parliament is a moment of crisis, a crisis that is either glossed over, or deliberately provoked, or exploited to put the blame on others. Perhaps the very fact that the question of declassifying personal police files was finally submitted to parliament is a symptom of the crisis. We could suspect a trap behind it, because the political crisis in Bulgaria is deteriorating, and hence, certain people are trying to preserve the parliament by forcing the deputies to stick it out, on the pretext that the debate on personal files is in process, and those who demand early elections are doing so in order to prevent declassification. Nevertheless, the SDS managed to explain its unmistakable position, which is a success in itself. It is evident that the problem must be resolved as soon as possible. In the opposite case, it would be postponed to the distant future and protract the forthcoming parliamentary elections, which everyone regards as the correct solution, for a long and painful period. The problem of declassifying personal files must be promptly resolved by a parliament resolution, rather than by a long procedure of passing a new bill, which could be protracted ad infinitum. Many bills have been delayed, with seven, eight, or nine months elapsing between first and second readings. In other words, the ploy of putting forward the proposition that the problem of personal files should be settled by law is an attempt to prevent early elections, of once more turning the eternal and tedious merry go round, and and is used as a cover to serve other interests. Knowing the current parliamentary majority, moreover, we can be sure in advance that the present parliament is incapable of passing a law on the declassification of personal files. This was clearly confirmed during last Thursday's [2 December] debate. The decision was blocked in practice by the joint efforts of the parliamentary groups that support the government, despite the stands that some of their representatives may have expressed during the debate. In the final analysis, when the vote had to be sabotaged they all walked out and withdrew the quorum. I respect this element of parliamentary tactics. It is the appropriate behavior by which a parliamentary group defends its supreme interests in trying to prevent a resolution. We applied this method on several occasions when the interests of the state would have been affected by a bill before parliament. Hence, the three parliamentary groups in question regard the problem of preventing the declassification of files as their supreme interest and tried to prevent the vote on it. They proved this with their action. Therefore, I say the SDS cannot possibly regard the declassification of personal files by law as a sensible alternative. To adopt this method would mean to prevent a solution of the problem. We have no reason whatever to wait for such an act to be passed in parliament. There is only one solution—namely that parliament should adopt a resolution, which it could do as early as this week.

[Denev] Do you think that individual National Assembly deputies from the other parliamentary groups would vote on such a resolution?

[Dimitrov] As long as they are people whose votes would contribute to a solution of the problem, it would be excellent. However, after the three parliamentary groups clearly expressed their stand last Thursday, there is not much chance.

[Denev] Would a result opposed to the one advocated by the SDS once more raise the question of you walking out of parliament?

[Dimitrov] The question exists anyway. I refuse to watch helplessly while judicial power is being curtailed, for example. On the other hand, the budget debate before Christmas will show whether we can expect a government crisis and whether it is likely to entail a parliament crisis. If this should not happen and if we are really striving for early elections, we should accept all risks in order to achieve results.

[Denev] Are you expecting any specific result from the activities of the parliamentary commission in charge of corruption?

[Dimitrov] It is very difficult to say, since I am not convinced that this commission as a whole is eager for results. At the last session of the National Coordinating Council I proposed that all members of the Council should submit declarations on their own financial situation,

which also applies to the members of the SDS Parliamentary Group. This is a step forward toward clarifying the question of individual financial assets and of their source. I am convinced that there should be rich people in Bulgaria and I quite approve the existence of wealthy people in the SDS. However, I shall never tolerate a situation in which individuals who are easily tempted by corruption should disgrace the political force that defends Bulgaria's cause. I think that I confirmed my principles by expelling Ludzhev from the cabinet and by my attitude to people like Trenchev, Michkovski, and others. It is true that such phenomena frequently occur in times of social upheaval, that even in a political force that is most loyally committed to national interests we can find people giving in to temptation. This is natural, it is a historical phenomenon of all eras. However, we have absolutely no right to tolerate such people, as I have repeatedly said. Hence, it is important to adopt measures against anyone suspected of corruption. On the other hand, in order to blur the picture the "yellow press" is spreading outrageous rumors affecting the honor of decent people who are beyond reproach. This is precisely why the data on the financial situation of politicians and parliament members, as well as on the source of their personal fortune should be openly publicized, so that everyone should know whether the man deserves our confidence or not.

[Denev] Shouldn't this have been done long ago?

[Dimitrov] It was done on several occasions, as a matter of fact. The question was discussed when we took over the government on 13 October 1991, and later at the beginning of 1993, but time is running out, unfortunately, and resistance to temptation is subject to change. Hence such public statements should be periodically repeated.

[Denev] Tensions regarding the structures and efficiency of the SDS National Coordinating Council and the distribution of tasks and responsibilities within the council have been escalating over the last weeks. A project on the subject was submitted by Mr. Sofiyanski, chairman of the United Christian Democratic Center, and numerous declarations were issued on the matter. The question is expected to be discussed at the Coordinating Council's session tomorrow. You have not expressed your public stand on it so far. What is it?

[Dimitrov] The National Coordinating Council is the political organ of a rather complicated formation. One of its primary tasks is to protect the formation and to absorb most of the rising tensions. Naturally, this makes it not very efficient, except for cases involving purely political decisions, and this is how it should be. The council is not a ministry, or an administrative organ in charge of acting in a strictly operational manner, it is a political organ....

[Denev] It is not a Politburo....

[Dimitrov] Evidently not. I have always wondered about this allegation, because a Politburo is a structure belonging to a different kind of hierarchy and makes sense only when the party coincides with the state. In our case there is no such situation. The idea that certain SDS activities should be implemented in a specialized manner makes sense. However, in my view, it is not quite serious to expect that special commissions working under the political organ should be in charge of such tasks. Actually such structures exist. They are represented by the groups working in various fields of our program. They are implementing the SDS political doctrine into projects for operational activities in the event of a future SDS government. Anyone could object to the lack of speed and efficiency in their work. I also have such objections sometimes, and I am trying to stimulate them. However, the political leaders in charge of the commissions are elected by the Coordinating Council and are responsible to it. Mr. Sofiyanski himself is one of them. Their duplication by political commissions would be meaningless, while the experts should cooperate with them precisely.

[Denev] Have there been proposals on electing deputy chairman of the National Coordinating Council?

[Dimitrov] I am surprised that this question should be submitted to discussion. The deputy chairmen of the SDS Coordinating Council have always existed and will exist in the future.

[Denev] Nevertheless, you have none at present?

[Dimitrov] I hope they will be elected.

[Denev] Who should propose this?

[Dimitrov] The political parties.

[Denev] Not the council's chairman?

[Dimitrov] It would be a good idea, I must submit it to the council.

[Denev] Joking aside, how do you assess the idea of cochairmen?

[Dimitrov] I do not think that any organization has ever benefited from a cochairmen system.

[Denver] Nevertheless, if the SDS Coordinating Council decides to introduce cochairmen, would you accept to be one of them?

[Dimitrov] I already said that I consider the system ineffective. Hence, in order to introduce it we should agree that the present system does not work at all. In the circumstances it would be an indirect reproach, I would even say, an indirect no- confidence vote for the chairman. Hence, it would be totally immoral on my part to compete for the post of National Coordinating Council cochairman. Therefore, I shall not be an SDS co-chairman.

[Denev] The political forces that are opposed to the SDS and their media, while pretending sincere concern for the SDS, always deplore the fact that you, of all people, should be the leader. They spread the rumor that you are

over-ambitious and reluctant to leave your post. However, the question is mainly discussed outside the SDS. Was it ever raised in the Rakovski Street headquarters?

[Dimitrov] The Coordinating Council in 134 Rakovski Street has never discussed the question.

[Denev] Does it apply to all three years of your leadership?

[Dimitrov] I have submitted resignation several times, but this is the rule. It is done. I have always said I a prepared to resign and as soon as someone demand its, I am ready to put it to the vote. On the other hand, I cannot permit myself to resign, because I know that the majority of our supporters want me to stay, and I cannot desert them. Naturally, it is always possible to make mistakes in one's evaluations, and this requires corrective democratic procedures. In other words, I am always ready to submit the question of my resignation to debate and to the vote.

[Denev] If this should happen, do you have an appropriate successor in mind?

[Dimitrov] Naturally there are many worthy people in the SDS, people who are perfectly capable of taking over my responsibilities. Ivan Kurtev is an excellent example. As chief secretary of the SDS, he already shares many of my tasks and can cope perfectly with his role. However, the individual is not so important. What counts is the cause we are defending and for the sake of which people are giving us their support. Naturally, our main obligation is to preserve the SDS as the only important alternative to the Communist Party. Only this can preserve us against chaos and our forces splintering completely, as happened in Poland. This situation threatens other former communist countries as well today. Thanks to the consistent and farsighted policy of the SDS, the real opportunities of the former Communist Party in our country's administration evaporated even before there was any talk about elections. Here, in this country, they can hardly deceive anyone, unlike Poland. I hope that re-communization, which is only now threatening some former communist countries, will soon be a thing of the past in Bulgaria.

[Denev] What should the SDS do to win the elections, in your opinion?

[Dimitrov] First, it should remain intact. It should not permit individual units to supplant our positions, and to deprive us of our followers. Second, the SDS should be resolute in implementing its strategic objectives. It should be ready to use all possible tactical methods for provoking a parliamentary crisis. Third, rather than deluding itself with dreams about dubious alliances, the SDS should engage in active work and cooperate with public and branch organizations, as well as with political formations which are ready to support the SDS rather than blackmailing it. The representatives of the Alliance For the Turnovo Constitution, who declared that they are ready wholeheartedly to support the SDS for the benefit of our country, are an excellent example of such cooperation. Fourth, we should start working on the preparations for the selection of candidates for the next elections. By Christmas time we should propose to our deputies to reflect whether they would like to run again, and then we should assess whether there are any serious objections against some of them in connection with their nomination. The National Coordinating Council, the SDS-member parties, and the local coordinating councils should have the opportunity of nominating additional candidates. All those nominations should be subsequently discussed and listed by the National Coordinating Council. Possible amendments to the Electoral Law should also be considered at this point.

Last, but not least, the working groups in charge of the SDS Program should intensify their activities. It is true that they do not represent a shadow cabinet, as yet. However they should draft plans for a future SDS administration. To be successful, the SDS should take over power with the necessary preparation, with ready-made concepts and measures, and with the appropriate people in charge of implementing them. Whenever we talk of people we seem to avoid the subject. Such reticence is unnecessary.

[Denev] Mr. Dimitrov, thank you for the interview.

## Hodja Views DPS Power Struggle

*AU1412200193 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 9 Dec 93 p 13*

[Interview with Mehmed Hodja, National Assembly member for the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, by Iva Petroni; place and date not given: "Mehmed Hodja: Nevertheless, Dogan Decided To Turn His Head Toward the SDS"]

[Text] [Petroni] Mr. Hodja, in it true that you will become the leader of a new Movement for Rights and Freedoms [DPS]? Former National Assembly member Sabri Hyuseini hinted that this will happen soon.

[Hodja] Those are fabrications of certain people. No one came to me, no one asked my opinion, and I did not authorize anyone to speak on my behalf.

Such statements are mere sensation and nothing else. I feel myself incredibly well and comfortable in the DPS. I do not think that I could defend my ideas and positions in another formation. Therefore, I do not need an alternative DPS.

[Petroni] If we accept as a fact that you will not join any new organization, do you think that there is a place for another DPS?

[Hodja] I think that it will be superfluous. At least half of the members of the existing movement adhere to the same ideals to which the eventual founders of the future alternative also adhere. So what is the sense in forming a new organization? It is clear that those who want to form

an alternative DPS aim only at splitting the DPS and stealing a certain number of voters. I think that this is immoral.

[Petroni] Who could benefit from splitting the movement?

[Hodja] All other political formations except the DPS would benefit from splitting the DPS. Our voters will lose, because a fractured DPS will have far less representatives in the various branches of the power. Splitting the DPS and its voters—this is something that would serve the interests of our opponents on all sides in an excellent manner.

[Petroni] What relations do you have with Ahmed Dogan at present?

[Hodja] The same as three months ago.

[Petroni] Do you believe that he stole your initiative on coming closer to the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS]?

[Hodja] I could only be happy if Dogan decided to turn his head toward the SDS after my statements. This is a real success. This means that we move in the same direction, and this is wonderful.

[Petroni] You openly demanded the statute of Turkish national minority. For his part, Mr. Dogan is trying to achieve this in a roundabout way.

[Hodja] It is easier to work out the details when a certain community achieves its basic right. The opposite—starting from the details and heading toward the fundamental factor—is more difficult.

This means that we are heading from different directions, because the protection of collective rights, which Bulgaria does not protect or accept, is an element of what I demand. The specific manner of our action does not matter as long as we achieve our goal as soon as possible. This issue will be resolved one way or another.

[Petroni] When will this happen?

[Hodja] This will happen after the Council of Europe adopts the protocol on the minorities, Bulgaria signs it, the parliament ratifies it, and the protocol becomes a part of the European Human Rights Convention.

[Petroni] In other words, within two to three years?

[Hodja] No, I cannot set a time limit. Naturally, regardless of what government rules, the DPS must pose this issue at the international and European forums.

In addition, I do not think that we need any seminars or theoretical conference on the topic whether such a minority exists or not.

[Petroni] You mentioned a DPS theoretical conference, which should take place this month.

[Hodja] I suggest to the authors of this idea that they relinquish it as long as this is still possible, because if 100 people participate in such a conference 99 will do everything possible to prove that there is no Turkish minority.

[Petroni] Will Kurdzhali try to change the DPS leadership?

[Hodja] No, but we had to present our opinion and claims on proportional participation. I do not have to carry the burden of the gentleman from Vidin or the gentleman from Montana. Those people have not founded any structures, yet they will be members of the Central Council. In Kurdzhali there is much more work than in Vidin or Silistra.

[Petroni] Why is there a confrontation between the north and the south in the DPS?

[Hodja] There is no such confrontation. However, there are people who try to suggest that there is such a confrontation. There are certain interested people, and I even think that some of our leaders belong to that group. We will not allow a split even if we have to make a compromise to show to the north that for us the DPS is a whole and indivisible entity—there is no north or south. We would not like the people to think that the representatives of Kurdzhali or the south have the ambition to conquer the DPS leadership. However, we are a bit insulted by the development of events at the conference.

[Petroni] How would you and the other delegates who walked out at the conference work in the parliament? Perhaps you will leave the DPS National Assembly faction?

[Hodja] We have no such intention. We will work for the unity, but will not keep silent. We will point out our shortcomings, mistakes, inability, and incompetence, and at the same time—the incompetence, unwillingness, mistakes, and omissions of the leadership. Let no one be angry.

I, as a member of the National Assembly faction, assume a 1/24 share of the blame. However, there is a basic rule—the leader assumes a much larger part of the responsibility, because whenever someone invokes the DPS, the leader is always the one that is meant.

We will not be dissidents, but will be uncompromising both toward ourselves and all factors within the DPS that do not implement their duties. I rely very much on the operational character of the new Central Council because it comprises eight deputy chairmen. I do not know whether any other party has such a leadership.

[Petroni] It appears that there will be new protest actions on the part of the tobacco growers. Will you head those actions?

[Hodja] We do not have any great ambitions and claims of greatness, but whenever the Kurdzhali people's representatives do something they really succeed. This is what happened with the draft bill on the tobacco and tobacco products. However, no one sees or values this.

As far as the strike is concerned, we certainly will be in the front ranks. We will not only support the strike, but will also find the proper way of doing this. A very great danger emerges, namely, that the people would die of hunger this winter. Not a single kilogram of tobacco has been purchased, although certain companies talk about offers of 4 or 5 dollars per kilo. This is the last blunder of the DPS. Those people in our parliamentary faction, who declared and convinced everyone that the tobacco will be purchased, should know that there will be consequences.

[Petroni] Do you mean Mr. Dogan?

[Hodja] I mean the people who made the declarations and the promises. Do you know what the tobacco growers could do? They could really come here to the parliament, undress us and lynch us. How long do you think the people will tolerate blunders such as sending workers to Germany, students to other countries, promised credits that do not materialize, and now the tobacco issue? At a certain point the people's patience will be exhausted and then they will direct their anger at us....

[Petroni] The DPS was expected to demand the dismissal of several ministers, for example, the ministers of agriculture and education.

[Hodja] There is no way we could do that. Did you not see how we behaved in the parliament when the no-confidence vote proposal, related to the government's social policy, was debated? Did you see a single DPS deputy on the rostrum? Why not? After all this is a government formed with the mandate of the DPS. Speak up, gentlemen! This is why we have spokesmen, chairmen and deputy chairmen of the parliamentary faction. Show the people what we are doing—do we support the government or not, do we back it or not.

It is not important what ballot we cast in the secret voting. It is important to voice our opinion in the assembly hall and show what elements of the government's policy we approve or disapprove. This was not done. Is this not another attempt to avoid any responsibility for what happens in Bulgaria? After all, this cabinet simply does not want to commit itself to resolving the country's serious socioeconomic problems.

[Petroni] What solution do you see?

[Hodja] If I wanted to give you a cynical but honest answer, I could say that for a handful of people in the DPS parliamentary faction the solution is in keeping this cabinet until the end of its mandate. I can understand them, because they, or at least some of them, will not be in the next parliament, and then one does not know what could happen....

[Petroni] What about comprehensively reshuffling the cabinet?

[Hodja] What do you mean by comprehensively reshuffling the cabinet? I think that there are several good ministers in this government. However, when the prime minister is not one of them, I do not think that any changes could change anything.

[Petroni] This means that you are in a no-win-situation.

[Hodja] We not only are in a no-win situation, but also in a very uncharacteristic position for the DPS. But let it be. This had to happen to us to be a lesson for us.

## Berov Meets Army Commanders at Defense Ministry

*AU1412164093 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 14 Dec 93*

[Text] During the last hour we have learned that Prime Minister Lyuben Berov held a meeting today at the Defense Ministry with commanders of Bulgarian Army units. They discussed issues connected with the state of the Army and the prospects for its development next year. It was established that funding and the provision of spare parts for maintaining combat equipment and weapons are still the main problems. The prime minister gave assurances that the government will do what is necessary to guarantee normal conditions for the Army's work in 1994.

## Union Official Discusses Miners Strike

*AU1412095093 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 8 Dec 93 pp 1, 4*

[Interview with Professor Krustyu Petkov, chairman of the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria, by Teodora Encheva; place and date not given: "We Could Shake Government's Tree To Make Rotten Fruit Fall"]

[Text] [Encheva] Professor Petkov, will the government fall?

[Petkov] You ask me the same question that Deputy Prime Minister Matinchev greeted me with yesterday at the entrance of the Council of Ministers. In 1993 it is impossible to topple the government through a strike. Bulgaria is a different country now. However, we could shake strongly the tree of the executive power and make the rotten fruit fall. It is the parliament that will decide whether the entire tree should be cut.

[Encheva] This means that the strike organized by the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria [KNSB] is aimed at a cabinet reshuffle?

[Petkov] If there is a certain animosity toward the cabinet on the part of the KNSB, then it is a result of the fact that the government is not sovereign. I have said this many times before. Berov's cabinet could be a nonparty cabinet, but it nevertheless is a pro-Podkrepa cabinet. We must not allow a situation in Bulgaria in which the country is ruled by people who have no responsibility and are subordinate to a structure that calls itself a trade union. This concerns the general position of the KNSB leadership. The miners strike has a different logic and motives.

[Encheva] Why is it that already four governments have failed to resolve the miners' problems? Everything in this branch is achieved through strikes, under pressure, and even through personal dramas.

[Petkov] Today the miners are different people. They understand that the ore-mining industry cannot guarantee the same number of jobs as in the past. They are prepared for the cuts. Every really reforming government should utilize this readiness, which is indeed an incredible asset. However, it appears that the minister of industry receives his information about the miners' mood from Podkrepa chiefs or the flunkeys that surround him.

The miners want only one thing—an alternative job. They are already unwanted even abroad. There are no other jobs in the Rhodopes region. However, the demand related to their wages has not changed. After all, they work very hard.

[Encheva] Prof. Petkov, why is the KNSB organizing a national miners strike precisely now?

[Petkov] There are people who remember how in August the miners expected Berov's cabinet to finally begin the restructuring of the branch. This did not materialize. In October and November there were again no funds for the restructuring. On top of everything, the miners received no wages in the last 4-5 months. Thus under those conditions a powerful strike is a natural phenomenon. I do not reproach those who began the strike last week in the mines near Luka a week before the official beginning of the strike.

This is the first time that the KNSB has organized a national miners' strike. Podkrepa did not dare to start this strike alone, because now it has no more than a handful of supporters. Thus it could only scare the crows.

It is much more interesting to understand what Podkrepa's real goal is. They have already said that they will topple the government, but I doubt it. Podkrepa never had a more obedient government. It seems that people such as Rumen Bikov, Valentin Karabashev, Valentin Aleksandrov, and Khristo Totev have exhausted their obedience. Nevertheless, Dr. Trenchev could be wrong in his calculations.

This time the miners' protest is directed to two addresses—the cabinet and the parliament—as institutions responsible for the economic reform. We are not interested in anything else. The responsibility for the strike could be divided in the following manner: 60 percent of the responsibility belongs to the parliament, because it did not adopt the economic laws, 30 percent to the cabinet, and 10 percent to the president, who kept silent for three months and only now publicly declares that the reform is in danger.

[Encheva] Are the trade unions responsible in any way?

[Petkov] I already said that we have our share of the responsibility through our participation in the National Tripartite Council. I was surprised by the statement of Deputy Prime Minister Matinchev, who told journalists that the decisions of the participants in the Tripartite Council only had a consultative character and no normative power. Thank you very much. It is so much easier to have no responsibility at all, and be just a consultant.

[Encheva] Am I to understand that the KNSB will no longer participate in the Tripartite Council?

[Petkov] At present I see no reason to support a hollow structure, because this is what the social partnership has become. It is impossible to have a parliament that does not function and also a tripartite mechanism for coordinating interests. It is impossible to coordinate air.

[Encheva] What does it mean? Not even one of the governments of our modern era could save itself from a strike.

[Petkov] Prof. Berov's cabinet is the most spoiled one. We are not declaring war on the government, but only applying a legitimate pressure on it in an attempt to compel it to do its job.

[Encheva] Prof. Petkov, will the existing parliament elect a new government, as Ahmed Dogan forecast at the end of the national conference of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms [DPS]?

[Petkov] A barren parliament cannot produce a strong and independent government. The early elections issue is on the agenda now as it was in the past.

[Encheva] When will they take place?

[Petkov] The best time will be in April-May 1994, but the exact date should be announced now. By the spring the parliament should adopt at least 304 economic laws. Perhaps the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] is the political party that is best prepared for new elections... but the Bulgarian voters are unpredictable.

A new government can only be a coalition government. Thus both the BSP and the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] are in an amorous period of seeking partners.

[Encheva] What is the role of the president in this context? Recently he made a rather scandalous statement for a foreign radio station.

[Petkov] I can understand the personal motives of the president, but as the chief of an authoritative institution he made a blunder. One should not demonstrate impatience for expanding his power prerogatives. I doubt that the philosopher Zhelyu Zhelev is prepared to rule Bulgaria and implement the reform through... personal dictatorship. He was most probably influenced by a small group around him that is using him as a puppet or a cover.

[Encheva] Does it mean that the president has two faces—a president and a philosopher?

[Petkov] Well, I have known him for a long time, since the period when he was a philosopher. I do not think that he could ever relinquish this role of his.

[Encheva] The philosophers in our country have rallied around the thesis that the Bulgaria of 1993 resembles the Bulgaria of 1991. Could you comment on this?

[Petkov] Bulgaria is consistent in one aspect—it is implementing the reforms very slowly, with much hesitation and delay. We could not begin the structural reform either in 1991 nor in 1993.

However, in the last two years a new oligarchy has emerged in our country. It consists of people who belonged to the old leadership and the old services, people of the new capital, and certain trade union structures. If in the past Bulgaria was ruled by a party-ocracy elite, now it is ruled by people who have in their hands the most important levers of power.

[Encheva] It became clear that the unborn "middle class," of which all political forces are talking, will carry the structural reforms on its back. Is the middle class already an ideological concept?

[Petkov] Unfortunately, yes. The mumbling about the middle class requires the production of laws and opening space for professional groups that actually form the middle class. By the end of the century, if the restitution of the land and the privatization proceed in an appropriate manner, we could see a middle class that will comprise of about 30-40 percent of the people.

## 'Over 30,000' Miners Reportedly on Strike

*AU1412195393 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 14 Dec 93*

[Text] Miners from the Podkrepa Miners Federation continued their effective strike actions into the second day. According to information from the strike committee, 158 sections of the Podkrepa Miners Federation were on strike today, a total of 16,708 workers. If one adds to this figure the numbers of strikers from other collectives outside the mining sector, the total figure is over 30,000.

According to the strike committee, the strike is strongest in northeast Bulgaria, at the Chiprovets and Ustren mines and the Burgas Copper Mines. Tobacco workers in [word indistinct] held a protest rally today in support of the striking miners and blocked the road to Macedonia for more than three hours.

## Unions Support Podkrepa Miners

*AU1412195493 Sofia BTA in English 1853 GMT 14 Dec 93*

[Text] Sofia, December 14 (BTA)—33,082 miners were on strike today. 16,708 are members of the Podkrepa Miners' Federation, its leader Dimitur Dimov told a press conference today. Yesterday the miners of the Podkrepa Labour Confederation (KTP), the second most influential trade union amalgamation in Bulgaria, began effective industrial action to press the government to take full responsibility for the sector's restructuring and for relocating its employees. KTP President Konstantin Trenchev said yesterday that the strike will be called off only after reaching a general agreement with the cabinet guaranteed by parliament. The other option is for the cabinet to admit its full incompetence and resign, according to him.

Today Mr. Dimov briefed Industry Minister Bikov on the progress of the strike. Tomorrow the Podkrepa Miners' Federation will submit a declaration inviting the government to negotiations, in keeping with the Act on Settling Collective Labour Disputes.

According to Mr. Dimov, the confederation today received 30 declarations in support of the strike. KTP organizations in the customs, transport and the tobacco, foods and light industries declared solidarity and readiness for industrial action. The Podkrepa Machine-Builders and Metallurgists Federation declared a strike tomorrow, according to Dimov. The protest action of the Podkrepa Medical Trade Union in several cities nationwide continued today.

Correspondents nationwide report that miners of the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions (KNSB), the most influential labour amalgamation, are also on a strike. Yesterday the national strike committee of the KNSB Miners Federation called off the strike of its members, which began in early December, after the government allocated 113 million leva in financial aid to the sector.

President Zhelyu Zhelev today received KNSB President Krustyu Petkov, who briefed him on the agreement with the cabinet, said the KNSB press office. Mr. Petkov provided to Mr. Zhelev information on hard-pressed and bankrupt municipalities and closed hospitals and schools, urging the latter to help parliament to update the national budget and pass a law on the transformation of bad corporate debts into public debt. Mr. Petkov also told the president that unless something real is done by Christmas, not only the cabinet but also parliament will totally discredit themselves in the eyes of the public. "Then winter turmoil would be unavoidable," according to the KNSB leader.

## Reaction to Russian Election Results Noted

### Baudys Withholds Comment

*AU1412073593 Prague CTK in English 2005 GMT 13 Dec 93*

[Text] Prague, Dec 13 (CTK)— It is necessary to wait until it is evident whether Russia will march towards a democratic system and the market economy, "as we do not know of any other well-working models," and only then assess the results of the Russian elections, Czech Defense Minister Antonin Baudys told CTK today.

"We must wait until the election winners implement the program they stood for, or another one," Baudys commented on the sensational success of the extreme-wing [as received] Liberal Democratic Party of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy. He said that until the official results of the elections were published, he would not comment on them.

### ODS Chairman: 'Great Misfortune'

*AU1412112193 Prague CTK in English 2158 GMT 13 Dec 93*

[Text] Prague Dec 13 (CTK)—The provisional results of the Russian elections are a great misfortune, Executive Chairman of the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) Petr Cermak said today.

We will closely follow developments. It's perhaps on the same level as if Sladek won in the Czech Republic, Cermak said, referring to the leader of the extreme-right Assembly For the Republic-Czechoslovak Republican Party (SPR-RSC), Miroslav Sladek.

### Havel Welcomes New Constitution

*AU1412162693 Prague CTK in English 1303 GMT 14 Dec 93*

[Text] Prague, Dec 14 (CTK)— President Vaclav Havel welcomed the probable passage of Boris Yeltsin's new Constitution in this weekend's referendum, saying it offered hope for Russia's democracy in its battle with extreme nationalistic forces, but he was less sanguine about the parliamentary elections. Early tabulations show the Constitution passing with about 60 percent of the vote.

In an interview with CTK and the left-leaning RUDE PRAVO, Havel declined to judge the outcome of the parliamentary elections before the final results had been announced, but he did say that the large voter support for Vladimir Zhirinovskiy and his Liberal Democratic Party—pushing 25 percent with 77 of 88 regions reporting—was at least a good reason for some serious thinking or even nervousness.

The final referendum tally is expected to be announced Friday [17 December], and final results of the parliamentary elections by Monday.

### KDS Voices 'Great Anxiety'

*AU1412184193 Prague CTK in English 1729 GMT 14 Dec 93*

[Text] Prague, Dec 14 (CTK)— "The victory of neoimperialist, nationalist, and postcommunist parties (in the Russian parliamentary elections) raises our great anxiety about the further developments in Russia," Frantisek Stanek, spokesman for the Christian Democratic Party (KDS) said today.

He said that the (government coalition) KDS (10 deputies in the 200-seat Czech Parliament) saw the adoption of the new constitution in the Sunday referendum in Russia as a success of the pro-democratic forces.

Despite the assurances of the leaders of the election winners, the results of the elections deepen the unpredictable character of both the political situation in Russia and the foreign political situation. Moreover, the poor economic situation contributes to Russia's internal and external instability, Stanek said. Central and Eastern European countries must carefully monitor the further developments in Russia, he stated.

"As to the KDS, we will unambiguously insist that the developments in our countries be decided by the countries' themselves, in cooperation with the West, not in the East," Stanek stressed. "However, we believe that the West... is aware of the situation and will continue to support Russia's democratic forces," he concluded.

### National Liberal Party Comments

*AU1412184393 Prague CTK in English 1633 GMT 14 Dec 93*

[Text] Prague, Dec 14 (CTK)— "The election success of the grand Russian nationalist party of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, as well as the considerable number of votes received by Communists showed that President Boris Yeltsin's adversary would be much stronger than supposed, says a statement by the National Liberal Party (LSNS). The statement of the opposition LSNS (5 seats in the 200-seat Czech Parliament) on the preliminary results of the Russian elections was announced to journalist by LSNS Chairman Pavel Hirs today.

According to the statement, the results of the elections reflect the disappointment of Russian voters at the economic and social troubles which are accompanying the reforms. The LSNS does not rule out that a certain nostalgia over the break-up of the Soviet Union also plays its role, as well as the desire to restore (the country's) former position of a world power.

"Russia's further developments will therefore not eliminate a possible threat to the reform and democratization efforts, and might adversely affect the country's foreign policy," the LSNS statement says.

They stress that there exist forces in Russia which want to have decisive influence on Eastern and Central European countries, and on the Baltic states. "If they (the

forces) were supported by the grand Russian nationalists and Communists in the parliament, the situation would grow serious," the statement says.

In this situation "the LSNS leadership expects the Czech Government to continue its efforts at our republic's quickest possible integration into the European political, economic, and military structures," the document says.

"It is necessary to say clearly, finally, and forever, that the era of Russian influence has ended in our country, and that we, as a state with traditional Western culture... belong completely elsewhere than Mr. Zhirinovskiy would like," Hirs said.

"The government coalition parties, as well as the parties of the reasonable opposition, must seriously consider quite a prompt integration (of the Czech Republic) into the Western European structures, including NATO," Hirs underlined.

He said that the LSNS was seeking methods of establishing closer ties with NATO as quickly as possible. "There is a possibility of joint exercises of the armies, another possibility is to station here (in the Czech Republic) a certain part (of NATO armies)—we have the necessary room," Hirs said.

### Communists on Zhirinovskiy's Success

*AU1412185193 Prague CTK in English 1732 GMT 14 Dec 93*

[Text] Prague, Dec 14 (CTK)— The Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM) considers the marked success of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy in the Russian parliamentary elections to be a "consequence of the anti-national and undemocratic policy pursued by the forces led by Boris Yeltsin and his Western followers and conductors," Vera Zezulkova said today.

Zezulkova, spokeswoman of the opposition KSCM (participating in the 35-member Left Bloc group of deputies in the 200-seat Czech Parliament), said on behalf of her party that "it is possible to say with some exaggeration that the shots fired at the parliament had opened up the road to power for Zhirinovskiy."

A group of KSCM experts deals with the possible consequences of the victory of the Zhirinovskiy-led Liberal Democratic Party on the further political and security developments in Central Europe, Zezulkova said.

The KSCM categorically rejects any schemes dividing the world between Eastern and Western powers, as well as ignoring the principle of both nations' and states' independence and sovereignty and of peaceful coexistence and disarmament, Zezulkova stressed.

She said that the KSCM was aware that "the militant and nationalist pre-election campaign launched by Zhirinovskiy was reaction to the attempts of the international capital and the advanced countries of the West to transform Russia into a second- ranking and dependent state."

Russia's future and character of its foreign policy will depend on what social forces will really influence it, Zezulkova concluded.

### Klaus: World 'Astonished'

*LD1412212293 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1700 GMT 14 Dec 93*

["Regular weekly interview" with Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by Katerina Kasparova and Vaclav Musilek; place and date not given—recorded]

[Excerpt] [Klaus] [passage omitted] [Kasparova] The whole world is following with tension the results of the parliamentary elections held in Russia last Sunday as they are being received. The results so far point to a marked electoral success for the radical Liberal Democratic Party.

Prime Minister, as early as yesterday you voiced the hope that the democratic development would continue in Russia. Despite this, the recent remark made by Liberal Democratic Party leader Zhirinovskiy about a common Russian-German border is nonetheless a reason for concern about a free future.

[Klaus] I do not think that this is a reason for concern about our free future. It is nonetheless clear—when we see various excerpts from Mr. Zhirinovskiy's speech—why the world is astonished and somewhat alarmed. Unfortunately this is so. I would like to say in the first place that it is necessary that we separate very carefully what has happened and what has not in Russia, what will probably be a short-term impact and what will be a long-term impact. It is clear that the Russian elections have not resolved the situation in Russia. The period of transformation will last incomparably longer than in this country. The issue now is to ensure that this period is as peaceful as possible both for the Russian people and all Russia's neighbors.

At present I do not dare to say whether these elections have contributed to it. In no case are they encouraging. On the other hand I believe it would not be right if we all became alarmed.

I believe that these elections must be analyzed. What is being missed at present from such analyses is more or less a territorially geographic viewpoint. I have always warned that I could imagine that a transformation of a post-communist country would take place relatively easily in relatively small countries where the very, very limited but determined reformist circle of consistant reformists—as a vast majority—are rather only traveling along and cooperating, are mostly capable at looking into a geographic distance from the place where they sit, and are able to travel and talk to people there, and the like.

How this could be done in Russia was beyond my comprehension because I knew that the central power was unable to see very far. This is also why it is not a coincidence that from our point of view election results were good in Moscow and St. Petersburg, but were far worse in distant areas, where personal contacts between politicians and voters is not possible, where everything is merely transmitted on a television screen—and who knows what kind of role television played in the elections.

In my view the territorially geographical aspect is very important when carrying out all analyses of what happend in Russia. [passage omitted]

## PRC Army Official Arrives for Military Talks

### 'Future Relations' Discussed

*AU1512085693 Prague CTK in English 1945 GMT 14 Dec 93*

[Text] Prague, Dec 14 (CTK)—Lieutenant-General Zhao Nanqi, commander of the Chinese Army's Academy of Military Science, told journalists today his visit to the Czech Republic was purely military.

Speaking after a meeting with Czech Defense Minister Antonin Baudys, he said: "We exchanged information on the situation in our countries and on future relations between the two armies, but we did not discuss concrete forms of cooperation."

Asked to comment on the results of Sunday's parliamentary elections in Russia, Zhao Nanqi said that "China does not interfere in the internal affairs of other states, respects different state systems, and other countries' decision to follow their own road of development."

During his stay in the Czech Republic, Zhao Nanqi will visit the 21st Tank Regiment in Zatec, north Bohemia, and the Military Academy in Brno, south Moravia. On Saturday, December 18, he and his accompanying delegation will leave for Slovakia.

### Paper Views Visit

*AU1512121993 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 11 Dec 93 p 2*

["km"-signed report: "Chinese Generals Want To Renew Relations With the Czech Republic Army"]

[Text] Prague—Next week, high-ranking officials of the People's Republic of China will arrive in Prague for a five-day official visit. Defense Ministry Spokesman Zdenek Borkovec told us this news.

Although the official program does not indicate in any way that the Chinese delegation would discuss possible cooperation in the field of arms industry, diplomats claim that this mission is the first step to the subsequent talks on this subject.

The meeting has been initiated by Chinese generals. According to our sources, they also invited Defense Minister Antonin Baudys to their republic. Baudys did not accept the invitation this year. He is to visit China next year.

The Foreign Relations Section at the Defense Ministry rates the visit as one of introduction. The section representatives stated that we see an evident effort to establish new relations.

According to our findings, arms factories would be interested in meeting the Chinese generals. The director of the RDP Group of arms manufacturers, Jan Vlcek, said that they could offer China cooperation in both civilian and military spheres, but only if it is politically acceptable.

## Agriculture Minister on Czech GATT Proposals

*AU1412083093 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 6 Dec 93 p 14*

[Interview with Josef Lux, deputy prime minister and minister of agriculture, by Jindrich Stepanek; place and date not given: "Josef Lux: The European Twelve Ought To Reduce the Protection of its Farmers"]

[Text] Prague—The talks between the EC and the United States on concluding the Uruguay Round of GATT which concern, among other issues, a reduction of agricultural production and of agricultural export subsidies, are culminating. Starting today, a Czech proposal will be discussed in the Geneva GATT headquarters concerning the level of tariffs that ought to protect the domestic agricultural market. Asked how close the Czech proposal comes to the protection of farmers in the countries of the European Twelve, Agriculture Minister Josef Lux says:

[Lux] Generally, it can be said that the level of our protection is comparable. This is due not only to tariffs and compensatory payments [vyrovnavaci davky], but also due to the exchange rate of the Czech koruna. If we look at the protection of the agricultural market item after item, however, we will see that, after November 1989, we have unfortunately unilaterally changed some of the protective measures, in the expectation that the others would follow suit. This has not happened, however, which makes our starting position at the negotiations more complicated.

[Stepanek] In spite of that, we are proposing another lowering of tariffs, are we not?

[Lux] Of course. Our proposal will focus on several areas. The first issue is access to the market. The proposal provides for the lowering of existing tariffs by 36 percent on average, with 15 percent being the minimum tariff cut for individual items. It provides, furthermore, for the preservation of existing possibilities of access to the market and for guaranteed minimum access in those cases where there are no major imports. In the first year,

the minimum guaranteed access should be limited to 3 percent of domestic consumption, and, later on, to 5 percent.

The second area is domestic support. The agreement presupposes that it will be lowered 20 percent by 1999. The assessment basis is the 1986-88 period. Export subsidies should also be lowered in the 1993-99 period—by 36 percent in terms of budget expenditures and by 24 percent in terms of the quantity of subsidized exports. The 1986-1990 period should be the assessment basis. The introduction of subsidies for additional agricultural commodities would be banned.

[Stepanek] Farmers claim that they are not protected against subsidized exports. If the tariffs are lowered, they will be even less protected....

[Lux] Basic commodities such as cereals, meat, and milk are sufficiently protected. The problems concern fruit and vegetables.

[Stepanek] Apple imports have increased sevenfold in the last two years and your ministry estimates that Czech growers will incur a loss of 162 million korunas this year as a result of these imports. In spring you had promised the protection of our fruit market but, in the end, you did not deliver what you had promised....

[Lux] It is true that apples and apple juice concentrate are among the sensitive items, about which we will negotiate in Geneva. The government decided that the Ministry of [Industry and] Trade would introduce anti-dumping procedures against importers. The government also agreed to award non-automatic licenses for the import of 15,000 tonnes of apples in the February-August 1994 period, should the anti-dumping procedures prove ineffective. I believe that this is very important also for this fall. Our growers have the guarantee that imports will not exceed 15,000 tonnes.

[Stepanek] You said that some of our commodities were insufficiently protected. Does that mean that some tariffs are going to be raised, after all?

[Lux] It is true that there are some commodities where, owing to mistakes made in the past in calculation or negotiations, our tariffs are incomparably lower than the duties levied by the European Community or by neighboring states. We want to raise this issue in Geneva. No state has submitted an ideal proposal in the sense that it would only propose the lowering of all tariffs.

[Stepanek] Which commodities would be affected by the increase?

[Lux] Apart from apples, which I have mentioned already, our traditional export articles such as hops and malt. After the adoption of the law that abolishes the tobacco monopoly, the problem of the reduced protection of our market for tobacco and tobacco products is also becoming topical.

[Stepanek] What will the future protection of the Czech agricultural market look like?

[Lux] I think that we subsidize our domestic production and exports on a much lower scale than the countries of the EC. During the negotiations, we will therefore work toward the European Twelve minimizing its strong protectionist measures.

## ODS Wants To Preserve Coalition With KDS

*AU1412162293 Prague CTK in English 1334 GMT 14 Dec 93*

[Text] Prague, Dec 14 (CTK)—T . Political Board of the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) respects the election of Ivan Pilip as chairman of the Christian Democratic Party (KDS), and wants to preserve its coalition with the KDS, ODS Spokesman Jana Petrova told CTK today. The ODS and the KDS formed a pre-election coalition for the June 1992 elections, and have maintained it since.

The Political Board did not talk about a possible government post for Pilip, Petrova said, answering speculations in today's press as to whether Pilip would be made a member of the government. Pilip is at present deputy education minister.

Petrova said that the election of the new chairman was an internal affair of the KDS. "For us it is important that the coalition continue functioning until the next parliamentary elections," she added. Pilip was elected KDS chairman at the party's conference last weekend. He replaces Vaclav Benda.

## Reaction to Russian Election Returns Noted

### Meciar, Minister Interviewed

*LD1512010793 Bratislava STV 1 Television Network in Slovak 2000 GMT 14 Dec 93*

[Interview with Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar and Olga Keltosova, minister of labor, social affairs and family by unidentified correspondents from several Slovak dailies, carried in the "Press Club" program—recorded]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] [Correspondent] Prime Minister, what could be the meaning of Zhirinovskiy's victory in the Russian elections for the further development in Europe and, hence, for our republic as well?

[Meciar] Zhirinovskiy-types can only be born in particular, historical conditions. Such particular historical condition came to being in Russia as a result of the state's demise, of the insufficient activity of state administration, of the nonexistence of well-defined parties and of their organizational layers down to local levels, as well as the result of chaos in the economic and social situation.

Every such period produced either Adolf [Hitler] or other similar person on other occasions. Zhirinovskiy is such a product of these times and of such a period in Russia.

As for the impact of these election results in general, one has to say that the constitutional system is built as a presidential system. Hence, the executive power should not be directly affected by these elections. The executive power will be controlled by parliament in matters concerning budget and legislation. To understand whether the bills would pass through parliament we have to know what will be the key for the allocation of proportional votes. Only then will we see what is the real political power and strength of this party.

Of course, such a political extremism of a party's top official will not last long. First, it will not be accepted by the international community. Second, it could result in an internal conflict among citizens. It is interesting that Zhirinovskiy was backed by more radical elements.

The third important thing is that this internal chaos will require a substantially more intensive effort to support the government and the president to create a counterweight against this man and this political power and party that he brought to being.

Moreover, as often is the case, Zhirinovskiy and his party could have won the elections but nobody knows what their real program will be. The extreme opinions, like the one about connecting borders with Germany on the territory of Poland, on another occasion a threat, have no realistic basis at all. If anything of the kind was to happen, it would be a tragedy for humankind. However, humankind can already protect itself against this. It is not only the citizens in Russia who must protect themselves against this. They have to protect themselves by using international solidarity and by international counter steps that would simply not give political space to the extremists.

To summarize, the situation is very complex. It demands a slight modification in attitude toward Russia. It does not mean turning away from Russia. On the contrary, one has to get involved in these matters so that the democratic powers realize that they have the backing and that they could clearly take the upper hand in presidential elections. If not, Russia is under the threat of fascism. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] This morning and yesterday evening, Radio Free Europe broadcast the premier's voice delivering that speech, its disputed passage on how the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] and the government are preparing to steamroll everything in Slovakia, and how the government does not care any more, and now the government is only waiting ...

[Keltosova, interrupting] I would recommend to you...

[Correspondent] ...that the government is only waiting for the situation abroad to calm down.

[Keltosova] I think that both the government and the HZDS have already taken stance on the issue. What Radio Free Europe broadcasts is at present of no interest to us. We are interested in the budget. [passage omitted]

### Foreign Ministry Notes 'Concern'

*LD1412210893 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 2030 GMT 14 Dec 93*

[Text] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic issued a statement today on the outcome of the parliamentary elections in Russia. It says that, despite great expectations, these results disappoint the supporters of a speedier process of reforms, and adds that the statements made by the eventual victors in the run-up to the elections have also provoked concern in Slovakia. The Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs describes as positive the fact that the constitution proposed by President Boris Yeltsin was approved. At the same time the statement voices the hope that the existing democratic direction of the Russian Federation will not be put in question by future developments.

## Budget Deficit Exceeds 19 Billion Korunas

*AU1412162493 Prague CTK in English 1331 GMT 14 Dec 93*

[Text] Bratislava, Dec 14 (CTK)— This year's Slovak budget deficit has exceeded 19 billion crowns ($570 million), Democratic Left Party (SDL) Deputy Chairman Lubomir Fogas told journalists today.

SDL Chairman Peter Weiss said that his party would not support the budget bill in parliament and that there was

a need for a "long-term and lasting solution to pull Slovakia out of its (current political) crisis. The SDL proposes the formation of a broadly-based government which would be capable of agreeing on program priorities. Only a government with unquestionable legality, a quality which can only be bestowed on it through elections, will be fit to lead the nation out of the crisis," Weiss said.

Turning to the Russian election results, he said that they reflect the fact that certain processes within the Russian society had not been properly analyzed and that false assumption had been made. Fogas said that the attempts of the Association of Zitny Ostrov Towns and Villages to proclaim the area a "self-governed province" as of January violate the Slovak Constitution.

Zitny Ostrov (Wheat Island) consists of flatlands extending over some 1,500 square kilometers to the east of Bratislava and defined by the Danube, its Maly Dunaj (Small Danube) branch, and the River Vah. It contains a large Hungarian minority.

### Poll Reports Opinions on Government Coalition

*AU1512101993 Prague CTK in English 1247 GMT 14 Dec 93*

[Text] Bratislava, Dec 14 (CTK)— Forty three percent of Slovaks have no faith in the recently-formed governing coalition between the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) and the Slovak National Party (SNS), according to a survey by the Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic published in the left-oriented daily PRAVDA today.

However, 40 percent said they welcomed the coalition, which was formed at the end of October. Asked what their main reason was, 15 percent said that it would calm down the political and social situation, nine percent that it would increase the efficiency of the government, seven that it would permit laws to be passed more easily and six that it would solve the question of early elections.

Two thirds (65 percent) believe the solution to Slovakia's problems lies above all in a reasonable agreement between all the political forces, 64 percent see a government of experts as a way out, and 50 percent in a capable and effective parliament.

Only two percent of respondents considered the present situation in Slovakia satisfactory, the survey of 1,291 Slovaks found.

### Hungarians Said Underrepresented in Ministries

*AU1412143593 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 7 Dec 93 p 9*

[Report by Bohumil Olach in the "Parliamentary Mirror" column: "Who Is a Nobody and Who Is Someone; Laszlo Dobos's Vain Efforts"]

[Excerpt] Laszlo Dobos, deputy for the Coexistence Movement, has repeatedly interpellated the prime minister and individual ministers to obtain information about the representation of citizens of Hungarian nationality in some government agencies and ministries. Here are some of the replies he was given:

Ministry of Agriculture: Of the 345 employees, 326 (94.5 percent) are of Slovak nationality, nine (2.6 percent) of Hungarian nationality, and one each (0.3 percent) of Ukrainian and Croatian nationality. Of the 883 Ministry of Agriculture staffers working in regional bodies of state administration, 94.2 percent are Slovaks and almost 5 percent are Hungarians.

Ministry of Environment: 555 Slovaks, six Czechs, five Hungarians.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Of the ministry's 358 employees, 14 are non-Slovaks, of which four are ethnic Hungarians. Of the 390 staffers working at Slovak missions abroad, 11 are non-Slovaks, of which six (including one ambassador) are ethnic Hungarians.

And so forth.

Deputy Dobos also quoted from the prime minister's reply to his interpellation, in which the prime minister informed him that he did not monitor the representation of ethnic minorities because the key consideration in filling posts at ministries was expertise. "How can we explain this?," Laszlo Dobos asked. "Are we incompetent or is there a political intention?" He drew attention to the fact that participation in the execution of power by the broadest possible strata of the population was an elementary postulate of a democratic state and pointed out that the Hungarian minority has always been much better represented in executive power than it is now, including in the period of socialism and the first years after November 1989. Commenting on the general proclamations about compliance with the European standard of minority rights in Slovakia, he said: "The Constitutional Court is a high tower for us. We have not been granted a place on the Radio Council, on the Council for Radio and Television Broadcasting, and so forth. Unfortunately, we are easily outvoted by the voting machinery.... The principles being applied are those of exclusiveness and exclusion." [passage omitted]

### MKDH Not To Back Call for Hungarian Province

*AU1412184993 Prague CTK in English 1640 GMT 14 Dec 93*

[Text] Bratislava, Dec 14 (CTK)—The Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement (MKDH) "is not entirely identified" with the call by the Association of Towns and Villages of Zitny Ostrov (SMOZO) to establish a "Hungarian province" there, Pal Csaky, chairman of the MKDH-Egyutteles (14 deputies in the 150-seat Slovak Parliament) told journalists today. South Slovakia is largely inhabited by ethnic Hungarians, in all of Slovakia

number some 560,000 or 11 percent of Slovakia's population [sentence as received].

In Csaky's words, the MKDH has its own alternative solution. On July 25 its deputies presented the parliament chairman Ivan Gasparovic with a constitutional bill which would comprehensively resolve the ethnic minorities' problems. The proposal specifies three essential unsettled problems: (I) the demand of "self-administration in the education and culture," (II) bilingualism in the administration in the ethnically mixed regions, and (III) an administrative set-up which would not artificially divide regions inhabited by ethnic minorities. "Nothing has happened" regarding these proposals, Csaky said.

Csaky refused to identify the MKDH's attitude to the demand of "regional autonomy," and added that a possible escalated tension in south Slovakia would result from the "government circus" around the minorities' laws, some of whose articles he labelled as a "provocation." The SMOZO call stated that the Slovak Government "was leading the minorities into ruin," and the country's political leadership had waged a propaganda which set the Slovaks against the Hungarians. As a result, "it is necessary to establish a province with its self-administration and special legal status in the region with a substantial Hungarian minority," the call said. The SMOZO has convoked a "historic" session on January 8 in Komarno, south Slovakia, of all the elected local deputies, mayors, and parliamentarians of south Slovakia. They are supposed to elect a 100-member assembly. On December 13 Slovak supreme constitutional representatives discussed the call which stirred up great controversy. On December 7 the MKDH-Egyutteles leadership supported the SMOZO call.

### Report Highlights Problems in Property Fund

*AU1412143193 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 10 Dec 93 p 2*

[Report by Daniela Zverkova: "Reshuffling the Executive Committee?"]

[Text] Bratislava—A joint meeting involving the National Property Fund [FNM] Presidium (president, V. Meciar) and the FNM Supervisory Board (chairman, J. Toth) was convened yesterday to discuss the activity of the FNM Executive Committee and to propose personnel changes. What is actually going on here?

On 3 December, the FNM Presidium recommended that seven FNM executive directors (that is, all of them, with the exception of the chairman of the Executive Committee and the vice president of the Presidium) resign voluntarily from their posts and that they air their views on this recommendation before 9 December. They all rejected it, and on 8 December—that is, the day before the joint meeting of the Presidium and the Supervisory Board—they appealed in writing to the chairman of the National Council of the Slovak Republic Privatization Committee.

It is apparent from the letter that on 13 October 1993 the Presidium, at its meeting, reserved the right to make decisions on the individual steps involved in the preparation, organization, and implementation of public competitions. The Presidium apparently dealt with this issue for the first time since then on 3 December which—to a certain extent—has influenced the speed of public competitions.

The letter also states that "in the current situation, we do not consider the recommendation from the FNM Executive Council Presidium to resign from our posts without reason to be an effective and competent way of dealing with the problems associated with the privatization process. It is not irrelevant that the FNM's ability to function will be impaired by such an across-the-board measure until new Executive Committee members are appointed and entered in the Company Register and that the execution of the privatization projects will be halted."

As far as the legal aspect of the matter is concerned, the FNM Presidium has the unequivocal right to recall Executive Committee members, but not its chairman, because that comes under the jurisdiction of the National Council.

Regarding the reason for recalling the Executive Council members, Paragraph 14 of Law No. 17/1993 may be used. Among other possibilities, it cites the "loss of ability to execute the function." This is a law on the jurisdiction of Slovak Republic bodies in matters concerning the transfer of state property to other persons and on the National Property Fund. It is also apparent from this law that the president of the FNM is the minister for the administration and privatization of national property. The law came into effect in this form on 1 January 1993. Before then, Slovak National Council Law No. 253/1991 applied; according to it, the president and the chairman of the Supervisory Board were appointed by parliament.

Jan Kato was elected deputy chairman of the FNM Executive Committee at the meeting of the two FNM bodies. Karol Danys was made a member of the Executive Committee. Ladislav Holomany and Michal Krajcovic were recalled from their posts for losing their ability to fulfill their functions.

## Goncz Continues Talks on Antall Successor

### Surjan Supports Boross

*AU1512124093 Budapest MTI in English 1206 GMT 15 Dec 93*

[Text] Budapest, 15 December (MTI)—President Arpad Goncz today continued his Tuesday [14 December] talks about the new prime minister with parliamentary party leaders. His first partner on Wednesday was the president of the coalition Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP], Laszlo Surjan. Surjan later told reporters that the president saw a chance to conclude discussions on Antall's successor this weekend, and that parliament elect the new prime minister next Tuesday [21 December]. On behalf of his party's leading bodies, Surjan supported the nomination of Acting Prime Minister and Interior Minister Peter Boross.

### Goncz Meets Party Leaders

*AU1412211993 Budapest MTI in English 1934 GMT 14 Dec 93*

[Text] Budapest, 14 December (MTI)—Hungarian President Arpad Goncz on Tuesday [14 December] met with a number of party leaders to discuss their views on the nomination of Peter Boross to replace deceased Prime Minister Jozsef Antall.

The president held talks with Acting Chairman of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] Sandor Lezsak, Chairman of the Alliance of Free Democrats Ivan Peto, Deputy Head of the Parliamentary Group of the United Independent Smallholders' Party Sandor Bejczy, National Secretary of the Independent Smallholders' Party Geza Gyimothy, and Chairman of the Hungarian Socialist Party Gyula Horn.

Tomorrow Goncz is scheduled to meet with senior representatives of the Christian Democratic People's Party, the Federation of Young Democrats, the Hungarian Justice and Life Party, the National Democratic Federation, and the Republic Party. The president will consult with the leaders of all parliamentary parties and with a spokesman for independent deputies.

The coalition party leaders said they would vote in favor of the candidate and his program. Opposition politicians announced that their parties would reject both, though the refusal will be addressed to the policy of the MDF-led coalition rather than to Boross himself. However, the opposition noted, it is an established practice in a parliamentary democracy that the president mainly considers approving the prime ministerial candidate nominated by the strongest parliamentary party.

### SZDSZ To Vote Against Boross

*AU1412140693 Budapest MTI in English 1327 GMT 14 Dec 93*

[Text] Budapest, 14 December (MTI)—Internal business after Prime Minister Jozsef Antall's death was discussed by Hungarian President Arpad Goncz and Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] Managing Chairman Sandor Lezsak on Tuesday [14 December]. They agreed there have not been any signs of uncertainty or tension in the country. Lezsak felt the president would not have to call general elections early. The first round of the elections can be held in the first week of May 1994, Lezsak said.

After a meeting with Goncz later, opposition Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] Chairman Ivan Peto told the press the SZDSZ will vote in parliament against Peter Boross as prime ministerial candidate and his program. Peto told journalists he had the impression that Goncz will propose parliament elects Boross prime minister. Later today, Goncz meets five parliamentary party heads.

## Parliament Approves 1994 Budget

*AU1512092093 Budapest MTI in English 2101 GMT 14 Dec 93*

[Text] Budapest, 14 December (MTI)—The Hungarian Parliament approved the law on the 1994 budget of the Republic of Hungary with 190 votes (54.3 percent) for, 157 against, and three abstentions tonight [14 December].

The budget envisages a deficit of 329,561.4 million forints, which is the balance of an expenditure of 1,637,695.2 million forints and a revenue of 1,308,133.8 million forints.

The law authorizes the finance minister to issue state bonds worth 300 billion forints with over 12 months maturity, and increase the stock of treasury bills and other state papers by 29.5614 billion forints to refinance the deficit.

## Defense Ministry Official Views New Defense Law

*AU1412073793 Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 9 Dec 93 p 4*

[Interview with Laszlo Szendrei, Defense Ministry political state secretary, by Rozgics in parliament on 7 December: "Coordinated Defense"]

[Text] Work of almost three years brought fruit in parliament on 7 December. With only one abstention and one vote against, 277 deputies adopted the defense bill. Thus, a long-awaited law will become valid on 1 January 1994, and we asked Defense Ministry State Secretary Laszlo Szendrei about the practical implementation of this law in parliament prior to the news conference on the new bill.

[Rozgics] Did you count on such a success?

[Szendrei] To be honest, I did not count on such a success. Before the vote, we still had doubts about the independent deputies and the deputies of the Hungarian Justice and Life Party [MIEP]. The results show the

quality of the preparatory work as well as the readiness of the opposition for a consensus.

[Rozgics] After the more than 500 modifying motions during the six-party coordination talks, one can also hear about opinions according to which this victory is equal to a defeat. To what extent is this law different from the original draft?

[Szendrei] It is true that the parliamentary parties made many modifying proposals, and we introduced many of these modifications into the final text. However, I think that, with the considerable consensus readiness of the government, we proved that we are in favor of legislating the law. Such debates are natural in the parliament of a bourgeois democracy and, therefore, I regard the enactment of this law as a victory.

[Rozgics] Thus, the defense law will become valid on 1 January. The Defense Ministry only has three weeks to work out the orders for the implementation of the law. What is your most important task now?

[Szendrei] The leadership of our ministry was not taken by surprise and unprepared, because our old desire has become a reality; thus, I will not tell a secret by saying that we were preparing for this day. We started working out the implementation measures in August, and we only have to make small modifications in these measures now. Every task is important for us, but if I have to classify them, I would regard the interpretation of the text as our most important task now. Every section must be taught how to interpret the relevant paragraphs and the subsequent tasks. For example, local government bodies, notaries, and republic commissioners will have a lot of tasks, tasks that previously belonged to the Defense Ministry. Therefore, we already worked out a training program that will start next year with the participation of all the relevant sides.

[Rozgics] What does the parliamentary "yes" mean to the Defense Ministry?

[Szendrei] Let me answer this question with a personal memory. Our father always told us that, after finishing a job, we should prepare for new tasks along with the feeling of satisfaction. He used to say that "we made a step in order to do something." The same applies to the atmosphere in our ministry today. We made a step in order to be able to make a lot of further steps in the future.

## Papers React to Russian Election Returns

### NEPSZABADSAG Cited

*AU1412142393 Budapest MTI in English 1150 GMT 14 Dec 93*

[Text] Budapest, 14 December (MTI)—All Hungary's Tuesday [14 December] papers report early results from Russian elections on Sunday, commenting on Zhirinovsky's liberal Democratic Party's expected win with concern.

Under "Russia: Stalemate Still On," NEPSZABADSAG says:

"The pendulum has swung far to the right at Russia's first plural elections after more than 70 years of a communist one-party system: The world is shocked. Nobody expected this, although political analysts have often warned that from the chaos in place of the former Soviet Union an aggressive, chauvinist great power may emerge with weak economic potential but immense military might.

"Now the prediction threatens to come true, democrats in and out of Russia look at each other profoundly shaken. There can be little doubt that Vladimir Zhirinovsky is a predator threatening democracy. He had undoubtedly the greatest success in the elections. Under the pseudonym Liberal Democratic Party, his party is shaping politics.

"First, it is clear that, despite goodwill and Western advisors, Russians cannot bear the forced pace of change to a market-oriented economy—as they showed on the first possible occasion.

"The second important issue is peace. Over the past few weeks, Russian foreign policy has differed from the tolerant tendency of Gorbachev's regime. Now, when there is a stronger than ever nationalist pressure on the government, this kind of foreign policy will become even more dominant. First, other republics of the former Soviet Union may get into a more difficult situation, to be followed by Eastern Europe. New politicians will have no economic cure-all, either. And, as the old fable says, it is always easier to ask God to kill the neighbour's cow as well. The many millions of Russians outside Russia can be used as a good pretext, and conquests by the Czar's empire or by the former Soviet Union as arguments."

NEPSZABADSAG continues, "for the time being, reformists are pointing at each other and looking for those responsible. They are angry at those who divided the real liberal forces. They are criticizing Yeltsin, who, cautiously, has stayed in the background, so that, whatever the election results, he can remain 'president of all Russians.' Maybe the moment will come, when the supporters of democracy in Russia and their foreign associates, who have also failed to do anything so far, can stop extreme rightist forces before they prepare the way for fascism.

"There is no need to get frightened yet. It is enough to be afraid and act," NEPSZABADSAG says.

### 'False Calculation' Seen

*AU1512114493 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 14 Dec 93 p 7*

[Editorial by Peter Barabas: "Russia's Drama"]

[Text] Only those people are surprised at the known results of the Russian elections who believed that respect for Yeltsin and the reformers was enough to win people

over. The president and his followers were wrong in their assessment of how desperate, hurt, and disappointed the Russians are. They believed that the bloody events in Moscow had made everyone realize that the group of democrats and reformers who are faithful to Yeltsin are the only representatives of the truth.

Even in the international press, the authors of few articles doubted that the road to democracy would be smoother after the showdown in Parliament, and even fewer feared that the power had created an even more dangerous enemy for itself. From Washington to Paris, there was a general view that the election conditions that are dictated by the winners and the dominance of various blocs that support the reforms would give no option to the voters but to support the president.

This false calculation also resulted in the fact that many parties and movements were excluded from the elections and this actually benefited the opposition that had been left in the arena, rather than the fragmented reform forces. If so many parties had not been kept away from the elections then the votes of the disappointed people would have been more spread out.

Zhirinovskiy's success is the worst that could have happened in Russia today. Compared with him, the imprisoned Khasbulatov and Rutskoy are democrats who are willing to make compromises. Even among the arrested organizers of the coup against Gorbachev, it is difficult to find people who would give their name to such extremes of nationalism.

The problem is not the fact that Zhirinovskiy promised everything that cannot be implemented, namely prosperity, security, and work, while the authorities did their best to convince people that they would be forced to give up everything for a long time. This kind of irresponsible demagogy has precedents in history. However, it has never happened in modern Soviet or Russian history that someone advocated the restoration of the empire along the 1917 borders. As we can learn from reports from Moscow, the party's symbol can be seen on the wall of the leader's office, which also shows Alaska as a Russian territory. Naturally, he does not accept the fact that the Soviet Union has disintegrated, either.

Zhirinovskiy promises happiness to the Russians at the expense of others. His Liberal Democratic Party has nothing to do with either liberalism or democracy, just as fascist views have nothing to do with sober moderation. Of course, it is not through his moderation that the party leader gained votes. On the contrary. It was his relentlessness that evoked sympathy in those people who, in addition to their individual drama, felt ashamed at what had happened to their country.

It was stupid to believe that a people that for decades had been brainwashed about having a mission would endure it without a shock that it neither has a mission nor an important role in shaping the events of the world. This is why it was possible for a program to become popular that promises to put the Russian people who have been "forced to their knees" back on their feet and to put an end to the humiliating situation. This would be done through burning up the foreign relations and increasing armament.

It is only now that Yelstin's group is beginning to realize that even the communists appear to be presentable compared with Zhirinovskiy and his associates. Even Yanayev and his associates who tried to remove Gorbachev did not go as far as announcing the complete halt of reforms. However, this is what the Liberal Democratic Party did. In fact, it even wants to stop the process in the framework of which military industry is being converted to civilian production.

Already we can find people who think that Yeltsin will be forced to cooperate with the communists in parliament. They have a chance to do this because Gennadiy Zyuganov, leader of the Communist Party, distanced himself from Zhirinovskiy.

The success of the communists is not surprising. In a country where the communist party was able to mobilize tens of millions of people for decades, it is not only the paratroopers and turncoats or those who are disillusioned with the ideas who are left in the arena. There are also those people who believe that it is the betrayal of the cause and the idea that alone led to the catastrophe. Rather than the return of Alaska or armament it is many other things they want to see again. The least they want is that they should not need to be ashamed of their communist past in a country whose leaders have long forgotten that they also used to be members of the Soviet Communist Party.

Is there anything that can give hope at the moment? The only hope is that, in addition to voting for his opponents, people—although only a small proportion—also voted for Yeltsin's constitution. This means that the Russian president can ignore the views of his parliamentary opponents in many areas and, failing all else, can even remove them. However, this cannot be done in a peaceful way. The question how long Yeltsin can remain in power is even more worrying. And should he be forced to leave, who will sit in his place and uphold the same constitution....

## Csurka Explains Party's Election Program

*AU1412142593 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 8 Dec 93 p 4*

[Interview with Istvan Csurka, cochairman of the Hungarian Justice and Life Party, by Janos Bercsi; place and date not given: "Yes for a Coalition With the Hungarian Democratic Forum but No to Embracement"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Bercsi] The political forces are declaring their own programs; at the same time, the ongoing rapid pauperization makes many people remember the Kadar-regime with increasing nostalgia....

[Csurka] The press is also to be blamed for the emergence of this feeling, but the government also must take its share of blame, a government that has brought the people into this situation with its ruthless measures. But let us wait with the formulation of the real opinion of the people, because it is possible that this is only a warning signal....

[Bercsi] The Hungarian Justice and Life Party [MIEP] would like to become a government factor in the next parliament, but the question is whether the MIEP offers any solution for the urgent problems facing this country.

[Csurka] We reject the current tax system and the current financial policy. Instead, we want an acceptable but strictly applied tax system. At the same time, we would like to create an international credit policy that will change the current self- destructive circle. Now, we take the loans and use it to pay up the old interest, and the next loans are only sufficient to pay up the next interest. Thus, the country will collapse, slowly but surely....!

[Bercsi] How do you envisage your political career if Parliament adopts the agents' law?

[Csurka] I do not think I should be afraid of this, one who was the only one in the country to clarify himself. Thus, I do not know what I should fear from this agents' law. If, in addition to what I admitted, they can prove something else, the situation will be different. Given the fact that nothing can be proved against me, I am very calm regarding the agents' law....

[Bercsi] An informer close to the MIEP Executive Committee said rather coarse things about the plans of the MIEP. Among other things, he said that, after gaining power, the MIEP would legislate a law on the percentage of Jews, Gypsies, and other nationalities allowed to become doctors, teachers, lawyers, or journalists in this country. In addition, the informant says that, according to your plans, the former members of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party [MSZMP] would only be allowed to accept public office after being "cleansed" and proposed by the local Hungarian Way circles. What is your opinion about this?

[Csurka] All this is nothing but invectives, and the ominous informer would do better to stop accusing me anonymously. Almost everything he says is a lie, and the truth is well combined with pure fabrications. It is useless to wonder about the fact that the MIEP would coordinate the nomination of personnel with the Hungarian Way, because that is what we intended to do originally.

[Bercsi] You said that the claims also contained elements of truth. What do you regard as elements of truth?

[Csurka] It is true that the MIEP has close ties with the Hungarian Way, and it is also true that former MSZMP members can only become members of our party after undergoing a test and their activity in the Hungarian Way is taken into consideration. However, it is a pure fabrication and a lie that we want to determine the percentage of Jews, Gypsies, and other nationalities in public life. At the same time, it is no secret that the basic goal of the Hungarian Way is to create a national-oriented middle class. [passage omitted]

## Opinion Poll on Party Popularity

*AU1412211193 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 13 Dec 93 p 12*

[Unattributed report on results of opinion poll on popularity of political parties in Hungary: "Opinion Poll: The Hungarian Socialist Party 'Caught Up' With the Federation of Young Democrats"]

[Text] The main results of the monthly opinion poll carried out by Szonda Ipsos on the popularity of political parties in Hungary appear regularly in NEPSZABADSAG and they are meant to present the current state of party political balance of forces, namely what parties the people surveyed would vote for "if elections were held next Sunday." The common feature of all these opinion polls is that they are prepared by using a representative segment of the population.

The following results came from the latest opinion poll carried out in November among a representative sample of 1,000 people, including 935 people with voting rights. The first and foremost thing that needs to be stressed is that the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] "caught up" with the Federation of Young Democrats [FIDESZ] on the popularity list: In November, both parties were in first place on the list.

It appears that 1993 will be the MSZP's year. Although the MSZP could not improve its stand compared with the previous month, if we consider the situation prevailing at the beginning of this year when the MSZP could only count on the votes of 9 percent of the people surveyed, it is absolutely clear that the MSZP represents a much more attractive alternative for the voters today than previously, because it now enjoys the support of 17 percent of adult voters. In connection with the people's opinion about the FIDESZ, in the long run, we can witness a totally opposite process. Compared with its stand at the beginning of this year when it enjoyed the support of 27 percent of the people surveyed, the FIDESZ has been getting increasingly fewer supporters and sympathizers in the course of 1993, and their position also deteriorated compared with October. It happened now for the first time that the number of FIDESZ sympathizers did not reach 20 percent in November. Similarly to the MSZP, the FIDESZ enjoyed the support of 17 percent of the voters in November.

The 3 percent fall in the FIDESZ voters between October and November is obviously connected with the departure of Gabor Fodor, one of the leading FIDESZ politicians. Besides, the drop in the popularity of the FIDESZ can mainly be felt in towns, and this drop is relatively high among young high school and vocational training school graduates (ages 18-39), people who form the basic

camp of FIDESZ supporters, a drop of an average 8 percent. It seems that most of the people "leaving" the FIDESZ have not yet moved toward another party; instead, they have become uncertain and do not know which party to support.

The drop in the FIDESZ's popularity and the subsequent increase in the popularity of the MSZP is even more spectacular if we concentrate on the politically active population, people who, in addition to supporting a party, also promise to definitely participate in parliamentary elections held "next Sunday." Our survey in October showed that the both the MSZP and the FIDESZ got 27 percent of the votes of this group. However, in November, 29 percent of these "certain voters" supported the MSZP, and only 19 percent suppported the FIDESZ. According to our survey, mostly politically involved and more active strata of the society turned their backs to the FIDESZ, and this means that the electoral activity of the FIDESZ-sympathizers seriously weakened compared with October. Besides, after the MSZP and the FIDESZ, the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] received 15 percent, the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] received 10 percent, the Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP] received 9 percent, and the Independent Smallholders' Party [FKgP] received 7 percent from the "certain voters" in November.

The less favorable evaluation of the FIDESZ and the more favorable evaluation of the MSZP could also originate from the fact that, at parliamentary elections "held now," the public sees greater chances for an MSZP victory than a FIDESZ victory. While, in October, 21 percent of the people surveyed said that the FIDESZ would receive most of the votes at elections held "next Sunday" and 20 percent said that the MSZP would receive most of the votes, these figures changed in November. Today, 23 percent of the people think that the MSZP would win, and only 17 percent think that the FIDESZ would win.

Along with these negative trends, it is, however, positive for the FIDESZ that this party continues to have the smallest number of non-preferences (1 percent); in other words, the FIDESZ is most rarely mentioned by people when asked which party they would not support at all.

## Christian Democrats Present Economic Policy

*AU1412141493 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 11 Dec 93 p 11*

[Jozsef Szabo Bartha report: "The KDNP Recommends a Third Way—New Taxes; Privatization Made Transparent"]

[Text] If the Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP] comes out of the elections as a determining governmental force then we can expect radical economic policy changes, Andor Mandoki, chairman of the KDNP's economic committee, claims.

The KDNP considers putting the economy in order more important than any other task. First, they would make a precise inventory—which the government failed to do in 1990—of the heritage they take over. They would reorganize the management of the economy. An economic ministry specially created for the job would be charged with implementing the short-term and long-term economic policy programs. In addition to fulfilling the debt servicing obligations, they also consider it important to draw up a new loan strategy.

In its election program, the party promises to introduce a new taxation system. According to this, the centralization of funds would be reduced, personal taxation would be based on the family as a unit, and further tax allowances would be given to investments made by enterprises and entrepreneurs. The two-tier value added tax would be kept but the 25 percent sales tax that hinders investments would be reduced. For a more just general and proportionate sharing of taxation, tax on assets would be introduced. Protection would be given to industry that creates domestic workplaces and to domestic products. They wish to restore agriculture's profit-creating ability through guaranteed prices, increased export support, and new credit and interest rate policy.

The party would make privatization transparent and it would use Draconian measures against all forms of corruption, abuse of power, and wastefulness. Progressing on a third road, the KDNP's goal is to implement a social market economy, Mandoki states. They are convinced that in the current weak conditions, the state cannot leave the economy or society on its own to cope with the "free market," therefore, until the economy becomes strong, the state's supportive, regulative, and controlling roles are essential. The fact that the state left industry and agriculture to its own devices is one of the main sources of the problems, the KDNP's leading expert believes. In Mandoki's view, people hoping that privatization and foreign entrepreneurs will solve the problems of state-owned enterprises are wrong. The KDNP is convinced that state-owned enterprises can also be operated economically if a management that has adequate interest is appointed to run it.

Talking about the Antall cabinet's four-year work, Mandoki said: The departing government completed legislation on the majority of laws that ensure the operation of the economy. It curbed inflation and cast the economy among the wild conditions of the market. It tried everything that has been recommended by the experts of free competitive capitalism. It launched itself on a road but it has been found that better roads also exist. It has been clearly proved—and this is a valuable heritage for the Christian democrats—that forcing a spontaneous transition without plans with a hasty speed demands too many sacrifices. This method is also unacceptable for the KDNP. In reply to why the KDNP has not tried to implement its economic theses that were drawn up two years ago in Godollo, Mandoki said: The government did not take our suggestions into consideration. More precisely, the importance of our views—and consequently, the size of our responsibility—was proportionate to the number of seats we occupied in Parliament. This, as we know, was only 6 percent.

## Citizens Abroad Not To Vote in 1994 Elections

*AU1512091893 Budapest MTI in English 2010 GMT 14 Dec 93*

[Text] Budapest, 14 December (MTI)—Hungarian parliament today [14 December] rejected a draft amendment to the Constitution which would have enfranchised Hungarian citizens living or staying abroad during the 1994 parliamentary elections. For the draft to go through parliament, two thirds of all deputies should have accepted it. Of the 382 deputies, 315 were present, and 163 voted in favor of the draft, 13 abstained, and 139 rejected it.

## Olechowski Comments on Russian Election Results

*LD1412194993 Warsaw TVP Television First Program Network in Polish 1830 GMT 14 Dec 93*

[Text] [Announcer] Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrzej Olechowski, who is visiting Washington, has expressed deep unease at the results of the Russian elections. Before meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Olechowski said that the news coming in from Moscow is bad. Andrzej Krajewski reports:

[Krajewski] The first American politician with whom Minister Olechowski spoke this morning was Lee Hamilton, the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the House of Representatives. American journalists also asked Minister Olechowski about Russia.

[Begin recording] [Olechowski] All the news we have received so far from Russia is bad, quite simply, bad, and here there is nothing else, it cannot be interpreted any other way. Let us hope that not all of it will be confirmed, that it will transpire that the role of the pro-democratic, pro-reformatory forces will be greater than that which we have so far, than that which we have heard of so far. The construction of democracy, the construction of freedom and human rights, the construction of this modern, sympathetic view of neighbors will take a few years in Russia. This is not something that will happen from day to day.

[Unidentifieed correspondent] Are there any chances of a change in American policy toward Russia?

[Olechowski] No. Particularly in a large country, this requires quite a long thought process and drawing of conclusions. We are nonetheless under the impression that the deadlines are urgent. The NATO summit will be in January. The decisions we feel to be exceptionally important will have to be made earlier. In any case, they are regarded as such here as well. So, well, we will be pressing (?for them). [end recording]

[Krajewski] It is precisely that which will be Minister olechowski's task during the most important talk of his visit, with Secretary of State Warren Christopher at the State Department this evening.

Minister Olechowski is the first eastern European politician to visit Washington after the elections in Russia, which question American policy in relation to Moscow. He thus has a chance to influence it in a way that is beneficial for Poland and stabilization in central-eastern Europe. However, even if he succeeds in gaining some promises from Secretary of State Christopher on the matter of Polish membership of NATO we might well not find out about this for a long time.

## Olechowski Begins 'Partnership for Peace' Talks

*LD1412231093 Warsaw PAP in English 2221 GMT 14 Dec 93*

[Text] Washington, Dec. 14—Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski on Tuesday [14 December] began three days of talks with top American officials in Washington, related to the U.S.-sponsored "partnership for peace" proposal. Olechowski is seeking preliminary assurances from the Clinton Administration that the plan is not just a vague substitute for security guarantees but a proposal opening prospects of NATO membership for Poland and other Central and East European countries.

After the first meeting, held with Chairman of the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee Lee Hamilton, Olechowski stated he had the impression that Polands message and expectations had received a kind welcome.

Also on Tuesday, the Polish foreign minister held talks with U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher.

The results of the Sunday general elections in Russia had an impact on the topic of the Polish-American talks. Olechowski told reporters that the news coming from Russia so far was bad but expressed the hope that not the worst fears would not be confirmed, and that the share of pro-democracy and pro-reform forces in the Russian parliament would be larger.

He stressed that Sundays poll shows that it would take several years for Russia to build democracy, freedom, human rights and a modern, well-disposed attitude towards its neighbours. This process requires international support, which should not be given to individuals but to definite forces and values, and it also needs some international discipline within which Russia should work, Olechowski said.

Asked about his opinion on chances for a change in the U.S. policy towards Russia, Olechowski said he did not expect to hear much on the issue during his visit as it would take time for the Clinton Administration to draw conclusions following the Sunday elections. He stressed, however, Poland would put pressure on the U.S. with less than a month to go before the January summit of NATO.

## Report Reveals Negative Situation in Agriculture

*AU1312143393 Warsaw PAP in English 2054 GMT 10 Dec 93*

[Text] Warsaw, Dec. 10—A report on the state of Polish agriculture revealed that only 10 percent of private farms and 40 percent of all food processing plants have a good enough financial situation to apply to banks for credits earmarked for modernizations. The debt of the entire food processing industry reached 27 trillion zlotys ($1.3 billion). Deputy minister of agriculture Wlodzmierz Dabkowski said at a press conference today that the report presents changes which took place in Poland's agriculture in the year 1989/93. According to the report,

plant production fell by 24 percent and animal production by 9 percent between 1989 and 1992. The current year saw a continuation of the downfall of animal production, while plant production grew by 15 percent. The production of the food processing industry is likely to rise by 9 percent this year as compared with 1992. As a result of privatization, the share of private firms in the food industry grew to 50 percent.

The authors of the report stressed considerable progress in the development of the water supply network in rural areas achieved in the past several years. The document revealed that 70 percent (1.5 million) of all private farms bring an income which permits farmers and their families to maintain a standard of living similar to that of families receiving unemployment benefits.

## Further on Walesa-TV Council Dispute

*WS1412101893 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 11-12 Dec 93 p 1*

[Report by B.I.W., K.Gr., P.W.R., T.S.: "Appetites for Television; Not Just Three Members but the Whole Council Endangered?"]

[Text] **"There were many people like this in the past—one had to bring cranes along to drag somebody out. This is no surprise to me"—this was a comment made by Lech Walesa as he was leaving a session of the Congress of the Polish Scout Union, concerning the refusal to resign by the chairman of the National Radio and Television Council Marek Markiewicz along with the council's two other members—Maciej Ilowiecki and Ryszard Bender. "Mr. President's way of speaking is unique but I do not feel offended"—Maciej Ilowiecki told RZECZPOSPOLITA. Representatives of companies trying to obtain licenses are surprised by the dispute between the president and the council; they say they do not understand what the issue is about.**

Let us recall that during an interview for PAP on Thursday [9 December] Lech Walesa said he hoped that the three council members who had been designated by him "will have enough of a sense of honor to come to me with their resignations." Why did the president start a "war" with the three council members whom he himself had appointed? There are speculations going on, concerning a secretive agreement between the president and the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] on recalling the entire council. Lech Walesa is supposed to prepare the basis for that with his declarations. The president's dissatisfaction with the council's performance may be later used as an argument by SLD when trying to officially bring down the council in the Sejm. The purpose would be granting a license for the all-Polish television to the kind of company that would make both the president and SLD happy. Another goal could be preventing Wieslaw Walendziak from appointing only his people to the most important posts in public television. All this is supposed to delineate a power structure in television before the presidential elections of 1995.

An opportunity to recall the council could be provided by its annual report (in the spring, or as the Belvedere suggests, as early as the end of this year). If the Sejm and Senate refuse to accept the report and the president shares that view, the council's term will expire automatically. Amending the law is another possibility. Andrzej Zarebski, one of the members of the council, made a statement suggesting that the president could be supporting one of the companies trying to obtain a license. Another member of the council (one of the three whom the president wants to see dismissed, that is Maciej Ilowiecki) thinks, however, that this is untrue. "Despite rumors that the conflict was created in order to influence the distribution of licenses, I do not think the president intends to pressure anybody for that purpose," Ilowiecki says.

**We asked representatives of some companies trying to obtain licenses on what they think about the dispute**

**Gabriel Meretik** of the Independent Polish Television [NTP]: "I suppose the real reason behind all this is not Walendziak's case—I think the president reconciled himself with his nomination. There are rumors that the dispute could have something to do with the whole procedure of granting licenses. In my view, the council is aware that there are different forces trying to eliminate it and so it may speed up the decision. The confusion—according to 'street talk'—may open the gate toward legislative measures aimed at recalling the council."

According to SIS Agency, NTP chief **Miroslaw Chojecki** said during a conference entitled "Television-Money-Power" that one of the biggest dangers facing public television is a temptation to transform it into a political instrument. The dispute between the president and the council comes at a perfect time to remind us of that danger. According to Chojecki, the emergence of an independent commercial television will cause public television to want to be independent from authorities and politicians.

**Aleksander Rogalski** of "Canal Plus"—"I do not know what impact the current dispute could have on the process of granting licenses." He also says the recent events were a surprise to him.

**Andrzej Gerhardt** of the "All-Polish Private Television"—"I do not have a view on this. I do not think the dispute will have an impact on the process of granting licenses."

**Piotr Mroczyk** of "Antena 1"—"The whole issue is completely incomprehensible to me. I do not know the reasons and I do not know what is going on. But I do know it is a bad thing to happen. The situation is unstable as it is."

**Zygmunt Solorz** of "Polsat"—"Time is the most important factor for us. I am troubled by this whole thing possibly delaying the granting of licenses."

## Rallies Against Tiraspol Sentence Continue

*AU1512085093 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1904 GMT 14 Dec 93*

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 14/12/1993—Demonstrations continue in Bucharest in front of the Russian embassy, where demonstrators keep pickets in the boulevard.

"Considering the attitude of honour and dignity by which Ilie Ilascu and the other Romanians in his group have steadily and boldly expressed their pride of belonging to the country and to the Romanian people, as well as the provisions in the law of Romanian citizenship," the parliamentary groups of the Agrarian Democratic Party of Romania and the Romanian National Unity Party propose that Romania's Parliament should pass a law whereby "for special services rendered to the country and to the Romanian nation, Romanian citizenship and 'honorary citizenship' as well as the title of hero of Romania shall be granted to Ilie Ilascu and the group of Moldovan patriots."

It is also proposed that a square and boulevard in Bucharest City should be named "Ilie Ilascu" and a statue of the convicts be erected in the respective square.

The World Union of all Romanians with headquarters in Bucharest, brands the juridical farce in Tiraspol. "United in thought and feeling with the Moldovan Romanian brothers on the other side of the Prut, we demand the setting up of an international court to try the real culprits, to punish the arbitrariness of the Tiraspol junta, and set free the Romanian patriots whom we praise."

The members of the large group of doctorands, students and pupils from the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine who learn in Bucharest have signed two letters addressed to the Bucharest ambassadors of Russia and the United States, branding the illegal sentence passed by the Tiraspol court and demanding the elimination of the conflict in Dniester and the removal of the 14th Army from the territory of the Republic of Moldova.

The independent daily RASUNETUL [THE ECHO] of Bistrita City will be put out, starting December 15, 1993, with the name of Ilie Ilascu as honorary director printed under the daily's title. The students and professors of the Christian University of Nasaud have issued to ROMPRES for release a communique which reads: "We join our firm voice in support of the Romanian patriots in Tiraspol, of the national hero Mr. Ilie Ilascu, the man who said a few days ago: "I believe in the people and hope that by peaceful means, through the Parliament, we will attain that end we have set ourselves, for the union with Romania, with the motherland, whether some want it or not, today, tomorrow, the day after tomorrow will surely be achieved."

"Here in Transylvania, we have the same faith in the country's reunification. We know how our parents and grand-parents worked and fought for the same Christian and national ideals for which our brothers across the Prut are fighting today."

## Russian Envoy: Moscow Not Involved in Trial

*AU1512132793 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1239 GMT 15 Dec 93*

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 13/12/1993—Yevgenniy Ostrovenko, ambassador of the Russian Federation in Bucharest, sent an appeal to ROMPRES for release, regarding the "demonstrations, pickets, and other actions organized in front of the building of the embassy of the Russian Federation in Bucharest" in protest against the sentence in the Ilascu trial held in Tiraspol, capital of the Dniester Republic, self-proclaimed in the territory of the Republic of Moldova, former republic of the Soviet Union.

"Russia has not been involved in this trial. It was organized and held far from the boundaries of Russia, in a different state. The attempts to make us responsible for the Tiraspol trial and the sentence passed there are ungrounded and unjustified. The Russian party consistently favored and favors that a solution be found in the Tiraspol trial based on legality and humanitarianism, it acted and acts to this end," reads the appeal, which expresses hope that "action irrationally prolonged in front of the Russian embassy will be finally put an end to."

## Parliament Motions Against Government Viewed

*AU1412125593 Bucharest AZI in Romanian 8 Dec 93 p 4*

[Octavian Stireanu commentary: "The Game of Motions, the Vote on Motions"]

[Text] Parallel to the great rallies organized by the trade unions, in parliament two motions are being prepared against the government: First, a "simple" one, initiated by the PSM [Socialist Party of Labor], which merely aims to discipline the executive; in other words it is merely a kind of inflated interpellation. The second one, initiated by the political opposition, is a no-confidence motion proper, and it is intended to achieve a change of the government, according to the Constitution. The simultaneousness of the two motions, on the one hand, and that of the motions and the union movements, on the other, is not accidental at all. The young but experienced politicians belonging to the PSM (A socialist party, right? The defender of the large popular masses, right?) have realized that their party could not keep silent while the masses took to the streets. As a consequence of this, their motion is actually not meant for the executive, but rather for that party's electorate, so that PSM followers could say that their representatives in parliament are at least trying to do something about the causes of the people's discontent. The fact that the PSM leaders are trying to strengthen their credibility before their own electors is doubtlessly a necessary and a good thing. However, the PSM, like all other political parties, has to build up a similar credibility in the eyes of our entire public opinion. And they will be put to the test soon, namely by the vote on the laws and preconditions demanded by the IMF [International Monetary Fund]. Judging from the things we already know, those laws and preconditions do not comply at all with the requirements of socialist policy. On the contrary, they have

a radically reformist character, stipulating severe measures in finance and economic restructuring, with all its direct consequences, the most important of which will be the increase of unemployment. The dilemma for the PSM's credibility is the following: Should the party vote in favor or rather against the preconditions? If the PSM accepts the preconditions imposed by the IMF, the "simple" motion recently initiated by that party remains a mere attempt to fool the naive, just an alibi to be presented to its electors (to whom they would explain that they opposed the government plans, as proved precisely by this simple motion.) However, if the PSM parliamentarians vote against the IMF terms—in which case I take my hat off to them!—it will mean that we have to deal with politicians of consequence, seriously anchored on the left wing of our political scale, who respect their position. However, seen from another angle, would such a waiver not also implicitly mean that they oppose economic reform, foreign financing, and the long-term well-being of our nation? These questions undoubtedly prove that by initiating their simple motion PSM has entered the realm of insoluble contradictions.

As to the other motion, the no-confidence vote initiated by the opposition, things do not seem to be any simpler at all. First, our parliament has a large number of political groupings and personalities who all agree that the current government has failed to achieve its tasks owing to its lack of resoluteness and inability to further reform. The diagnosis recently elaborated by IMF is quite clear: The government is not expected to work out "technical details," but rather to rethink the whole array of legal levers that could be used to bring about profound reform. As someone said, they [IMF] expect the Vacaroiu government to achieve within 10 days what it proved unable to achieve over a whole year! The no-confidence motion is intended to sanction this reality. Thinking in terms of that motion, things are as follows: Whoever votes in its favor implicitly acknowledges that people are taking to the streets, that social discontent has become omnipresent, reform is blocked and we needed the IMF experts to come and sort things out for us, that the country is deprived of foreign financing on account of political considerations and there is no internal financing either, because the government has not managed to restructure the industry it inherited, failed to make it internationally competitive, and so on. Whoever votes against the motion will actually tell the whole nation—even if not in words, but rather by means of the secret language of the black and white balls—that the people's life is just fine, that the trade unions took to the streets for nothing, that the students went on general strike out of mere whim, that abroad they are fighting over the steel products turned out at Calarasi, our agriculture is flourishing, and that our central heating pipes do not merely transport hot water and warm us, but they also deliver milk and honey to our apartments!

Because of all this, the way in which our parliamentarians will vote on the no-confidence vote initiated against the government is actually a matter of honor for all of them.

## PRM Rejects Opposition's Censure Motion

*AU1412211493 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 10 Dec 93 p 3*

["The Greater Romania Party's Stand on the Avalanche of Motions and Political Crisis in the Country"]

[Text] Examining, with lucidity and realism, the new situation in the country's politics of the last few days, the Steering Committee and the parliamentarians of the Greater Romania Party [PRM] are in a position to declare the following:

1. PRM speaks out against any forms of violence, which, under the current conditions, may lead to a civil war. In this respect, we condemn the serious events that occurred in Bucharest on 8 December 1993, when several troublemakers attacked soldiers of the Romanian Army who were guarding certain basic institutions of the state.

2. We do not know how sincere the concern of others regarding the country's fate is, but we are very concerned about shortening the people's suffering, improving the living standard, and immediately taking the country out of its crisis. We have never aimed at achieving any kind of specific or political advantage and we are the only grouping that has not asked for any kind of ministerial portfolios.

3. We do not believe in the efficiency of motions, which cannot be separated from the battle for power.

4. We will not vote in favor of the simple motion introduced by the Socialist Party of Labor [PSM], because we were not informed of its elaboration, although we have a joint parliamentary group with the aforementioned party in the Senate, and three days before the introduction of that motion we agreed on another strategy of action. At the same time, the text of the motion demands a halt to economic decline, something that is anachronistic since the Vacaroiu government has managed to achieve this requirement, after huge efforts, something that is attested to by all serious economists in the country.

5. We will not vote in favor of the censure motion introduced by the opposition, because it covers another attempt to take over power in Romania, by irresponsibly trying to achieve political capital from the dramatic circumstances experienced by the population. We believe that neither the Democratic Convention [CDR] nor the National Salvation Front [FSN—full name: Democratic Party (National Salvation Front)-PD(FSN)] has the moral right to talk about corruption as long as their people receive massive aid from abroad and are facing lawsuits that should make them not dare raise their heads at all. Some 50 ministers and state secretaries are working in the government, but why do we forget the phenomenal army of mayors and councillors of the CDR and FSN, who are ruining the daily life of the country's communes and towns? Just compare the figure of 50 governmental dignitaries with the 4,000 mayors and councillors the FSN alone has around the country. What

are the latter doing to redress the social and economic situation? We resolutely demand that General Prosecutor Vasile Manea Dragulin and Director Eugen Vasiliu lift the suspect blockade they introduced around the penal files of the FSN leaders, the truly guilty ones for the country's misery. At the same time, we demand the suspension of the mayors of the "Key" [symbol of the opposition at the last elections] from great municipalities such as Bucharest, Brasov, Timisoara, and Constanta.

6. We will never be able to vote along with an anticonstitutional grouping as the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR], because we cannot separate the social and economic problem from the national problem.

7. We invite the government—at the forthcoming debate on the censure motion, which promises to be quite stormy—to tell the whole truth about the catastrophic inheritance from the Roman-Stolojan [former prime ministers Petre Roman and Theodor Stolojan] two-headed rule and unmask the acts of terrorism and sabotage that cause panic among the population, acts whose aim is to bring the people out into the streets, particularly the students.

8. To bring about the government's fall now, at the end of the year and in the middle of winter, is an act of exceptional gravity that will throw the country into a state of chaos, something the opposition and its masters from abroad have been aiming at for the past four years.

9. We cannot dismiss our work of a year and leave the way free for an antinational opposition that would establish a regime of terror and plunder in Romania.

10. We reject any attempt to involve the trade unions in this political equation, thus turning them into parties and shock troops, which is tantamount to a serious violation of the law.

11. The avalanche of this kind of motions only prevents the Parliament from exercising its primary function, which is to give the country the necessary laws long awaited by the population and foreign investors alike.

12. All this does not mean that we will give the government a blank check indefinitely. We expressed our vexation over the condemnable ease with which the government failed to work out the much awaited anti-crisis program and over the lack of firmness against the explosion of prices. We are the most severe critics of the government, because the population is being sacrificed for the sake of imported reform. The upshot of it all is that, in its censure motion, the opposition is reproaching the government the very fact that it has somewhat applied the breaks to this diabolic reform, meaning that, if—by some absurd chance—the "Key" leaders were to come to power, they would accelerate the pace of the reform, thus sending the entire population to the grave.

13. Before giving our vote, we will ask the presidency and the government to change certain extremely poor ministers, the leadership of the General Prosecutor's Office, the management of the Radio and Television, and certain prefects who are not doing their jobs.

14. During the debates on the censure motion, our party will give a first and last warning to the government to present the first effects of the anti-crisis program by 31 January 1994, to make order in the country, and to wage a life and death battle against anarchy, plunder, and crime. For these actions, we will lend our moral support to the executive branch, so that it can lead forcefully and, if necessary, even introduce the state of emergency in certain sectors. Things cannot go on like that. We are no longer talking about democracy or politicking here, but rather about the survival of the country and of the biological being of the Romanian people.

15. If, by 31 January 1994, the situation stagnates or, God forbid, deteriorates, the PRM will withdraw all support for the government and will firmly demand early elections: local ones, in March, and parliamentary elections in April. Regarding the latter ballot, we will also demand that a national referendum be held on the same day on the subject of republic or monarchy. We thus believe that the atmosphere will quiet down in Romania and the people will be led by the political forces they truly want. We believe that our position is correct and is bound to produce major changes, without dangerous social convulsions. As a matter of fact, we recently informed Messrs. Ion Iliescu, Nicolae Vacaroiu, Oliviu Gherman, and Adrian Nastase of our opinions and intentions. If this reasonable strategy is not accepted, our party will withdraw from Parliament, because it cannot participate in Romania's destruction by keeping quiet.

The PRM Steering Committee and Parliamentary Groups

## Censure, Rebirth of 'Russian Giant' Viewed

*AU1512122393 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1000 GMT 15 Dec 93*

[From the 15 December Romanian press review]

[Excerpt] Bucharest ROMPRES, 15/12/1993—Political maneuvers related to the debates to follow in parliament over the no-confidence motion called by the opposition against Romania's government, social convulsions and echoes of the ultra-nationalists' victory in Russian elections are the main subjects of commentaries run by the leading Romanian press of Wednesday, 15 December 1993.

CRONICA ROMANA comments on the news conference of the ruling Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR] during which in [PDSR Deputy Ion] Solcanu, vice president of the party, said: "We are in the December offensive of the opposition. We are witnessing actions organized by the Democratic Convention of Romania [CDR] and the Democratic Party-National Salvation Front [PD-FSN], to which unions and students' leagues are added. We haven't clutched to power,

but we must state openly that the current governing has the merit to have mended some mistakes done by the previous governments."

Daily ORA comments on the consultations held between Premier Nicolae Vacaroiu and leaders of the parties supporting him in parliament (the Greater Romania Party, the Socialist Party of Labor, the National Romanian Unity Party, and the Democratic Agrarian Party of Romania): "The prime minister is furthering consultations with parties of the majority coalition. He is scared of his own courage to defy the spirit of the Romanian revolution."

In its midnight news section, daily EVENIMENTUL ZILEI informs readers that at yesterday's evening meeting held behind closed doors "PDSR has decided on a government reshuffle after the winter holidays." The measure is said to have been taken to meet the requests of the National Romanian Unity Party [PUNR] that conditioned its support to reject the no-confidence motion on its participation in governing.

Daily AZI informs readers on disagreements among parliamentarians regarding the settling of the date when the motion is to be put under debates. "The senate uses the tactics of its speaker [and PDSR chairman Oliviu Gherman], delaying debates on the motion," the daily writes.

For daily DIMINEATA "the motion seems to be a measure meant to annihilate reform and to prove people that potential support would be like trying to irrigate a desert."

Daily LIBERTATEA prints opinions on the current political situation by politician Silviu Brucan who considers that "this gloomy December is decisive for Romania's development: On one hand, it is for the first time after the revolution that conditions are in place for a start on economic recovery in mid-1994, while on the other, social and political tensions further accumulating are to make Romania a country that is difficult to govern... [punctuation as received] What Romania needs now is an inspired political initiative taken by President Iliescu..., a large openness towards those whom he opposes, which could prove that he is not only the president of a certain political spectrum, but of the entire nation."

Daily COTIDIANUL informs readers on what it calls "the biggest student strike," showing that the students' league in Bucharest University have redrawn priorities on their claims. "The first claim is related to the 'truth on the December 1989 events,' while their second claim is the government's resignation for 'inability to solve the issue of the Romanian detainees in Tiraspol' and 'other social claims.'"

Daily ROMANIA LIBERA prints an appeal on the country for the organization on 16 December, at 1500, of demonstrations all over the country "to save the Ilascu group; to commemorate the Timisoara martyrs; to save the country by a motion of no confidence; to gather signatures for a law to regulate investigations on the December revolution."

"Darkness comes from the East" is the headline of the editorial run by daily ADEVARUL, which reads: "As Hitler in 1933, Zhirinovskiy, who does not hide his adulation of Hitler, had known how to take advantage of the discontent of a bewildered population in a country where economic and political chaos is total."

Daily COTIDIANUL comments on the same issue: "We believe that the West must give up illusions of the past years and, starting from reality, to recognize the inconsistency of the strategy carried on until now, admitting that neither communism is as dead as it seemed, nor the Soviet Union as dismembered as they wanted to believe."

"The ancient Russian threat becomes a painful reality for the Romanians. Romania has to make the West its sound ally before effects of Zhirinovskiy's victory are shown on the Kremlin policy," is the opinion of daily EVENIMENTUL ZILEI.

Informing readers on the first day of the visit paid by Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu to Washington, TINERETUL LIBER writes: "Maybe Mr. Melescanu, as any other diplomat in former communist states, will plead while meeting the American secretary of state for an as soon as possible period of partnership (between NATO and these states) under the new conditions set by the revival of the Russian giant." [passage omitted]

## Army Chief of Staff Views 'Potential Dangers'

*AU1512122193 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1035 GMT 15 Dec 93*

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 15/12/1993—Major General Nicolae Pastinica, army chief of staff, reviews in an interview with ARMATA ROMANIEI [ROMANIA'S ARMY] potential dangers for Romania's national security and sketches possible strategies.

"Following the disbanding of the Warsaw Treaty, Romania, like the other former socialist countries, is in a difficult position in point of national security." "While Western countries have three-four collective security 'umbrellas,' such as NATO, WEU [West European Union], and CSCE, we only have CSCE, which has no military dimension. We can easily be victims of an aggression caused by various interests. The danger is the more greater as collective security systems such as NATO and WEU are reluctant to receive [as new members] former socialist countries, although they have partnership ties with them. To be well understood, I think that such aspects have to be related to the play of interests in which Romania is or can be a matter of dispute. This play has not taken definite shape yet."

Regarding the struggle for power in Romania's regional sphere, Major General Pastinica said: The crystallization of power centers in the area of the former socialist countries, including Romania's proximity, is natural I think, considering that these countries have no collective security guarantees any longer. The problem is that

certain such centers can pose potential dangers to Romania's security. For instance, the Visegrad Group [Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary] has been created in 1990 in our zone of interest. A theory is more and more invoked, that of Europe's regionalization for political-economic and also strategical reasons. The Carpathian Euroregion was created in 1993. I think that the final goal of these structures is not so difficult to infer, added Pastinica.

"A battle for supremacy is being waged in our area, which can turn detrimental to us. For instance Ukraine wants to be a great power in its region. A nuclear power as a matter of fact. And some traditionally Romanian territories are part of Ukraine following the enforcement [in 1940] of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact. Hungary, for its part, wants to become greater Hungary again. This geopolitical situation and the subregional play of interests can be detrimental to the natural process of Romania's recovering territories inhabited by Romanians."

Speaking about the fact that Russia cannot be neglected in this equation, Pastinica said: "It is no doubt that Russia shows ever stronger that it intends to be part of the power's feast. And as far as I know 'troops forwarding' is part of its army's structure."

Major General Pastinica mentioned some other risk factors, such as the influence of military powers and alliances in international bodies, making arbitration in conflicts and crises that could be detrimental to Romania, and, of course, the proximity of open conflicts in former Yugoslavia, the ex-Soviet space, and the Middle East area.

Pastinica concluded that "Romania has a key geo-strategical position in South-east Europe... [punctuation as received] It has to use this advantage the best it can. As it is clear for the West that Romania, favored by its geo-strategical position, can and has to improve its role of a real power in its area, of an important factor of stability and security."

Pastinica assessed that this can be done by Romania's integration into Euro-Atlantic structures, the building of good relations with neighboring countries, with states in its proximity, which can back it to make good use of these conditions, countries such as Germany, Turkey, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, with far-away countries that can be good friends of Romania, such as the United States.

## Iliescu Chairs Supreme Defense Council Meeting

*AU1412211693 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1900 GMT 14 Dec 93*

[Text] President Ion Iliescu today chaired an ordinary meeting of the Supreme Defense Council. Examining the implications of the situation created by the Tiraspol verdict in the Ilie Ilascu trial, the Supreme Defense Council considers that it represents a premeditated assassination, with an appearance of legality, passed by a court of a self-proclaimed state formation, which is supported by certain forces from the outside, but is not recognized by any other state or international body or organization.

The Supreme Defense Council backs the attitude adopted by Romania's public authorities, all political forces, nongovernmental organizations, and all the Romanian people and endorses the specific request that the sentence passed on the Moldovan patriots should be canceled and that the prisoners be set free.

According to the communique received from the presidency, the Council expresses the hope that reason and justice will prevail and that the force of what is right, rather than the right of what is force will emerge victorious.

Proceeding to an analysis of the other agenda points, the Supreme Defense Council examined—in the framework of fulfilling a decision adopted at its previous meeting—a draft program to restructure the defense industry, a component part of the reform process of transition to the social market economy. The program stipulates the redimensioning of production units in accordance with the necessary requirements of military technology for the Armed Forces, the modernization and retechnologization of certain units, the preservation of certain strictly specialized installations, and the conversion of other specialized productive units. In working out the proposals included in the program, the political, economic, and military characteristics of Romania's geopolitical situation at subregional, regional, and zonal levels were taken into consideration.

The Council recommended that the government set up a governmental commission to put the final touches to this program and ensure cooperation among ministries, other central bodies, and the economic units in its implementation.

In close correlation with the problem under discussion, the Council examined and endorsed the programs of scientific research and assimilation of new military technology products as well as a program of supplies for the Armed Forces in the 1993-96 period and up to the year 2000. The fulfillment of these programs, which will ensure a sufficient combat capacity for the country's defense, depends on the financial resources to be annually allocated from the state budget, the communique reads.

The meeting examined and approved the draft law on the organization and functioning of the Foreign Intelligence Service [SIE], which will be submitted to the approval of the Romanian Parliament.

On the basis of a report presented by the Romanian minister of national defense regarding the results of the implementation by the Ministry of National Defense—in the first year since their adoption—of the provisions of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, of the Vienna 1992 document on measures to increase

trust and security in Europe, and of the Romanian-Hungarian Open Skies agreement, the Supreme Defense Council of the Country estimated that the activities carried out by Romania are in accordance with the decisions taken and that further measures will be taken to fulfill all commitments assumed.

The Council also solved other current events, in keeping with its prerogatives, as stipulated by law.

## PUNR Wants Coalition With 'Credible' Parties

*AU1412133693 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 0954 GMT 14 Dec 93*

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 14/12/1993—The Romanian National Unity Party (PUNR) in the government coalition considers that the current single colour party has no more political, economic and social viability, for it did not distance itself from past governing, captive structures. That is why the PUNR has entered negotiations with several parliamentary parties one month ago to form a coalition government that could gather two or more much credible political forces. After concluding a political pact, it is compulsory to conclude also a social pact with the unions, according to the Romanian National Unity Party. It also views union confederations as a credible social partner willing to assume political responsibility for governing. As a consequence, the Romanian National Unity Party elaborated an economic and social anti-crisis programme that will be debated together with all union confederations.

## Party Calls for 'New Government Formula'

*AU1412174993 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1628 GMT 14 Dec 93*

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 14/12/1993—The leaders of the Liberal Party '93 [PL'93] assess that the only way out of the "deep crisis" of the country is the change of the current parliamentary majority, through the endorsement of a new government formula. Deputy Dinu Patriciu said at the weekly news briefing on December 14 that only 17 votes were necessary from the left of the Parliament Hall for the no-confidence motion to pass. In the same sequence of idea, he cautioned that the memorandum with the IMF "is not a miraculous solution" but a survival one, and such an agreement could be applied only by a reforming government.

"I believe that by his gesture of high patriotism, Ilie Ilascu wanted to demonstrate for the Moldovans that the power in Chisinau is sold to Moscow," said Horia Rusu, executive president of the party. He severely criticized the policy of the current political power in Romania with regard to the Republic of Moldova, terming it as "demagogical, conjunctural and lacking in coherence." Moreover, Horia Rusu considered that "without a previous understanding between Presidents Iliescu and Snegur the emergence of the so-called Dniester republic would not have been possible."

## Trade Unions 'No Longer Trust' Government

*AU1512092793 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 9 Dec 93 p 3*

[Article by Clementina Filip: "Unions Resolutely Demand the Resignation of the Government"]

[Text] A marathon-meeting between a delegation of the Trade Union Confederation Alfa, BNS [National Trade Union Block], and the Students' League on the one hand and the members of the Standing Bureau of the Chamber of Deputies on the other was held last night at the headquarters of the Chamber of Deputies.

The representatives of the demonstrators wanted to explain to the parliament leadership the fact that the social situation has reached the most critical level since December 1989 and that it is the parliament's duty to solve the current situation, adding that a new government program has to be adopted. A certain source of the Standing Bureau expressed the opinion that, through euphemisms, the trade union members imperatively asked parliamentarians to endorse the censure motion and thus, to give a chance for the establishment of a new cabinet. However, the meeting that should have been a dialogue between parliamentarians and trade union and students leader however turned into a dialogue of the deaf.

In his speech, which lasted about 15 minutes, Ioan Gavra, PUNR [National Romanian Unity Party] leader and vice president of the Chamber of Deputies, turned into the defender of the Vacaroiu Cabinet and tried to convince the delegates that what they are doing is not good and that, in fact, the disastrous situation of the country is due to the activity of the previous governments, thus he tried to explain that the censure motion will not be able to succeed and turned the explanations into a long succession of accusations against the opposition, especially against the Democratic Party.

Ioan Gavra's attitude differed even from the attitude of the PDSR [Social Democracy Party of Romania] representative, Ovidiu Petrescu, who partly admitted the solid justification of the trade union leaders's claims. Ioan Gavra's expansive explanations received again an energetic response from the representatives of trade unions, who said that they no longer trust the current executive power lead by Nicolae Vacaroiu. At that point the meeting suddenly came to end.

## Over 1 Million Unemployed in Dec

*AU1512085493 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1909 GMT 14 Dec 93*

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 14/12/1993—The unemployment rate by December 13 was 9.8 percent, the number of unemployed 1,138,713 of which 137,229 [were] in Bucharest. The unemployment hits mainly female work force, about 60 percent and youth, about 55 percent. The number of job offers was 7,978 of which 513 [were] in Bucharest.

## Talks To Start in Geneva, Continue in Brussels

*LD1412164093 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1547 GMT 14 Dec 93*

["Pool" item]

[Text] Geneva, Dec 14 (TANJUG)—Peace talks on the former Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) will start on December 21 in Geneva and continue in Brussels a day later, TANJUG learnt here today from well informed circles close to the conference on the former Yugoslavia.

The same sources state that the co-presidents of the conference on the former Yugoslavia Lord Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg have addresssed an invitation to the representatives of the three warring parties in Bosnia—Muslims , Serbs and Croats, the presidents of the Yugoslav Republics of Serbia and Montenegro and the president of the former Yugoslav Republic of Croatia, in which they they state that they had been asked by the European Union to extend the invitation also to the Brussels meeting. Besides the foreign ministers of the European Union the Brussels meeting will be attended by the president of the European Commission Jacques Delors.

The co-presidents expressed their readiness to continue talks after the Brussels meeting if necessary. Even though the agenda of the Geneva and Brussels meetings has not been announced in the invitation it is unofficially learnt that the leaders of the three warring parties will be asked to sign a peace agreement on Bosnia-Herzegovina and on the demilitarisation of Sarajevo while the territorial questions will be discussed at later talks.

The peace agreeement on Bosnia-Herzegovina as a union of three ethnic republics was rejected at the beginning of September by the Bosnian Muslims who asked for greater territorial concessions than those made by the Bosnian Serbs and Croats. Foreign diplomats in Geneva expressed fear that the Bosnian Muslims will again condition the signing of the peace agreement with the settlement of territorial disputes.

## Owen, Stoltenberg To 'Demand' Signing of Accord

*LD1312201093 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1712 GMT 13 Dec 93*

[Text] Geneva, Dec 13 (TANJUG)—The co-chairmen of the international conference on former Yugoslavia, Lord David Owen and Thorwald Stoltenberg, will demand from the representatives of the three warring sides from the ex-Yugoslav republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina to sign a peace agreement on Bosnia at the December 21 Geneva talks, TANJUG has learned from well-informed diplomatic circles.

Lord Owen and Stoltenberg will first insist on the signing of the peace agreement, including the part on the demilitarization, and only then will they focus on the resolution of territorial disputes through talks on territorial divisions, the circles said. According to these sources, the co-chairmen should this week meet in Zagreb with Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, and in Sarajevo with Bosnian Moslem leader Alija Izetbegovic. The Geneva meeting is also expected to be preceeded by bilateral talks between the Bosnian Serbs and Croats, and the Bosnian Croats and Moslems, all conducted on the basis of joint declerations signed in September this year in Geneva. However, the diplomatic representatives of the permanenet U.N. missions in Geneva express fear that the Moslems will once again make the signing of the peace agreement conditional on the resolution of territorial disputes. This fear is based on the belief that the Moslems will demand access to the Adriatic Sea in Neum and thus further complicate the negotiating process which has recently been moved from a dead end.

At the latest round of Geneva talks, the Moslems were offered another access to the Adriatic Sea on the Croatian part of the coast on condition that the Bosnian Serb Republic (RS) secures the approach through its territory. Western diplomats said that their governments are willing to support all solutions, acceptable to the three warring sides in Bosnia, irrespective of what these solutions are. They believe that it is far less important if the Bosnian Serbs, Croats and Moslems will live within a union of republics, in independent states or whether they will form a kind of 'third Yugoslavia.'

Regarding the venue and date of the peace talks on Bosnia, it seems that all uncertainties were resolved after the European Union (E.U.) announced that the talks would be held in Brussels on December 22. This came only hours after the co-chairmen invited the presidents of Serbia, Montenegro and Croatia (Slobodan Milosevic,, Momir Bulatovic and Franjo Tudjman [words indistinct] the three national leaders from Bosnia to take part in the talks. The diplomatic circles and certain officials of the international conference on former Yugoslavia in Geneva claim that the talks will open at 11:00 A.M. on December 21 in Geneva, and that the E.U. foreign ministers will arrive in Geneva on December 22 for only one day. Estimates are that the negotiators could remain in Geneva on December 23.

## Izetbegovic Rules Out Any Division of Sarajevo

*AU1412211093 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 14 Dec 93*

[Text] Today in Sarajevo the [Bosnia-Herzegovina Army] 2d Hill Brigade held a ceremony under the name of [words indistinct]. Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Presidency, addressed this gathering of the valiant. Expressing his pleasure at having a chance to meet the heroes of our army, Izetbegovic said that it was not without reason that the largest number of songs are written about love and courage. Courage and strength, Izetbegovic said, do not imply lack of fear. All normal people feel fear, and the brave are aware of the aim of their struggle and make the decision [words indistinct] freedom.

Izetbegovic spoke of the political and military situation in our country, and his recent tour of the free territories, where he saw that our army had grown into a firm and increasingly well-organized armed force. He then answered soldiers' questions. The negotiations in Geneva and our diplomatic efforts in general do not mean that we have relaxed in front of our enemy, whom we know all too well. On the contrary, they represent our readiness to achieve as much as we can without bloodshed. Answering questions from the officers and other ranks, Izetbegovic also addressed other issues, such as the lifting of the siege of Sarajevo and military operations in general, and he mentioned that the legal political bodies of the country relied on the expert assessments of our military bodies and political decisions [words indistinct].

As for the lifting of the siege of Sarajevo, that is a military question, but it is also largely the question of the morale and [word indistinct] of the people. It is true that we have been prevented from defending ourselves, that the imposed embargo is in practice aimed only against the interests of Bosnia-Herzegovina and its defense efforts, but our patience, despite everything, is not limitless. There cannot be and will not be any division of Sarajevo, Izetbegovic stressed.

The present soldiers reiterated the readiness of Bosnia-Herzegovina and its Armed Forces to halt the criminals, as was being confirmed by the increasing successes of our courageous defenders on the ground.

## Abdic Seeks Participation in Peace Talks

*LD1412200993 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 14 Dec 93*

[Excerpt] The autonomous province of western Bosnia has sent a message to the heads of state and governments of the European Union and the cochairmen of the conference on the former Yugoslavia requesting that its parliamentary delegation, headed by Fikret Abdic, take part in the peace negotiations scheduled to take place on 22 December in Brussels.

If this request is ignored, Abdic's province will consider the peace negotiations null and void. [passage omitted]

## Serbs: Conditions 'Ripe' for Signing Peace Plan

*LD1412190293 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1755 GMT 14 Dec 93*

[Text] Belgrade, 14 Dec (TANJUG)—The Serb negotiating position at the upcoming Geneva talks was defined today at a meeting between Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, republic of Srpska president Radovan Karadzic, and republic of Srpska assembly president Momcilo Krajisnik. It was unanimously assessed that all conditions have been created for the signing of a peace plan for former Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Milosevic, Karadzic, and Krajisnik concluded that conditions have become ripe for the international community to finally abandon its policy of double standards, that the signing of the peace plan would equally affirm the interests of all three peoples in former Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that the sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia would be lifted.

It was also said that the course of events and negotiations within the framework of the Geneva conference has confirmed that a solution to the Yugoslav crisis can only be found through respect for the legitimate interests of the Serbian nation and its right to self-determination.

## Silajdzic Condemns West on 'Loss of Credibility'

*AU1412202693 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 14 Dec 93*

[Report by Mehmedalija Sisic on talks between Bosnia-Herzegovina Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic and General Francis Briquemont, UN Protection Force commander for Bosnia-Herzegovina, in Sarajevo on 14 December—recorded]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Silajdzic] We addressed another issue, and that is the transport of our parliamentary delegation from Bihac, from Zagreb to Bihac. It has been there for several months as it cannot get over to Bihac. We also spoke about the transport of a delegation from Sarajevo to Bihac. We mentioned two convoys, one convoy from Split to Bila, and another one from Split to Maglaj. These two convoys have been arranged to start off simultaneously by Croatian Foreign Minister Granic and myself. However, I hear that the Croatian side has arranged two convoys so there could be some confusion there. I hope not. I hope that everything will run according to plan. One convoy for Bila has been arranged and one for Maglaj. They are supposed to start off tomorrow. We will see, we will see how that goes. I hope that there will be no problems.

[Sisic] Asked by the reporters about his view of the relation between the peace process and the shelling, General Briquemont said:

[Briquemont] That is one of my greatest concerns. Two days ago I had an important meeting with the head of the Serbian army, and tomorrow I have another meeting with General Mladic. I repeat again that the shelling of the cities like Sarajevo and Mostar will bring no gain on the military plan. It is a tragedy every time it happens, and it brings no advantages on the international scene. I ask myself every time why all this shelling, and I will bring up that point again tomorrow.

[Silajdzic] We spoke about that, and about the shelling of Sarajevo and other cities. Sarajevo is again being targeted now. We were very clear with the Serbian side at the plenary session in Geneva that the Bosnian side will not be intimidated with that, and that the two-year experience shows that this is no way to intimidate the Bosnians, that it is counterproductive. So if they are

sincere when they talk about attempts to achieve peace, a peaceful solution, then they have to stop that. If, on the other hand, their intention is to raise tensions and prolong the aggression on Bosnia-Herzegovina and the war, then they have achieved that aim with this shelling.

This is not a shelling of civilian targets, this is shelling of civilians. So they are practicing the killing of people without firing many shells, because of the reaction of the international community.

We will make it very clear to the international community that they have not fulfilled their promise that they would react—that they would attack Serb positions if they shell Sarajevo—that people are still being killed in Sarajevo. Eight, I believe were killed today, yes? 10! You see that this sad figure keeps rising. The international community should from now on either say nothing, we will ask them to say nothing, or what they say [pauses] they have a credibility problem when it comes to our people and our (?country). The international community is losing credibility every day. We do not know who to believe anymore. They said that if the strangulation of Sarajevo, as they put it, continued, they would react. They are not reacting. They said that if the shelling of Sarajevo continued, they would react. They have not reacted. They have banned flights over Bosnia. That resolution has been violated 1,100 times, and so on. The problem with relations between us and the international community is (?their) loss of credibility.

## Silajdzic Holds Talks With Dutch Minister

*AU1412163193 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 14 Dec 93*

[Report by Nedzad Leko on talks between Dutch Foreign Minister Peter Kooijmans and Bosnia-Herzegovina Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic in Sarajevo on 14 December—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Leko] After talks with Prime Minister Silajdzic, Dutch Foreign Minister Peter Kooijmans told reporters:

[Kooijmans] I am visiting the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government to acquaint myself with the views of the Bosnian Government concerning the peace process. We are now in a crucial period. The EU summit last week agreed to hold a new meeting on 22 December in Brussels with all the sides, and I believe that this is really a crucial moment. I think that we have to reach a solution before the winter. I hope that we will be able to make progress.

There is another reason for my visit. The EU has decided that, if a peace agreement is reached, it will participate in the implementation of that agreement. I also have to inform the parliament of my country under what conditions the implementation of the agreement has to be carried out. I have listened to Prime Minister Silajdzic very carefully. I will not talk about what I heard—that would be unwise—as hard days are ahead and we should not make any comments before we hold that meeting.

[Leko] After the talks with the Dutch foreign minister, Prime Minister Silajdzic addressed reporters:

[Silajdzic] I took advantage of the presence of the Dutch foreign minister to express our gratitude to the government and people of the Netherlands, since the Netherlands is one of the European countries that has provided Bosnia-Herzegovina with concrete help, particularly in the project to install a natural gas works in Sarajevo. That has been a great help. I hope that this will continue. They have also helped us transfer humanitarian aid by air from Zagreb to Sarajevo. I think this needs to be said. I think that our people should know about it.

The minister also spoke about the political aspects of our meeting today. We of course spoke about the negotiations and the possibility of completing these negotiations. I do not think that there is a solution yet. We are still running around in circles. We might be able to say more about this in a few days.

[Leko] [passage omitted] Asked by the reporters about the EU's attitude to the Bosnian demands, Minister Kooijmans said:

[Kooijmans] Last Saturday we stressed in our declaration that we consider two demands of the Bosnian side justified. One is their demand to get one third of the country, and also their wish to get access to the sea is legitimate. That is why we will hold our next meeting. I am not saying that the EU will support any demand that might be set, but we are seeking an agreement based on these two conditions. That is our position.

## OSLOBODENJE Daily Wins Sakharov Prize

*AU1412181093 Paris AFP in English 1737 GMT 14 Dec 93*

[Text] Strasbourg, Dec 14 (AFP)—The European Parliament on Tuesday [14 December] awarded the prestigious Sakharov Prize to the Sarajevo-based Bosnian daily newspaper OSLOBODENJE. But the paper's editor-in-chief Zlatko Dizdarevic, receiving the award, accused the international community of helping "fascists" to divide Bosnia-Herzegovina by sanctioning their actions. The world community had "legitimized fascists's rights to divide us, to chase us from our homes in the name of a made up version of history, false myths, and because of its own lack of insight," he said.

He was speaking after European Parliament President Egon Klepsch said the daily, which has kept printing through more than 18 months of war, was an "example of tolerance and understanding." The award was presented to Dizdarevic by Yelena Bonner, the widow of the Russian dissident and scientist Andrei Sakharov, who gave his name to the award in 1988. The newspaper is

seen as one of the last remaining symbols of multiculturalism and ethnic pluralism in Bosnia-Herzegovina, torn apart by warring Moslems, Croats and Serbs.

Dizdarevic, describing conditions under which his paper functions, said: "We have lost in this war everything it is possible to lose." Five of his journalists have been killed, with 25 injured and 10 missing, he said. "We are not surprised to see that these fascists exist," he told his audience. "What astonishes us is the fact that their fascism is being legitimized in the name of a 'new political reality'," he said. At a press conference, he thanked international journalists' associations without which he said his paper would not appear. Of those who produced the paper, he said: "Our only nationality is that of journalist."

The Sakharov Prize, given for "freedom of spirit" and accompanied by a cash sum of 15,000 Ecus (about $15,000), is awarded by the parliament. In 1992 it was given to opponents of dictatorship in Argentina.

Among other previous recipients are Nelson Mandela, who received the award in 1988, and Alexander Dubcek in 1989.

## Croats Release 236 Muslims; Closing Camps

*AU1512125193 Paris AFP in English 1235 GMT 15 Dec 93*

[Text] Zagreb, Dec 15 (AFP)—Bosnian Croat authorities released 236 Moslem prisoners from two prisoner-of-war camps in Bosnia-Herzegovinia on Tuesday as they started to close the camps down, a Croat official said. Many more Moslem prisoners were to be freed Wednesday from the camps at Rodoc and Gabela, according to Vladislav Pogarcic, a senior aide to Bosnian Croat leader Mate Boban. Eighty-six Moslems held prisoner at the Rodac heliport, near Mostar in southern Bosnia-Herzegovina, and 150 others held at Gabela, 40 kilometres (25 miles) south of Mostar, were freed on Tuesday, Pogarcic told AFP by telephone. He said a larger number of prisoners were to be released Wednesday as the Croats pressed on with dismantling the two prison camps, as announced by Boban last Friday. Boban said he intended to close down the prison camps by December 17. All prisoners will be freed apart from those who face criminal charges. More than 3,000 prisoners were to be released out of 4,000 at the Rodoc and Gabela camps, the official said.

## Shelling of Sarajevo Leaves 8 Dead, 13 Wounded

*AU1412143993 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 14 Dec 93*

[Text] Shortly before this program we received a report from the information service of the 1st Corps on the situation in Sarajevo and the consequences of the shelling of (?civilians).

One person was killed by sniper fire in the district of Kobilja Glava. As a consequence of the enemy's artillery shelling of the districts of Stari Grad, Centar, [words indistinct], eight civilians were killed and 13 wounded either slightly or seriously. We have received this information from the Kosevo and the state hospitals, the report states.

The Chetniks started a fierce artillery attack from their strongholds in Borije and Vidikovac shortly after 1300 using mortars, tanks, and [word indistinct] on the districts of Stari Grad and Centar. The central parts of the town were attacked from Beogradska Street with [word indistinct]. Kobilja Glava was hit by 14 shells from the direction of Pretrznje. The artillery attack on the town has been going since 1300 and the citizens are warned to remain in their homes and in shelters until further notice, because the general danger alarm is still in force. This was reported by the information service of the 1st Corps.

## Muslims Using Tear Gas on Sarajevo Front

*LD1412155793 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1414 GMT 14 Dec 93*

[Text] Lukavica, 14 Dec (TANJUG)—The Sarajevo front has been marked today by intensive sniper fire and fire from heavy infantry weapons by Muslims on Serbian positions and Serb-held suburbs. Throughout the night combat activities were considerably stepped up in the northern and southwestern sections of the front where Muslim forces pounded Rajlovac, Ilidza, Hadzici, and Nedzarici with artillery weapons, among others. Positions of the Vogosca operative group of the army of the Serb republic were pounded with antitank grenades and 82-mm mortar shells from the direction of the Muslim strongholds at Sokolj and the city's main waste disposal location. The Serbian side returned fire and according to Serb military sources, one Serb fighter was wounded in the attack. Overnight, Muslim forces carried out a strong mortar attack against Kasindolska Street from the direction of Butmir and across the airport runway. The 82-mm caliber shells were filled with poison gases, that is, tear gas.

During the night Muslims stepped up fire against the Serb defense lines in Hadzici and Zuc hill from the direction of Goduse, Kralupa, and Ormanj Hill. There is also evidence of Muslim forces concentrating in the area of the cold-storage plant at Stup and in Sokolovic Kolonija.

## Bosnian Serb Police To Escort UN Convoys

*LD1412175093 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1644 GMT 14 Dec 93*

[Text] Belgrade, Dec 14 (TANJUG)—The U.N. peacekeepers in Bosnia have agreed that the local Bosnian Serb police should escort U.N. humanitarian convoys through territories controlled by the Serb forces, the Sarajevo U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) Spokesman, Idesbald van Biesebroeck, said on Tuesday.

Agreement on this was reached on Monday by UNPROFOR Commander for Bosnia Angus Ramsay and Bosnian Serb Army Chief-of-staff, General Manojlo Milovanovic, foreign agencies cited the spokesman as saying.

In question are convoys which will be sent to the Moslem enclaves in eastern Bosnia. Under the agreement, these convoys will be checked only once before leaving Serb-controlled territories, while the U.N. will secure fuel for the escorts, the spokesman said. According to him, the agreement aims to avoid bureaucratic delays and possible misunderstandings. Van Biesebroeck rejected claims that the agreement will serve to limit the freedom of movement of the convoys, as agreed in Geneva last month.

Relief aid convoys pass through Bosnian Serb territory safely but are regularly checked as there were cases when convoys intended for the Moslems contained goods other then humanitarian aid, like ammunition for example. The spokesman for the U.N. secretary general, Joe Sills, said on Monday that humanitarian convoys pass through Bosnia without major problems, thus denying reports in some western media that the Bosnian Serbs are blocking the convoys for eastern Bosnia.

## Muslims Launch Attack on Serb-Held Doboj

*LD1412154993 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1517 GMT 14 Dec 93*

[Text] Doboj, 14 Dec (TANJUG)—An attack against Doboj defense lines, launched by Muslim formations from the direction of Gracanica this morning, is still continuing. On two occasions shortly after 1400, a general alert was sounded sending the population of Doboj to their shelters. Shells are pounding the town halting all activites. Schools have closed and all institutions and firms have stopped work. Doboj defenders have been responding vehemently and are in full control of the defense lines, Serbian military sources have said.

## Babic Continues To Lead Krajina Elections

*AU1512091993 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 0900 GMT 15 Dec 93*

[Text] According to the unofficial and incomplete results of the presidential, parliamentary, and communal elections in the republic of Serbian Krajina, Milan Babic and the Serbian Democratic Party of Krajina are leading convincingly. Milan Babic is president of the Serbian Democratic Party of Krajina. The representatives of the Republican Electoral Commission told journalists last night that Milan Babic won about 110,000 votes, while the runner up, Milan Martic, who is promoted by a group of citizens, won about 54,000 votes. Results have still not arrived from the communes of Benkovac and Gracac.

## Martic Demands Annulment

*LD1412212093 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1515 GMT 14 Dec 93*

[Excerpts] Knin, 14 Dec (TANJUG)—The election headquarters of Milan Martic, an independent candidate in the presidential elections held in the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK] on Sunday [12 December], today asked the electoral commission to annul the results for six electoral units: Knin, Gracac, Krnjak, Kostajnica, Vrgin Most, and Vojnic. Details of the request were revealed at a news conference in Knin today by Petar Damjanic, the head of Martic's election headquarters. [passage omitted]

The ball is now in the electoral commission's court. Its spokesman said last night that "if the objections prove to be correct, the election results for the six electoral units will have to be annulled."

## Tudjman Congratulates Yeltsin on Referendum

*LD1412150893 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 14 Dec 93*

[Text] Dr. Franjo Tudjman, president of the Republic of Croatia, has sent the following telegram to the Boris Yeltsin, president of the Russian Federation:

Your excellency: in response to the endorsement of the new constitution of the Russian Federation in a referendum of all its citizens please receive the most sincere messages of congratulations from me and from the entire Croatian people. The endorsement of the Russian Federation's most important state document will, no doubt, help in further developing democracy in line with the best traditions of democratic life suitable for the present-day development of state and legal systems in the world.

Your excellency, please receive the expressions of my personal respect.

[Signed] Franjo Tudjman, president of the Republic of Croatia.

## Article Views Regionalization of Republic

*AU1412122693 Rijeka NOVI LIST-TJEDNI NOVI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 4 December 93 p 3*

[Article by Neven Santic: "Regionalization of Croatia on the Model of Austria"]

[Text] More than two months should have passed from the first assembly of regionalists held in the middle of September in Opatija and the session of the Presidency of the Association of Regional Parties that was founded at that gathering. What happened in the meantime leads to the conclusion that parts of the ruling party, not without influence, but also some other participants in the political and public life of Croatia, are not well-disposed toward the strengthening of regionalists, especially their program and interrelationships.

President Tudjman's speech at the Zagreb Croatian National Theater and the one he gave a day later, in Lupoglav, was an introduction to a series of attacks on parties that are said to advocate autonomy, secession, the division of Croatia, and many other things that are supposed to discredit those political groups in the eyes of the electorate. Setting aside the fact that the circumstances of the explosion at the Split headquarters of the DA [Dalmatian Action] have still not been clarified by the court, and that leaders of this party were imprisoned, which the regionalists took as an attack on them and their political orientation—the almost two-month cycle of "anathematizing" regional parties ended with an "analysis" of the trip of the IDS [Istrian Democratic Assembly] to Geneva and their conversation with people from Lord Owen's office.

And so, the Presidency of the ARSH [expansion unknown], instead of 10 days after the gathering in Opatija, assembled much earlier, since they realized that the political game in which they had become involved will be much "tougher" than they thought or wanted to believe at first, as "friendly and practice games" are very rare in politics. When "points" are at stake, and the judge "favors" the one with a higher score, "eager outsiders" must be prepared for everything.

### "Reducing the Problem to a 'Hackneyed' Dilemma"

However, it would be wrong to think that regionalists were totally surprised by the latest series of attacks on their politics. There have been such attacks before, actually since the very foundation of parties that emphasize the regional in the state politics seeking to undermine the centralism lying at the core of the bureaucratic organization of the state in the 20th century. If anything came as a surprise, then it was the extent of those attacks, which all have in common the fact that they aim to avoid real confrontation of arguments and that they want to reduce the entire conflict to a "hackneyed" dilemma—for or against Croatia.

But how is one to respond to the challenge of political opponents? By straining relations or by continuing the

present, seemingly futile politics that counts on graduality but also on consistency? Judging by statements of the leaders of the IDS, RIDS [Democratic Union of Rijeka and Istria] and the SBHS [Croatian Party of Slavonia and Baranja], Ivan Jakovcic, Vladimir Smesni, and Ivica Bogadija, not to forget Mira Ljubic-Lorger from the DA, who was absent with good reason from the session of the ARSH Presidency in Rijeka, they opted for another solution. Primarily because, in an open exchange of "fire" with their opponents, they would probably get the worst of it, without gaining on the political plan, and then also because, by doing so, they would put their foot in it, as they constantly advocate a different way of discussion than the one prevailing on the Croatian political scene.

"We will act utterly constructively and offensively, starting from citizens and their interests," said Ivan Jakovcic in his condense presentation of principles on which regional parties are trying to bring on changes in the Croatian politics. Their set framework which presents the essence of basic guidelines of the political activity of the ARSH, within which that activity will be tested, bordered by the fight for a consistent regional organization of the Republic of Croatia on principles of the Croatian state tradition, European regionalism, and local self-government, and against centralization, county division, semi-presidential system, accumulation of political functions, and other "evils" of the Croatian politics.

**Organization of Croatia**

Perhaps along the lines of offering concrete solutions, as a form of "constructive political offensive," the announcement of the future proposal for the organization of Croatia is the most interesting one. What will the regionalists offer that will differ from the existing division into counties and will not be the federalization of Croatia, which they explicitly spoke out against the other day? The proposal is far from being fully defined; it will probably be necessary to search leaderships of each party first, but "well-informed sources" say that the regionalists want to organize the future Croatia on the model of Austria. Therefore, this is about "laender," [German term used] i.e. lands such as in the country to the north of Croatia; the terminology is not important in this case, but their local self-government and relation to the central authorities in Vienna is.

Obviously, regional parties will not reconcile themselves to "administrative shaping of regions and artificially created, helpless counties," and they offer a form of organization that, according to them, is more suitable to the historical, cultural, economic, and political circumstances, which will not aim to weaken but to strengthen the Croatian state in general. We immediately see the historical analogy with the organization of Austria-Hungary, i.e. the fact that the regionalists are more inclined to the former (and evidently also to the present) Austrian model of regions, which was also realized in practice through the status of Istria and Dalmatia as provinces, than to the Hungarian, which was accepted in central Croatia and on which the present division of the country into counties is based.

**"Regions With Autonomous Authority"**

Of course, that has nothing to do with being sentimental regarding the former state creation to which the Croatian lands also belonged, but it is logical that regional parties will advocate the state organization that is more advanced in the process of decentralization. Measured by such a "decentralist meter" it became clear that the division into regions with autonomous authorization is superior to decentralization through smaller administrative units, which are most often just a mere transmission of centralist and bureaucratic authorities.

The question is what will be the contents of this model—which avoids the federalization of the country on the model of Germany—how will it be elaborated and, above all, how will it be accepted by the political public which closely inspects every proposal coming from a regional party. The difficulty which the regionalists encounter at the very beginning lies in the fact that the county model has just been adopted, that it still needs to be shaped to the full, and that the obligation to adopt the decision on county emblems and flags is a part of that completion, and that the ruling party, which pushed the entire model, does not intend to relinquish this concept of territorial and administrative division of the country.

It would be too naive to believe that leaders of regional parties did not consider that objective hindrance. The answer to why, in spite of everything, they still want to shape their proposal for the state organization, partly lies in their intention to fully and explicitly present their political views, and partly also in hoping that, sooner or later, it will come to light that the present county model did not pass the test of life and that it will be necessary to change it. If not in near future, then definitely in case the ruling party is replaced.

On the other hand, concrete shaping of such an important question for the state should also prove the capability of the regional association to face the present reality and to deny criticism which reproach them with dealing with "abstract" problems of democracy (although those problems are generally not present), splitting hairs of the authorities, without offering alternative solutions. And, let us not forget, the future shaped solution of territorial and administrative organization of Croatia is just another "offer" to other opposition parties to present to the electoral body a different picture of Croatia than the one promoted by the ruling party. For, almost all important opposition parties' programs offer, among other things, the regional development of Croatia, but have hitherto not offered any concrete solutions which would show what they really mean by that.

**Greatest Burden of the IDS**

Once the regional proposal of the "Croatian laender" is made public, it will be interesting to follow the reactions it will trigger, and we will witness constant, everyday attempts of the regionalists to launch a counterproposal

to every proposal of the authorities. Opting for a constructive offensive and "bombing" the authorities with concrete solutions will not end with this example, according to the regionalists. It will become a constant which will best present the (im)potence of this political group in the time and space in which they are active.

And that is why it is logical that the IDS take the greatest burden, due to their position in the Parliament but also due to the great power it has in Istria, which, indeed, is just one part of Croatia, but the one indicative of vibrations on the entire Croatian political scene. Regionalists from Slavonia-Baranja, Dalmatia, and Rijeka are mature enough to realize who can really act as an "anti-centralist icebreaker," and they were probably relieved when their realized that the IDS will not abandon them and wish to play solo until the end. That party probably concluded that political playing solo in Croatia today is a Sisyphean task and that it only produces countereffects.

The ARSH has, therefore, announced to the ruling party that it will fight patiently for a long time, as a reply to the fact that its activity was characterized as anti-Croatian. The ultimate result of that tug of war is uncertain, but, for the time being, the power is in the hands of the authorities. However, we must not forget that power is relative and that it largely depends on the reflection of the actual situation. If reality keeps denying the elite in power, time will start working for other political options, and thus also for those regional ones.

The first real test of the balance of power between the authorities and the regionalists will be the acceptance of present form of local government and self-government in the electoral body. Consequently, the regionalists started from that level, hoping that events will develop to their benefit. It remains to be seen whether they are on the right track.

## Participants in Geneva Talks Examined

*AU1412120193 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 5 December 93 pp 10,11*

[Article by Mirko Galic: "Struggling in the Balkan Noose"]

[Text] After more than a year of negotiations, the Geneva conference has not changed regarding one thing—it is still moving in the circle of the original opposites: the Serbs want to hold on to as much of their plunder as possible, the Muslims want to use the negotiating table to win back what they lost (to the Serbs) in battle (or, better yet, by not fighting them), while the Croats do not have the plunder of the Serbs, nor the (mis)fortune of the Muslims. However, standards determining the sensation of an event have changed in the meantime: whether Tudjman and Milosevic will meet, was once as interesting as the Pope's private life, whereas today, the meeting of the representatives of Croatia and Serbia is no sensation. For a long time Alija Izetbegovic stubbornly refused to sit at the same table with Karadzic, but today, he negotiates with him both in private and at plenary sessions, regardless of the fact that members of his delegation refer to the president of the "Serbian Republic" as the "Serbian Mengele." Milosevic did not need much persuading to come to the diplomatic scene, for he always wanted international promotion. However, it is difficult to extract a solid promise that would bind Milosevic, and give hope to others, to ensure that Serbia will finally become a country like others. Therefore, everybody will try to negotiate for their own interests; the problem, however, is how eager they are to make the negotiations successful?

This time the Palace of Nations hosted more "cooks" than ever before, which was enough to "boil" the broth, i.e. to initiate new negotiations, but not enough to prevent "spoiling" the broth (i.e. negotiations). Lord Owen, with a touch of flu, and Thorwald Stoltenberg, who was in good health, were assisted by the entire European diplomatic advisory council, as well as by the authors of the new peace plan, Juppe and Kinkel. The Norwegian was smiling going down in an elevator to his first meeting with his counterparts from the European Union; the expression of his face did not reveal the fact that these were his last negotiations, or was he in such a good mood exactly because of that? The position of the British lord is safe, for the time being; the European Community (Union) has more patience than the United Nations, which have once replaced their negotiator (Cyrus Vance).

Who knows what Slobodan Milosevic will some day say about David Owen? About his predecessor, Lord Carrington, he said something that justifies the suspicion (or, at one time, even open criticism) that the first leader of the conference is somehow "related" to Serbia, on the royal or some other side. The Serbian president did much to justify his severe judgment according to which the European Community has made "many mistakes" concerning the "Yugoslav crisis." For, "your former representative, Lord Carrington, and some of your predecessors, ministers, are openly talking about those mistakes."

### "Lord Owen—Serbian Ally?"

Will Milosevic one day also refer to the other lord, Owen, as his ally? In the Palace of Nations, Muhamed Sacirbey, at one point, threatened that his delegation would leave the negotiations in protest, for Owen "went beyond his mandate" and proposed that the Serbs and the Muslims negotiate about Sarajevo. Perhaps if it were up to Sacirbey, he would have left the Palace of Nations. Izetbegovic and Silajdzic, who decide about that, did not leave the negotiating table, thus leaving the journalists in two minds about who is the real "boss" of the Bosnian-Muslim "side?"

Senior, both by age and hierarchy, Izetbegovic is worn-out by the war, his political capital is not what it used to be, after he wrongly predicted that there would not be a

war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and after his wrong conviction that the West will intervene militarily, and after his share of the responsibility for the "conflict between victims" (the Muslims and the Croats). His younger prime minister has spent most of the war in Geneva, London, New York, and Vienna, and does not carry as many scars as Izetbegovic. Rumor has it that he would prefer to have peace (he would not be held responsible for the war and its victims) and that "one can negotiate with him." Even Serbian sources say that.

The Croatian side, especially Minister Mate Granic, has a lot of experience, but even it finds it difficult to say what Silajdzic really wants. How independent is he in negotiations? Does he keep his promises, unlike Izetbegovic, who is torturing everybody by changing his terms, so that those who negotiate with him must take sedatives or apply for accelerated retirement plan? How much did Silajdzic learn from the negotiating skill of constant dodging? Some think that one must put up with him, some that one cannot do without him; some are baffled by his interpretation of history (Bosnia as a "thousand-year-old maritime country"), and by his insistence on several kilometers of the coast for the future Muslim republic, while others are realists—one cannot choose negotiators!

**"Izetbegovic's 'No Progress'"**

European diplomacy (Willy Claes) has set quite limited goals—no agreement in one day; that is why no one could be very disappointed when there was no progress after four days. Indeed, Karadzic will praise the "encouraging atmosphere," which indicates that this psychiatrist has mastered some skills of diplomatic rhetoric and can speak without saying anything, for which he could be condemned by domestic opponents or European judges (from the Hague) tomorrow. He still radiates old passions which put him on Eagleberger's list, and so he is again saying that the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina are "the oldest nation," that they hold 64 percent of the country and that they form a majority on 65 percent of the territory.

His poetic self, who allows himself the freedom not to have to prove his feelings, claims the right to speak in the name of the "Christian majority," although he was not given the authorization of the Christian part of that majority. In distinction to the new/old Karadzic, Izetbegovic, speaking for the media, showed that his English did not get any better: he kept saying "no progress," and he has been saying the same for a year. Perhaps it is so; he probably thinks so: there would be "progress" if the Serbs returned Muslim territories that they conquered in eastern and western Bosnia, and if the Croats gave the Muslim republic "territorial access to the sea." It would be just if Karadzic returned that which ethnically does not belong to him, regardless of statistics of the "republic of Srpska," but the question is: Did the world and Europe given up on justice already at the beginning of the Serbian aggression, in Croatia, when they stood by watching an army armed to the teeth destroy towns, and kill and expel people?

But what can Mate Boban give, now that he is almost pauperized, without the Sava Basin Region, which is occupied by the Serbs, without central Bosnia, which now belongs to the Muslims? Herceg-Bosna is left without Bosnia, and if it had to let the Muslims get to the sea, and thus create a precedent that the Serbs would also refer to, there would not be much left of [passage indistinct] happen to Croatia, in that case? It would be divided into two parts, with prospects of ultimately losing the entire state and national territory! And that is why Boban, and especially Tudjman, returned everything to the carrier "Invincible." There, the Croatian side made "as many concessions as possible"—giving the Muslim republic "access to the sea" through the ports of Ploce and Rijeka (free trade zones), and letting the Muslims decide whether they will build the port on the Neretva River (if possible).

**"'Constructive Behavior' of the Croats"**

Although he was the last to arrive at the Palace of Nations (as the entire Zagreb machinery was engaged in clearing the snow from the Pleso [Zagreb airport] runway, so that the "Challenger" could take off), the president of Croatia spoke first: territorial access for the Muslims (the same should apply for the Serbs as well) "is out of the question." A "Modus vivendi" in Croatia—yes, provided that European countries guarantee Croatian borders with a set deadline. If it demanded "cooperation" from negotiators, the European diplomacy got it, to the extent the Croatian delegation estimated it could cooperate.

That seems to have been enough to show that the Croats are "behaving constructively," which Willy Claes stipulated as one of the terms for offering his "carrot" (economic aid to Croatia, making it a member of the "PHARE program") [Economic Reconstruction Aid for Poland and Hungary]. The Belgian minister, who will be "the first among equals" until the end of the month (before the arrival of the Greek, Pangalos, whose pro-Belgrade behavior has already instilled fear in his European counterparts), did not make demands that, according to European standards, would be quite unacceptable for the Croatian delegation: not to change the "offered concessions" in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and do that in two ways—"access to the sea" (not "exit" to the sea) and "port concessions," and to agree to the "modus vivendi" in Croatia, which would first of all mean cessation of hostilities, secondly withdrawing Croatian forces from areas that they had "conquered" in January 1993, and thirdly, only as a "transition stage" to the "final solution" that would recognize the "legitimate demands of Croatia for its own territory," and "aspirations of the Serbs to greater autonomy."

The agreement does not depend on one will only, but on two, three, or more wills (and interests). Striving to gain

access to the sea, and to build their own port and tourism there, the Muslims have not modified their demands at all: "a maritime country" demands its piece of the sea! Does Izetbegovic really care about sea water or about bitter negotiations? To what extent do his crazy ideas reflect the real assessment that the Muslim republic cannot survive without the sea, and to what extent do they present a would-be alibi for some other plans? The way in which he presents and defends his demands—that there should be stricter sanctions on Serbia, if it does not agree to what he demands, and that sanctions be imposed on Croatia, if it does not make its share of contributions—is reminiscent of some old times when the kadi [a judge in a Muslim community] could both accuse and judge.

To what extent is Izetbegovic's behavior counterproductive? Indeed, he is surrounded by young diplomatic lions, Sacirbey from New York, Hadzimusic from Brussels, who emphasize the difference between the Serbs and the Croats, and are not influenced by the conflagration of present Croat-Muslim relations. Will that tendency prevail and how much support will it get at home and abroad?

### "And What About Milosevic After the Elections?"

Nothing was settled with the Muslim negotiators: both the target and the distance is the same. Concerning Milosevic (and Karadzic and Bulatovic, if he is still "in charge" of anything at all), things are not any clearer either: the president of Serbia waddles across the Palace of Nations as though this is the first time he had stepped on the firm ground, but he does not give any sign of not having mastered the skill of walking across the diplomatic ice. He is still a very difficult man to understand: in one speech, he is prepared to swear at European diplomacy and slap ministers around in the first part of his speech, and pretend to be a peacemaker in the second part. One can probably not count on him before the Serbian elections.

However, what will he do after that? Will he then be willing to recognize Croatia? When he was Seselj's ally, Milosevic justified himself by saying he could not have done that, since his ally would "raise hell." Will Arkan be a hindrance for him after 19 December—or an excuse—not to recognize the neighboring country (Croatia), which is prepared to recognize Serbia? In that case, what is not unclear, will become more clear now—that Milosevic made war for "greater Serbia" and that he does not see the borders of Croatia as they were internationally recognized.

However, what will he do with the noose of economic sanctions? Before his public, he is capable of accusing the international community of having committed a "genocide against the Serbian nation." How will he feed that public after the war games that have made him a beggar? For, if happiness is measured by a kilogram of potatoes in a country, and prices change three times a day, if its youth are fleeing the country and its old people are sinking to an all-time low, then even the "sheep" will one day ask the "shepherd": where have you brought us?!

In the Palace of Nations, we again had unanswered questions. How many times did that happen: big turnover, small profit!

## IMF Representative Assesses Economic Policy

*AU1412124693 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 10 Dec 93 p 3*

[HINA report: "Croatia Opens the IMF Door a Little"]

[Text] Zagreb—Croatian Prime Minister Nikica Valentic received a delegation of the IMF and the World Bank headed by Scott Brown, deputy IMF director for Europe, in Zagreb on Wednesday [8 December].

On this occasion, the Croatian prime minister spoke about the implementation of economic stabilization measures in Croatia, and pointed out in particular that inflation was reduced from the former 50 percent to less than 2 percent. He said that there is a significant opposition to new economic measures as many people adjusted themselves to new economic measures, and he particularly pointed to the problems faced by big public enterprises such as railroads, shipbuilding, and water management [vodoprivreda]. He also touched upon the paying out of pensions, student strikes in Zagreb, remarks made by trade unions, and particularly spoke about the budget consolidation and everything that it should lead to.

Nikica Valentic expressed hope that Croatia will be given support by the IMF, but pointed out that the Government should also rely on its own forces and proffer its own program of restructuring the economy.

In his response, Mr. Scott Brown said that the initial results of the Croatian Government's anti-inflation program have gone beyond expectations, but that the hardest part is still to come. He pointed out that the low inflation has increased the credibility of the Croatian Government and state, but that some time has nevertheless passed, so that this credibility is rather frail. He pointed out in particular that maintaining low inflation may require an even more rigid monetary policy than the one so far. He expressed the opinion that a great reduction in inflation failed to have positive influence on Croatian exporters and proposed to the National Bank to adjust the dinar rate of exchange with what the market dictates. As regards the budget, Scott Brown pointed out that it will also demand certain political decisions to be made and that a short-term budget will be used until a long-term one is made.

The IMF representative also spoke about reducing unemployment, privatization, and other issues connected with the implementation of the stabilization program, and said that upon returning to IMF, he will very directly convey what he saw in Croatia, so that decisions could be made about possible financial help to our country.

## Federal

### Bank Chief on Need for New Debt Repayment Plan

*LD1412150793 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1219 GMT 14 Dec 93*

[Text] Belgrade, Dec 14 (TANJUG)— The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) needs to prepare a new programme for the repayment of its foreign debt which would serve as the basis for negotiations with its creditors, the deputy governor of the National Bank of Yugoslavia (NBY) and until recently a member of the Board of Executive Directors of the International Monetary Fund, Zarko Trbojevic said.

The maximum that the Yugoslav economy could secure for the repayment of its debt should not exceed 20 per cent of the country's foreign exchange income, according to Trbojevic.

There is presently no hard currency inflow into the country due to the eighteen-and-a-half-month-old international sanctions banning all imports and exports and cutting off all financial transactions with other countries.

The FRY external debt has, according to NBY figures of September 30, stood at six billion dollars. Because of its present situation caused by the break-up of the former Yugoslav federation and the imposition of sanctions, the FRY is currently not meeting its obligations to foreign creditors. Foreign partners owe several billion dollars to the FRY, for the goods they imported for cash or credit. It is important, he adds, for the NBY to try to collect the maximum of this outstanding debt and to incorporate the funds into the country's foreign currency reserves or use them for necessary imports.

A series of unfavourable circumstances make it impossible for the FRY to collect its outstanding debts in many countries. This is the case of Iraq and Libya, countries which are also under U.N. Security Council sanctions, as well as the countries of the CIS (ex-USSR) where the economic situation is extremely difficult. It is necessary to enable the Yugoslav economy to maintain a level of production necessary to immediately launch economic recovery and obtain foreign private capital with this aim. Through shortages of fuel, raw and production materials, three quarters of the Yugoslav economy are at a standstill, according to surveys made in the last few months.

Investments of private firms and corporations from abroad could be the first real step towards the revival of the Yugoslav economy, after which international financial support will follow. These conditions must be met for the FRY to ensure regular servicing and repayment of its debt, Trbojevic concluded.

## Serbia

### Poll Predicts SPS Victory in 19 Dec Elections

*AU1412174393*

[Editorial Report] Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian on 14 December on pages 12 and 13 carries an approximately 3,500-word report entitled "There Will Probably Be No Winners," on the results of an opinion poll on the popularity of the main political parties prior to the 19 December elections in Serbia.

The main political parties are:
SPS—Socialist Party of Serbia
SRS—Serbian Radical Party
DS—Democratic Party
DSS—Democratic Party of Serbia
Depos—Democratic Movement of Serbia

The poll was carried out by BORBA on 10 and 11 December and, according to the report, "involves 350 respondents from all nine electoral units. The number of respondents in the electoral units is proportionate to the number of voters. The respondents were selected from the telephone directories using the technique of random sampling.

"One should bear in mind that the sample includes only the telephone owners, who, according to social research, represent a special category of the population (the sample also includes a negligible number of rural population).

This poll includes a higher than normal percentage of highly educated people."

The results of the poll are expressed in percentages and summarized as follows:

**"Inclination of Voters in the Polls of 12-14 November and 10-11 December"**

| | 12-14 Nov | 10-11 Dec |
|---|---|---|
| SPS | 24.44 | 21.38 |
| SRS | (about) 4.70 | 4.72 |
| DS | 9.75 | 11.66 |
| DSS | (about) 6.00 | 3.88 |
| Depos | (about) 14.00 | 18.11 |
| Others | (about) 4.5 | 4.28 |
| Do not know | (about) 30.00 | 19.72 |

The report also adds that 8.88 percent of the voters said they would not vote in the elections.

**"Prediction of the Election Results" (pie chart)**

| | |
|---|---|
| SPS | 51.11 |
| SRS | 0.83 |
| DS | 4.44 |
| DSS | 0.55 |
| Depos | 6.11 |
| Opposition | 6.94 |
| Others | 1.38 |
| Do not know | 28.06 |
| Do not want to say | 0.55 |

## NIN Publishes Poll

*AU1512120093*

[Editorial Report] Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian on 10 December carries on pages 21-22 an approximately 4,500-word report entitled "Until the Last Vote," on the results of an opinion poll on the popularity of political parties and politicians in Serbia prior to the 19-December elections.

The poll was conducted by NIN on 4 December and involves "200 respondents randomly selected from the telephone directories from all parts of Serbia (respondents from Kosovo are non-Albanians)."

According to the report, the number of respondents selected from all electoral units is "proportionate to the number of voters in the electoral units. The number of respondents from the rural areas is slightly higher than the number of voters in rural areas (48 percent as opposed to 45 percent), and from towns and cities slightly lower (31.5 percent as opposed to 33 percent, and 20.5 percent as opposed to 22 percent respectively)."

The report also states that the sample includes 49 of percent women and 51 percent of men, and that 78 percent of the respondents are "in active employment."

The report adds that "majority of the respondents complain about material circumstances (58.5 percent as opposed to 46.5 percent at the end of October), and that fewer respondents watch Dnevnik 2 Newscast on the Serbian Television (64 percent as opposed to 74.5 percent) and read daily newspapers (38 percent as opposed to 43 percent). The sample includes a noticeably larger number of the followers of the Orthodox religion (58 percent as opposed to 42 percent), and fewer atheists and agnostics (26 and 11 percent respectively)."

The results of the poll are expressed in percentages and summarized as follows:

**"Who Would Gain What; distribution of 250 deputy seats in the Assembly of Serbia"**

| | 23 October | 4 December |
|---|---|---|
| SPS | 71 | 86 |
| DS | 21 | 20 |
| Undecided | 126 | 144 |

The report notes that "the votes given to the parties that did not satisfy the legal minimum requirement of 5 percent was apportioned to the parties satisfying this condition, proportionate to the number of votes they received."

**"Majority Remains Undecided; Will You Vote at the 19-December Elections, and If You Will, How Will You Vote?"**

| | 24 October | 4 December |
|---|---|---|
| Do not know | 5.5 | 4 |
| Will not vote | 15.5 | 10.5 |
| Will vote | 79 | 85.5 |
| —have not decided for whom | (42.4) | (46.2) |
| —do not want to say | (10.7) | (4.7) |
| —for SPS | (24) | (27.5) |
| —for opposition | (7.8) | (7) |
| —for DS | (7) | (6.4) |
| —for Depos | (4.4) | (4.6) |
| —for SRS | (3.8) | (1.2) |

The report notes that the "figures in parenthesis were worked out on the basis of the number of those who will take part in the elections."

**"Politicians of Trust; Can You List at Least Three Politicians, Currently in Power Or Opposition, That Instill Trust?"**

| | 23 October | 4 December |
|---|---|---|
| None | 63 | 48 |
| Slobodan Milosevic | 21 | 30.5 |
| Zoran Djindjic | 4 | 17.5 |
| Vojislav Kostunica | 8.5 | 15 |
| Vuk Draskovic | 4.5 | 6 |

The report notes that "Between three and five percent of the respondents mentioned Zeljko Raznjatovic [Arkan], and Vojislav Seselj."

**"Characteristics of Leading Politicians; Why Do They Instill Trust?"**

Slobodan Milosevic: consistent; champions Serbs; Qualities mentioned less frequently: a diplomat who favors peace; honest;

Zoran Djindjic: clever; honest; young; Qualities mentioned less frequently: reasonable; able, good-looking;

Vojislav Kostunica: realist; serious; moderate; Qualities mentioned less frequently: clever; honest; articulate;

Vuk Draskovic: favors changes; frank; Qualities mentioned less frequently: good; close to people; consistent;

## SRS Official: Coalition With Democrats 'Possible'

*AU1512110893 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 13 Dec 93 p 9*

[Report by M. Mihajlovic: "Nikolic: Coalition With DS, DSS, and Even SPS Possible After Elections"]

[Text] Krusevac, 12 Dec—In the finale of the electoral campaign in Krusevac this afternoon, Tomislav Nikolic, vice president of the Serbian Radical Party [SRS] first appeared on Krusevac radio and television and then at the news conference.

"We remind the current authorities that they must respect the results of the elections regardless of who will win. We will respect these results in any case. We remind that participation in elections is the choice of people. We do not wish our President Slobodan Milosevic to share the fate of Ceausescu. If the Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS] decides to introduce the state of emergency, which is already being announced, then this will also be their definitive departure from the political scene," Nikolic stressed.

The SRS vice president also categorically stated that Serbia is already in the state of emergency, which he supported with the information about rationed supply, worthless pensions, issue of money without cover....

"The president of the republic has neither the legal nor moral right to conduct a campaign for one party only. He exploited his latest visit to Geneva to stream the electoral body to the advantage of the SPS instead of concerning himself with solutions to the problems in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Serbian Krajina," Nikolic emphasized.

Nikolic also introduced the SRS parliamentary candidates Radovan Boncic, president of the SRS regional committee, Miloslav Simic, Dragan Miletic, and Mihajlo Miljkovic, with a remark that a coalition with the Democratic Party, the Democratic Party of Serbia, and also with the Serbian Renewal Movement is possible after the elections if they state that they recognize the republic of Srpska and the republic of Serbian Krajina as well as the right of self-determination of the Serbian people in former Bosnia-Herzegovina.

## SPS Comments on RSK, Russian Elections

*LD1412210293 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1533 GMT 14 Dec 93*

[Excerpt] Belgrade, 14 Dec (TANJUG)—Ivica Dacic, spokesman for the Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS], today said that the elections in the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK] are a factor of unity, not of disunity.

Speaking at a regular Socialist Party news conference, Dacic did not comment at length on the RSK elections because, as he said, the final results have not been released. He noted, however, that the elections should help articulate in the best way the wishes and interests of the people living there.

Commenting on the results of the elections in Russia, the SPS spokesman stressed that relations between Russia and Serbia should be as good as possible, and should not depend on who is in power, and who is in opposition—either here in Serbia or there in Russia.

In his opinion, the world needs a strong Russia with developed democracy and human rights, a Russia which will be a factor of stability. He reiterated the stand that the elections are an internal affair of the citizens of the Russian Federation, and stressed that both nations have enjoyed traditional friendship. [passage omitted]

## Seselj Hails Zhirinovskiy as 'Serbian Nationalist'

*AU1412163893 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 14 Dec 93*

[Text] As part of the Serbian Radical Party's [SRS] promotional rally, Vojislav Seselj, the party's president and the top candidate on all electoral lists, explained the SRS's position on the elections in the republic of Serbian Krajina and Russia.

[Begin Seselj recording] The SRS sincerely congratulates Dr. Milan Babic on his convincing victory in the presidential elections in the republic of Serbian Krajina. If it turns out that Mr. Babic has not achieved an absolute majority, and that a second round of elections will be held, the Serbian Radicals will support Dr. Milan Babic in the second round. The SRS is otherwise satisfied with the results achieved in the parliamentary elections. We were somewhat handicapped by the majority electoral principle, which promotes the strongest political party, but significantly damages the second strongest political party. However, the Serbian Radicals will nevertheless have an increased number of seats in the republic of Serbian Krajina's assembly, and their influence there could prove to be crucial.

The SRS is very satisfied with the success of the party with a similar ideological profile and political program, the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia. We sincerely congratulate Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, president of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia and radical Serbian nationalist, on his great electoral victory. We are aware that Russia will be plagued by great problems and that the situation after the elections will be extremely complicated, but we believe that Vladimir Zhirinovskiy will be able to find the best way to settle things and to restore the powerful Russian state. We are convinced that Zhirinovskiy's victory in Russia will contribute to the stabilization of events in the Balkans and to a more active Russian involvement in solving the Balkan crisis, primarily regarding the protection of the Serbian people, who are today being threatened by the Western powers and the United Nations. [end recording]

## Oil, Parts Shortages Cut Rail Traffic

*LD1512110893 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1055 GMT 15 Dec 93*

[Text] Belgrade, Dec 15 (TANJUG)—Most diesel-locomotives and rail-cars in Serbia are not in traffic, due to a lack of oil. The problem is gaining in gravity after 18 and a half months of international economic sanctions, which include an oil embargo. The oil industry of Serbia is delivering to the railway [words indistinct] tonnes of oil daily, which is far from necessary to meet all needs, the Belgrade daily POLITIKA writes on Wednesday [15 December].

Railroads which are not electrified can expect a total collapse of passenger and cargo traffic, the director general of the railway transportation firm 'Beograd' said. Adding to the problem are railway cars out of order and a lack of spare parts whose importing has also become impossible due to sanctions. About 80 percent of cars are not in traffic due to this reason. Locomotives with only two or three cars can often be seen on the railroad. Passengers are discouraged from entering such trains where conditions of travel are inhuman.

## Macedonia

### Politicians' Dec 1993 Poll Ratings Reported

*AU1512122593 Skopje PULS in Macedonian 10 Dec 93 pp 12, 13*

[Commentary by Zvezdan Georgievski: "Breakthrough by the 'Silent' Minister"]

[Text] The traditional politicians' popularity rating that has been implemented for the fourth time this year by PULS, in cooperation with the agency for public opinion polls of the Publishing House of NOVA MAKEDONIJA DATA PRESS (this time 18 politicians were included in the inquiry, compared to the 20 of the previous one), has shown a global stability in the political opinion of the Macedonian public. Indeed, there have been some changes on the list, as well as a slight decline in the popularity of nearly all the politicians, which can be explained by the political affairs that have developed in the interim.

Nonetheless, President of the Republic Kiro Gligorov is still invariably on the top of the list. He was positively assessed by 88.33 percent of the polled, 5.67 had a negative opinion, while 6 percent were not sure. The positive opinion about the work of President Gligorov dominated in all categories polled. If we look at the national criteria, the smallest percentage of positive opinion was stated by the Albanians (55 percent), while 90 percent of the Serbs expressed a positive opinion, and the Turks and Gypsies were 100 percent in favor of Gligorov. The Albanians also had the highest percentage of negative opinion (16.67), followed by the Serbs (10 percent), and finally the Macedonians (2,83 percent). The PDP-NDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity-National Democratic Party] affiliates and fans had the least positive opinion (62.07 percent), followed by VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Movement for Macedonian National Unity] with 85.71 percent. In other words, the parties defined as the two opposite classifications on the Macedonian political stage have approximately the same opinion about the President of the Republic. If we take his work as personifying global Macedonian policy, we easily come to the conclusion that these two parties' affiliates have a similar attitude in that regard. The other parties' affiliates have a 100-percent positive opinion about Mr. Gligorov. On the other hand, the worst opinion was expressed by the affiliates of the VMRO-DPMNE (14.29 percent), followed by the PDP-NDP (6.90 percent).

One of the most noteworthy discoveries in this rating was the breakthrough by Foreign Minister Stevo Crvenkovski, who was second on the popularity list (he was the sixth on the previous one). This high position of the first man of Macedonian diplomacy can be explained by the Macedonian public's increased interest in our state's foreign policy, and at the same time it indicates that the public approves of the Macedonian foreign policy strategy. Mr. Crvenkovski is said to be a "silent" person, a man who does not wish for mass media exposure, nevertheless he received a 62.33 percent positive opinion of the total number of the polled (he had 48 percent at the last rating), and 19.33 percent expressed a negative opinion (compared to the 25 percent at the previous one). The inquiry showed that those who do not agree with the Macedonian foreign policy are more critical toward the work of Stevo Crvenkovski. That is, it was once again demonstrated that the VMRO-DPMNE and the PDP-NDP have great similarities. Out of the total number of polled PDP-NDP affiliates, 51.72 percent had a positive opinion, compared to the 64 percent of the VMRO-DPMNE. The affiliates of his own party, the Liberal Party, and of the Socialist Party had a 100-percent positive opinion, while the SDSM affiliates expressed 91.67 percent positive assessment.

The Chairman of the People's Assembly Stojan Andov lost his second place on the previous list. Regardless of that, he essentially retained his popularity, because now 60.33 percent had a positive opinion about him, compared to the 59.33 percent of the previous rating. There was also less negative opinion expressed about him compared to the previous list. Now 21 percent of the polled had a negative opinion about him, while last time it was 25.33 percent. What is interesting here is that, apart from Kiro Gligorov, Stojan Andov was the only politician on the rating list who got a higher percentage from the female section of the polled, than from the male. He was positively assessed by 64.79 percent of women, and 56.33 percent of men. This correlation with Kiro Gligorov was 92.25 to 84.81 percent respectively. The independent delegate Todor Petrov could also compete in this regard, because the women and men voted equally for him (32 percent). This data shows that, compared to the previous ratings, women were more severe toward the Macedonian political elite.

The Prime Minister was also put one place below his last rating. The percentage of positive opinion (52.67) placed him on the fourth highest position. He was assessed negatively by 24.67 percent of the polled. The slight decline in his popularity can be defined by comparison with the previous rating, when he was positively assessed by 53.33 percent, with the negative rating of exactly 24 percent. This time again Mr. Crvenkovski was mostly trusted by the elderly generation. Namely, 62.64 percent of the polled at the age of 50 had a positive opinion about him. This percentage was 52.03 with the generation between 30 and 49 years old, and 43.02 with those between 18 and 29. The same correlation applies to negative opinion, with the

youngest group at 27.91 percent, the middle aged 26.02 percent, and the eldest 19.78.

Just after the Prime Minister comes the Minister of the Interior Ljubomir Frckovski (he was in seventh position at the last rating) with a 48.67 percent positive and 32.67 percent negative evaluation, which makes "the first Macedonian policeman" the most controversial politician. This controversy can be viewed through the other analyses of the inquiry. For instance, 28.33 percent of the polled Albanians had a positive opinion about Frckovski, compared to around 50 percent of the other nationalities (Macedonians, Serbs, and Turks). The Albanians expressed the highest negative evaluation (48.33 percent), followed by the Serbs (40.00 percent), the Macedonians (27.83 percent), the Turks (25.00 percent). The PDP-NDP expressed the least positive opinion (31.03 percent), followed by the VMRO-DPMNE (35.71 percent). These parties had the highest percentage of negative opinion about Minister Frckovski (PDP-NDP—48.28 percent, VMRO-DPMNE—42.86 percent).

This controversial situation can also be attributed to the President of the Democratic Party Petar Gosev. That is, he was positively assessed by 39.67 percent, and negatively by 38.33 percent of the polled. Occupying the sixth highest position, Mr. Gosev is the highest positioned oppositionist, but compared to the last rating, he moved two places down. Although he declared himself as the leader of the Center, the public demonstrated a strong evaluation on a nationalist basis. For the Albanians, for example, Gosev is one of the most unpopular politicians on the PULS rating list. That is, 73.33 percent of the Albanians had a negative opinion about him (in this regard only Ljupco Georgievski, the leader of the VMRO-DPMNE is worse, with 87.50 percent, and the delegate Dosta Dimovska shares the same percentage, while Todor Petrov received 63.33 percent). The surprise came from those who expressed a positive opinion, the highest being given by the Serbs (60 percent), followed by the Macedonians (47.17 percent), shared by every tenth Albanian.

The method used in the rating defines the position of the politicians according to the percentage of positive opinion, while all other factors have been left out. If we apply the same method in defining the list of the most unpopular ones, the first position goes to Mr. Ljupco Georgievski, who was assessed with 72.00 percent negative points, the second one is Miss Dosta Dimovska with 69.00, followed by Vladimir Golubovski (59.00 percent), Nevzat Halili (58.33 percent), Esref Aliu (46.67 percent), Todor Petrov and Petar Gosev (38.33 percent), and so on. By the same method the bottom of the list of the most unpopular is shared by Stojan Andov (21.00), Stevo Crvenkovski (19.33) and Kiro Gligorov (5.67). According to the data obtained, and by using another methodology, the adjective "most unpopular" can be attached to Risto Ivanov, the vice chairman of the government of Macedonia. That is, he is the least known politician, and 40 percent of the polled had never heard of him. The best known are Kiro Gligorov and Stojan Andov, because all of those polled had heard about them. Just following them is Branko Crvenkovski and Petar Gosev with 0.67 percent, and 1 percent of the polled had never heard of Ljubomir Frckovski, Vladimir Golubovski, and Ljupco Georgievski. The least assessed politician was Todor Petrov, as 24.66 percent of the polled had no opinion about him at all, and Risto Ivanov was assessed by 40.33 percent (20.33 positive, 20.00 negative). Just after him was Jane Miljovski with 47 percent (23 positive, and 24 negative).

This poll fulfilled its basic aim: It told us about the trends in policy and the politicians in relation to the public and public opinion. It is now up to the politicians and the policy to draw adequate conclusions. The public will evaluate them appropriately. And that will be seen in the next PULS ratings.

**[Box, p 12]**

DATA PRESS, the agency for public opinion polls of the Publishing House NOVA MAKEDONIJA, following the list of current politicians in the Republic of Macedonia defined by the independent weekly PULS in the period of 3 to 7 December 1993, carried out its fourth telephone survey this year, canvassing the opinion of 300 persons in the Republic of Macedonia within the long-term project entitled: "Ratings of the Current Politicians in the Republic of Macedonia"

The people surveyed for this exclusive research made by the weekly PULS were selected accidentally, proportionally, and singly, as samples, respecting all methodological procedures in carrying out a project of this type—telephone interviews. This time again the categories of people surveyed (especially bearing in mind the nationality) adequately reflected the structure of the adult population in the Republic of Macedonia.

The number of those who refused to take part was small, that is those who were questioned demonstrated a high level of interest in participating in this project.

Research group:
Cvetko Cvetkovski, manager
Gopce Georgievski, administrator
Olivera Petrova, Mirjana Sazdovska, Vesna Janakievska, Teuta Dumani, Milorad Efat

**Structure of the Polled**

Sex: male (52.67); female (47.33)
Age: 18-29—28.67; 30-49—41.00; over 50—30.33.
Education: elementary—15.67; highschool—58.00; university

—26.33. Nationality: Macedonian—70.67; Albanian—20.00; Turkish

—2.67; Gypsy—1.00; Serbian—3.33; others—2.33.
Affiliates of parties: VMRO-DPMNME—4.67; SDSM—4.00; RS-

LP—1.00; PDP-NDP—9.67; SP—0.67; none—76.00;

others—4.00
Employment status: unemployed—46.33; employed in state companies—38.67; employed in private companies—15.00.

### Citizens' Purchasing Power Increases in 1993

*AU1512095493 Skopje MIC in English 14 Dec 93*

[Unattributed report: "More Spent Than Earned"]

[Text] According to the published official statistics, life was better this year than the last, 1992. For example, in August last year, with the average Macedonian wage one could buy 94 liters of cooking oil, 225 kilograms of bread, and 297 boxes of cigarettes of the brand "Partner." In August this year, one average wage could buy even 174 liters of cooking oil, 245 kilograms of bread, that is, 510 boxes of "Partner." The experts claim that this is a result of the fact that in the republic, more was spent than earned.

### Production of Wheat Drops 16 Percent

*AU1512095293 Skopje MIC in English 14 Dec 93*

[Unattributed report: "Agricultural Products"]

[Text] 249,789 tonnes of wheat are harvested in Macedonia this year, which is 16.6 percent less than in 1992. The corn crop amounts to 104,473 tonnes, barley 103,455 tonnes, rice 13,317 tonnes, sugar root 54,968 tonnes, sunflower 17,496 tonnes, and raw tobacco 22,735 tones. In addition, 45 to 59 tonnes of apples have been harvested. The commercial needs of wheat in the republic are anticipated at about 320,000 tonnes, which means that a big shortage appears, and the solution is the import. Macedonia also needs to provide 50,000 tonnes of corn as cattle food.

### Government Adopts Economic Program for 1994

*AU1512095093 Skopje MIC in English 14 Dec 93*

[Unattributed report: "The Government Adopted the Stabilization Program for 1994"]

[Text] At yesterday's session, the Macedonian Government adopted the stabilization program for 1994, whose basic elements have been coordinated with the International Monetary Fund. This program is based on the reduction of the current yearly inflation from 233 percent to 70 percent for the next year, which is expected to be achieved with implementation of discipline in the wages and the rigorous monetary and fiscal policy of the government.

## Montenegro

### Army Said Experimenting With Cold Fusion

*AU1512103993 Podgorica MONITOR in Serbo-Croatian 3 Dec 93 pp 12,13*

[Article by Vladimir Jovanovic: "Conspiracy in a Conspiracy"]

[Text] It seems that the series of serious robberies in the so-called bodies and institutions of the "federal state" is reaching a high point. Everybody is stealing; there are very difficult cases of stealing of state property in ministerial circles around Radoje Kontic's government, but primarily in the Yugoslav Army. The situation there is simply catastrophic.

There is accumulation of wealth through selling of the property of the Yugoslav Army. The sums are extremely high. The scandals in which some of the pensioned high officers were involved, are being unveiled now, like the one in connection with General Pavle Strugar, the earlier commander of the Second Army Division. His name and the names of his closest assistants are linked with trading with Muslim and Croatian lives east of the Neretva River. The Muslims and the Croats from this region had to pay approximately 5,000 German marks per person in order to save a life. The money earned in this way enabled General Strugar to complete his house in the Montenegrin National Park of Skadar Lake. The construction material was also brought from eastern Herzegovina, from the houses of the expelled Muslim families.

**Promises**

MONITOR has already written about the possibility that the Military Court in Podgorica starts proceedings against a group of officers involved in a serious crime in connection with trading with oil, and the purchase of yachts and apartments at ridiculously low prices. The crimes that were committed and are still being committed by some Yugoslav Army officers are openly discussed also by the soldiers. The case has, however, obviously got stuck somewhere, and someone from the General Staff is holding up proceedings. It is feared that many unpleasant things could come to light that would affect many current politicians in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

This is especially evident from the response of the Yugoslav Army legal bodies, which should not—in their

scope of activities—be influenced from outside, but this is not so. In an interview for NIN in October, Ljubodrag Stojadinovic, head of the Information Division of the Yugoslav Army General Staff, only indicated how profound the problem is. He said that Colonel Ristic, head of the General Staff Legal Division, "was—to his knowledge—very close to the leader of the Serbian Radical Party."

The situation is not new. It actually started with the "Opera" scandal, when the then leaders of the Air Force and Air Defense Counterintelligence Service were illegally abused and imprisoned in private prisons established by Generals Nedeljko Boskovic and Bozidar Stevanovic. The best known of these prisons is the one in Zemun. It was urged in June 1992 to bring a legal action against the "Opera" scandal suspects, but Miladin Papic, the then district attorney of the Belgrade Military Court, refused to do it on the grounds of insufficient evidence. He and some judges were therefore dismissed by Ljubomir Domazetovic, the man in charge of the legal and personnel matters at the General Staff. A completely new generation of people took over the role of the executor of the "Opera" suspects.

Lieutenant Colonel Mile Vignjevic was elected the new judge at the Military Court. Generals Boskovic, Stevanovic and Domazetovic promised him the colonel title if everything went according to their plans. Vignjevic got the title as well as an apartment in Belgrade. He was practically won by a blackmail—he was threatened that he would be "unmasked" because he decided to release Djuro Decak until the pronounced sentence took effect. Decak did not report and he is a general at the Croatian Army now. Since Vignjevic could have paid a high price for this mistake, he joined the campaign against the "Opera" suspects, especially against Colonel Slobodan Rakocevic.... He is not the only one.

**Apartments**

Colonel Ratko Kelecevic, president of the Military Court in Belgrade, was assured by the above mentioned generals that he would get one, perhaps even two apartments in Belgrade if he managed to "unmask" Colonel Rakocevic and sentence him to a long term of imprisonment. It happened exactly like that: Colonel Kelecevic obtained two apartments in Belgrade at the moment when 20,000 Yugoslav Army officers and their families had no home at all. One of them is situated on Omladinskih Brigada Street (two-room), and the other in Vracar (three and half-room). This was explained by his need to open his private office as attorney-at-law. Kelecevic prolonged Rakocevic's pretrial confinement to the record length of seven and a half months, which is an unbelievable precedent.

Generals Boskovic, Stevanovic and Domazetovic won Colonel Milovan Belic, president of the Supreme Military Court, by promising him a general's title. Belic also obtained an apartment in Belgrade. His son got a job with the Air Force and Air Defense bodies (with General Stevanovic), but this is not the end yet. Belic's son also got a 70 square-meter apartment in Belgrade. Because of the fuss surrounding this apartment, it was put about that the son in question is a disabled veteran. The truth is that he slightly injured himself!

Belic did not give up: Although it was proven that none of the seven criminal charges against Rakocevic was substantiated, he scheduled a new hearing in court for 16 December 1993 in spite of that. Before that, during the time he was president of the appellate court (the Supreme Court), he sentenced Rakocevic to six months imprisonment because he "tapped" the people around General Stevanovic at the end of 1991. Belic also accuses Rakocevic (as well as Colonels R. Radakovic and R. Drobnjak) of alleged illegal accumulation of money from selling "Skorpion" automatic guns, although there is no evidence of this.

What are, after all, several automatic guns compared with divisions of tanks, guns and artillery weapons left behind without any record in Croatia and Bosnia. Not to mention the airplanes!

Belic scheduled a new hearing for 16 December, although his mandate as the president of the Supreme Court expires on 1 December 1993. This allows at least two conclusions: It is insisted that the legal suit against Colonel Rakocevic is in any case continued, or Colonel Ristic is afraid because of the pressure exerted by the "generals." He probably has good reason to be afraid, since he was sentenced two times already, once for "the indecency of committing crime."

**"Cold Fusion"**

On the other hand, Colonel Belic fervently opposes the beginning of the trial against a group of high-ranking Yugoslav Army officers in Podgorica, especially against General Strugar. This is a recognizable alliance, cherished by the regime. The unlucky outcast of Slobodan Milosevic's regime, Vojislav Seselj, speaks openly about all these connections, and his allegations are true in 99 percent of the cases. In a news conference on 11 November 1993, Seselj openly asked: "Why did Milosevic postpone the dismissal of General Zivota Panic? Because Panic shared the plunder with them. From the Vukovar Bank alone 7 million German marks disappeared."

Although the scandal in connection with illegal accumulation of wealth of Z. Panic and his son, the owner of the "Kentaur" Company, was disclosed in May, he remained chief of General Staff until the end of August. An established state board had the task of examining the circumstances in connection with the "Panic" scandal (it was led by the unlucky Minister Pavle Bulatovic), but it has not written a report for the public yet. If Seselj is lying, why is not he put on trial? If General Panic had stolen, why is he not he on trial...?

One of the people we spoke with says this is "a game within a game," adding that General Panic is an important man of the Serbian regime, one of the "untouchables." His name is mentioned in connection with dealing with weapons and oil through a federal foreign trade institution. This institution has in the meantime been transformed into a company that functions as a fictitious cover for everything ("Jugoimport"), about which Seselj spoke for NIN, fearing that this weekly would be prohibited after this information is published!

The journeys of General Panic to Russia and Iraq in March 1993 can be seen in this light. MONITOR wrote last month that large quantities of ammunition are entering Serbia and go on to Bosnia, and that there is also the transfer of weapons and parts for manufacturing 1000-km range missiles. It is also mentioned that technology is being imported and concentrated in the nuclear institutes in Serbia. The process of "cold fusion," which would enable to equip the missiles with nuclear warheads, is being tested.

Are there still dilemmas about where this is leading us?

**[Box, p 13]**

**Friends**

It does not have to be mentioned that Colonels Rakocevic, Radakovic and Drobnjak are being tried for stupid things. Colonel Rakocevic, who was sentenced to six months imprisonment (apart from seven and a half months spent in "illegal" confinement), did not want to comment on it for MONITOR because he was afraid that this could be used against him at the trial. He served his "sentence" for tapping, which is, in fact, his professional task. This will probably enter all the encyclopedias about intelligence services.

On the other hand, the crimes committed by Generals Stevanovic, Domazetovic, and Boskovic can best be illustrated by a simple case. Although he had already been dismissed from the position of the Intelligence Service head, General Boskovic was given an airplane from General Stevanovic on 31 May 1993 in order to have a more pleasant journey to Podgorica. Apart from Boskovic and Matanovic, the pilot, there were also three hunting rifles and two dogs on board. Boskovic went hunting at Skadar Lake, where Strugar was already waiting for him.

They are excellent friends.

## Kosovo

### Albanian Leader on Chances for Secession

*94AE0052A London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 9 Dec 93 p 18*

[Interview with Albanian leader Fehmi Agani by Jamil Rufa'il and Zahrah Baygura in Pristina: "We Will Not Give Up Option for Independence; Any Spark Could Lead to Inferno"]

[Text] Despite mounting tensions and the gravity of the situation in the majority-Albanian Kosovo region in the Republic of Serbia, this "power keg" has held fast and not exploded. Fear, however, is on the rise and threats continue; Serbian-Albanian clashes have remained violent, while hopes for a peaceful solution are still far away, and stubborn problems remain.

Since the collapse of former Yugoslavia three years ago, a Kosovo political group called the Democratic League has risen to prominence, leading a movement of Albanians seeking independence. It conducted a general referendum, in which a majority of participants declared their choice for a republic and independence. In June, 1992, Dr. Ibrahim Rugova was elected President of the Republic of Kosovo. The Serbs, however, do not recognize all these Albanan measures, and, seeing them as illegitimate, thought it their right to put a stop to them by all means available to them, ignoring the Albanian majority in the region: with nearly two million residents, they comprise 85 percent of the population.

**The Democratic League**

AL-HAYAH met with Deputy Chairman of the Democratic League in Kosovo, and its official spokesman, Dr. Fehmi Agani, a professor in the College of Philosophy in the regional capital, Pristina, to address the truth of what is happening in the region. First of all, I asked him about the role of the Democratic League on the political scene.

Dr. Agani answered, "When this league was formed three years ago as the first Albanian political party in Kosovo (though membership is open to non-Albanians), broad sectors of the Albanian populace joined it to express a political direction more than the desire for partisan action and struggle. The organization has remained the one most oriented toward the masses, despite the appearance of other political parties. The number of names officially on its party membership rolls now exceeds 200,000, and this trust has grown out of its principles, which represent a national, democratic, patriotic Albanian movement, and a political power with a clear direction. Its goal is to resist Serbian rule in Kosovo, without resorting to arms, to achieve its aim of an independent Kosovo republic by peaceful means."

[AL-HAYAH] You have said that the Democratic League is open to non-Albanian citizens. Are there any Serb members?

[Agani] When it was first formed, a considerable number of Serbs joined, but they withdrew later as the result of intense pressure from Serb nationalists. Of course the other reason for the Serbs' leaving the League was the slogan "Independent Kosovo" despite the fact that the Republic of Kosovo belongs to all its citizens.

[AL-HAYAH] What is the extent of your control of public affairs in Kosovo in light of current conditions?

[Agani] With the proclamation if the Serb republic's new constitution four years ago, Kosovo was wholly annexed

to it. The Serbian authorities annulled all existing legitimate institutions on the basis of autonomous rule, chiefly the parliament and the government. It forcibly created an alien government in the region. The area's authority and powers were moved to Belgrade or transferred to the Serbs in Kosovo. The Albanians did not accept the status quo, and the parliament and government went off to act in temporary exile. The Albanian leadership organized a general referendum to explore the people's opinion on its right to self-determination, and to choose independence and sovereignty. Legislative and presidential elections were held, though members of the new parliament who had been elected more than 17 months before were unable to meet due to the oppression of the Serbian authorities. This, however, was no obstacle to the Albanian political struggle. The parties, as part of the mass movement for national liberation, continued to act as usual. Led by Dr. Bujar Bukashi, the government continued to work with its auxiliary agencies abroad, while the presidential institutions worked at home under Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, who had been elected in a general election.

[AL-HAYAH] What is the role of the other Albanian parties?

[Agani] Twenty-two parties and political blocs took part in the legislative elections last year, to the Democratic League, but only four of them won seats in Parliament. I believe the reason for that was their failure to define their political specifics for the citizens, despite the fact that they all agree on the issue of national liberation and the effects of oppression and racial discrimination against Albanians. The Serbian parties and a few groups loyal to Belgrade boycotted our elections.

[AL-HAYAH] But there are groups loyal to the Albanian cause, though they are in sharp conflict with your course. For example, the well-known academician Rexhep Qosja who have strongly criticized Dr. Rugova's program.

[Agani] Rexhep Qosja represents the concept of Albanian national unity and the unity of all territories in which Albanians live. No Albanian is against this solution, but achieving it is very difficult, and most of the Serbs are against it. That means that achieving it by peaceful means is impossible, and is incompatible with the peaceful course chosen by the Democratic League, which is more suited to the "independent Kosovo" solution. This does not mean that other legitimate parties are for violence and war. They all intend to achieve their aims peacefully, despite the radicalism of their programs, because the radicalism on the ground is disproportionate to the goal and the means needed to achieve that goal.

**Attacks and Arrests**

[AL-HAYAH] There are reports of the existence of Albanian groups calling for armed struggle. Are they true?

[Agani] Leaflets were recently distributed in the name of a "National Liberation Front" calling for the use of force to end the Serb republic's control over the Republic of Kosovo. There is no information about this front. It is no secret that any faction, even any person, could have printed these leaflets and left them in the streets. Even if this front actually existed, it could not undertake effective action alone under current conditions.

[AL-HAYAH] The authorities have increased armed attacks on security people in Kosovo. What is your response?

[Agani] Before the arrest and unmasking of the perpetrator, there can be no certainty that the perpetrators of the attack are Albanians. Despite the continuation of these attacks, the Serb authorities have not prosecuted anyone or proved the charges so far. It is not unthinkable that it could be a Serbian faction that is behind some of these incidents or even all of them, in order to justify their acts of repression. For our part, we have asserted in a Democratic League statement, distributed by its media center, that we are for a peaceful course. This clarification was to prove our innocence of any connection to these incidents.

[AL-HAYAH] The authorities have said that they have arrested persons from a secret ministry of the party in Kosovo.

[Agani] The government of the Republic of Kosovo working abroad has limited members due to circumstances. It is comprised of a president of the ministry, his deputy, ministers of education, finance, health, and the media. The officials working in them are not ministers, but they do their work in foreign affairs and liaison affairs. Their are no ministries for an army, defense, the interior, or security. I can state, in the name of President Ibrahim Rugova as well, that we have no aim of engaging in an armed uprising, though self-defense is the right of every people. It is no secret that the state has armed the Serbs in Kosovo, or that the Democratic League of Kosovo has not armed the Albanians, though it does not deny any person the right of self-defense.

[AL-HAYAH] what is the effect of international monitoring on the situation in Kosovo?

[Agani] There were observers from the European Conference on Security and Cooperation, but their Serbian authorities refused to renew their residence on the pretext of protesting the freezing of Yugoslavia's membership (the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro) in the Conference. The real reason, however, was the Serbs' dodging outside monitoring of Kosovo and hiding its repression from the world's eyes.

[AL-HAYAH] Have you thought of securing the minimum Albanian national interests now that it is clear that Kosovo's independence does not enjoy the support of the international community?

[Agani] The Kosovo region has set out on the road to independence, whatever the cost—that is what we do not know. But the final outcome must be independence, and this will remain the goal of the parties and the Albanians in Kosovo. We know that the international community is trying, for practical reasons, not principled ones, to find a solution in the framework of the Yugoslavia that exists or will exist. This ignores the bloodshed and spread of the struggle. But the international community is the last to grasp primarily the reasons for Serbia's extremist positions and racial discrimination, which do not even allow the education of Albanians, that a solution within the framework of Yugoslavia is not even possible any more. Under the conditions that prevail, our choice for independence does not conflict step by step with the course. We have proposed that Kosovo be put temporarily under the protection of the United Nations, with the supervision of NATO and European Community (European Union) troops. Or, any other temporary solution offered in Bosnia-Herzegovina or any other place could be applied in Kosovo.

[AL-HAYAH] Do you really believe the Serbs will relent and give up Kosovo?

[Agani] They have no other course, because they are unable to keep Kosovo forever, because that would be a burden bringing upon them the most terrible trouble, which they could not endure in the long run.

**Positions**

[AL-HAYAH] How do you assess international positions?

[Agani] We can see that Albanian demands are winning increasing understanding and support in general. The members of the European community individually and the United States have shown great concern and are concentrating their action now on the human and national rights of the Albanians. I have the personal impression that understanding and support for our cause are constantly growing, for two reasons. First, out of respect for the Albanians' peaceful stand, and secondly due to Serbian extremism and the Serb republic's refusal to renounce it.

[AL-HAYAH] And the Islamic countries?

[Agani] So far they have expressed only sympathy. From a distance, of course.

[AL-HAYAH] And Serbian citizens?

[Agani] I really do wonder often about the extent of the knowledge, on the part of the Serb republic's citizens, of the oppression their government is visiting upon the Albanians of Kosovo. I am perplexed by that. A few days ago 41 Serbian intellectuals, among them the head of the Democratic Party, Dr. Dragoljub Micunovic, and his deputy Zoran Djindjic, sent a letter to U.S. President Bill Clinton in which they rejected reports indicating the existence of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. Among the signatories of the letter were a number of members of the Serb parliament, which was dissolved a few days ago, and which had made a resolution demanding the settling of Serbs in Kosovo. The aim was clear: to change the structure of the population. Of course settlement is going on, especially the thousands of refugees from Bosnia and Croatia. This will force large numbers of Albanians to emigrate abroad, in addition to the 250,000 Albanians who have fled Kosovo in the last three years.

**The Education Problem**

[AL-HAYAH] As head of the Albanian delegation to the education talks with the Serbs now going on in the framework of the Geneva talks dealing with former Yugoslavia, have you made any progress?

[Agani] As is well known, the Serbian authorities have imposed a ban on the teaching of the Albanian language in high schools and the university, on the pretext that they were using study materials not in conformity with the Serbian curricula. This left nearly 60,000 high school students and 20,000 college students without continuity in their studies. We were compelled to move these schools and colleges into the private homes that had not been raided by units of the Internal Security. We have been talking about this subject with the Serbs for more than a year, but no actual progress has been made. It has become clear to us that the Serbian purpose is to exploit the closing of the schools to pressure the Albanians to accept the Serb state and its authority in Kosovo. This is why we are continuing to talk without any expectation of a quick solution to the problem.

[AL-HAYAH] Soon there will be early legislative elections in the Republic of Serbia. Have you adopted a position on them?

[Agani] As is well known, Milosevic dissolved the parliament and set a date for new elections. With his arrogant personality, he could not stand the existence of parliamentarians opposing him. Our decision is that we will not take part in these elections. We boycotted three Serbian legislative rounds in the past. We have no conditions for participation, because we are expressing the principled position of the Albanian people, which is that since the Albanians have proclaimed their independent republic, the Serb republic is no longer their country. And so if they took part in the elections of another country, they would nullify the decision for independence that they made in a public referendum, thus giving legitimacy to their existence in the Serbian state. Plus the fact that the resolution made by referendum can be changed only by another referendum.

[AL-HAYAH] But we have seen the emergence of figures known for their nationalist Albanian positions, who have called for participation in the Serbian elections.

[Agani] The few opinions that have supported participation in the Serbian elections by nominating Albanians with nationalist views, but changed their party alignment, appear to think—based on their statements—that

an Albanian presence in parliament would lead to the widespread circulation of Albanian positions, and would help to consolidate Serbian democracy. However, all the Albanian parties opposed these opinions and decided to respect and support the boycott resolution, in support of the referendum. These elections are an internal affair for the Republic of Serbia and its citizens. It concerns only them. At the same time, they have nothing to do with Kosovo.

[AL-HAYAH] What is the volume of foreign aid to the Albanians of Kosovo?

[Agani] Several countries have helped us with humanitarian aid, especially the United States, which gave us $9 million to handle the worsening conditions of the Kosovo Albanians resulting from the international sanctions, and the general plunder which the Serbian authorities have perpetrated on the region's economy. We agreed with the United States on a mode for distributing its aid directly among those who need it, to save it from being taken by the Serbs.

[AL-HAYAH] What is your position on the accusation of the Republic of Macedonia's authorities, that the Albanians have formed paramilitary organizations in preparation for a rebellion?

[Agani] It is well known that the Albanians of Macedonia cooperate with the local authorities to the greatest extent. They have 30 seats in the parliament and five ministers in the government. These accusations and arrests were a blow to this cooperation. It is not unthinkable that extremist internal and Serbian forces plotted this attack, which resembles current practices in Kosovo, especially with the Serb republic having engaged for some time in a media campaign aimed at the alleged Albanian danger in Macedonia. We hope that the Macedonian authorities are aware of their actions, and wary of defaming Albanians and opening a front with them. [They should] comply with their legitimate demands and deal with them as the equals of the Macedonians and others in rights and duties, especially as they are, in any case, 30 percent of the total population.

[AL-HAYAH] And your assessment of recent Greek moves?

[Agani] We prefer, and hope, that Greece will stay out of the campaign being waged against the Albanians and not get mixed up in any alignment that could lead to the spreading of the conflict in the Balkans.

**Albania and Serbia**

[AL-HAYAH] What is your assessment of the current situation in Albania?

[Agani] Albania has had significant successes internally in the fields of democracy and the economy. It has opened up to the world and worked with it successfully. It receives international aid, which is very important, not only for Albania but for Albanians outside its borders, and public relations in the Balkans.

[AL-HAYAH] What is your position on the recent visit to Belgrade of the delegation from Albania's Democratic Alliance?

[Agani] This party is currently in the ranks of the opposition, and has no effect on political decision making. In any case, we see the visit as harmful to us. It is up to those who went to Belgrade to think over the reason Belgrade opened its doors to them at a time when they do not have the opportunity to visit Pristina to talk with their own people.

[AL-HAYAH] What is your position on Albanian President Sali Berisha's call, a few days ago, for Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic to hold a dialogue with the real leaders of Kosovo's Albanians, chiefly Ibrahim Rugova?

[Agani] We have always supported dialogue and a peaceful solution to the Kosovo question. Naturally President Berisha knows that there is no chance for any lasting solution without negotiation with the true leaders who enjoy the trust and support of the Albanians. But it appears that the Serbs want to use people who lack mass support, such as Basri Plana and others, to talk to them and exploit them in local and international propaganda. Meanwhile, the Albanians get nothing, which means that the Serbs still refuse to acknowledge the truth.

[AL-HAYAH] As far as you are concerned, are you capable of conducting a dialogue with the Serbian government?

[Agani] There can only be a successful dialogue if there are no conditions, and with mutual respect and good faith. Of course, dialogue with the present Serbian regime is very difficult, even impossible, because the way in which the dialogue is set out does nothing to encourage the obtaining of a positive outcome.

[AL-HAYAH] Can the situation change if the government of the Republic of Serbia changes?

[Agani] It does not appear that this government will change soon, plus the fact that the opposition parties' positions on the Kosovo question do not offer us much hope either.

[AL-HAYAH] Is it possible to reach a compromise, such as having Kosovo remain a republic within the federal Yugoslav framework with the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro?

[Agani] This solution would be hard for us to accept, because our bad experience with the Serbs has made us distrust any link with them.

[AL-HAYAH] Why do you reject linking the Kosovo problem with the issue of the Serbs of Krajina in the Republic of Croatia?

[Agani] Kosovo cannot be compared to Krajina, which was a wholly assimilated part of the Republic of Croatia throughout the past Yugoslav era. Kosovo, on the other hand, was a federal unit with its own parliament, government, and representatives who were on equal footing with those of the other Yugoslav federal units, which means that Kosovo should receive equal treatment with the other internal units of the federation that decided their fates, not with the fragments of units which never had any federal or special status.

[AL-HAYAH] And the end?

[Agani] In spite of all our thinking and hoping to keep peace, I think it is impossible for Kosovo to remain in the current state of affairs for the long term. Any spark could lead to an inferno. We still seek a peaceful and speedy solution. If that does not happen, I do not have the stomach to predict events.